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ABSTRACT
Value-Driven Design is a paradigm that argues that the goal of the engineering design
process is to create a system with maximum value. However, the design of large, complex
systems undoubtedly requires the efforts of many individuals, and it is naive to think these
individuals will act to maximize value if their own values are not maximized along the
way. This research focuses on building the foundational knowledge for incentivizing the
many individuals in large system design to make design decisions toward maximizing
system value. Specifically, this dissertation uses the mathematical framework of normative
decision making to formulate and evaluate incentives.
We formulate two promising incentive structures: the Piece Rate–where a marginal
increase in system value yields a marginal increase in reward an individual will receive–
and the Variable Ratio–where a marginal increase in system value yields a marginal in-
crease in the probability of a reward to the individual. These incentive structures are eval-
uated twofold: (1) by how well they motivate an engineer to provide effort to search for
an optimal design solution and (2) by how well they motivate an engineer to collaborate
with other engineers to yield an optimal system design solution. We derive mathematical
models of effort and collaboration provision for incentive evaluation.
Mathematical analysis suggests that which incentive structure motivates greater search
effort or collaboration is contextual. The effectiveness of one incentive over the other for
effort provision is dependent, in part, on the risk preferences of the engineer. The effec-
tiveness of one incentive over the other for collaboration provision is dependent, in part,
on how the incentive structures are scaled with respect to the feasible system alternative
space. Therefore, the analysis in this dissertation suggests that the greater information a
system-level manager has over the people in the design process and the general character-
ii
istics of the system design alternative space, the greater her ability for choose between the
Piece Rate and Variable Ratio incentive structures to induce search effort and collaboration
to maximize system value.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Overview
The research presented in this dissertation is all about building the foundational
knowledge for incentiving human design decision makers in the Value-Driven Design
systems engineering paradigm. Value-Driven Design (VDD), in its most broad charac-
terization, is the philosophy that systems engineering is a purposeful activity, and that
purpose is to maximize system value. Therefore, all decisions should be made on the
basis of a singular notion of system value, according to VDD. The knowledge needed for
large, complex systems design often precludes a single decision maker from making all
decisions, and thus decisions are delegated to domain experts who may not know how
to affect system value or have differing ideas of what system value is [10]. Therefore,
properly formulated incentives intuitively motivate decision makers to act in a way as to
maximize system value.
The research in this dissertation is rooted in mathematical analysis. More specifi-
cally, this research uses Game Theory as a mathematical framework for interactions be-
tween decision makers, such as the interaction between a system-level manager or stake-
holder) and domain experts or subsystem-level designers or the interaction between mul-
tiple subsystem-level designers. Optimization and decision theories are used to analyze
the local decisions a system-level manager and subsystem-level designers face. By inves-
tigating such interactions with mathematical rigor, this dissertation lays the foundation for
Value-Driven Delegated Design (VD3), a conceptual framework for system design which
many decision makers. The remainder of this chapter provides more detailed motivation
to the research by identifying gaps in the current VDD and systems engineering literature,
then presents the specific issues this research addresses.
1
1.2 Motivation
The nature of large, complex systems design often precludes a single decision maker
from making all decisions. Consider the following posits Grady formulates for the design
of complex engineered systems [10]:
1. The requisite knowledge base to design a complex engineered system is far larger
than any one individual’s maximum knowledge capacity.
2. The design of complex engineered systems involves difficult problems that must be
decomposed into a set of smaller problems.
3. Individual designers working on a small piece of a larger design problem must un-
derstand how their decisions influence the larger system.
The first posit describes a need for many designers with specialized knowledge such that
the sum of this knowledge includes the requisite knowledge base for system design. The
second posit describes the need to simplify system design problems and is driven by the
first posit, i.e. the limitations of an individual’s knowledge capacity preclude solving dif-
ficult problems. The solutions to the smaller, decomposed problems must be stitched to-
gether to form solutions to the more difficult problems. The third posit describes the need
for design guidance–e.g. requirements, targets, or objectives–for designers when solving
decomposed problems; without design guidance, designers have no way of knowing the
quality of their solutions in the context of the greater system. Grady’s posits paint a picture
of the system design environment as filled with many designers with their own–perhaps
hidden from other designers–knowledge making decisions related to their delegated sub-
problems. Indeed, engineers today solve large, complex system design problems by de-
composing them into smaller, more tractable problems and delegate these problem to the
appropriate domain experts to solve [10–12].
2
1.2.1 Delegation with Requirements
Delegation in classical systems engineering (SE) models–including the V-Model,
Waterfall Model, Spiral Model, and NASA Systems Engineering Engine–is driven through
requirements flow-down [11, 12]. Engineers at higher levels of system abstraction craft
requirements from stakeholder needs to be given to engineers at lower levels of system ab-
straction as a means of conveying desirable design characteristics. The Quality Functional
Deployment (QFD) serves as an example approach for decomposing higher-level require-
ments into requirements for specific functions or subsystems of a system [1, 13, 14]; see
Fig. 1.1. As exemplified by Fig. 1.1, the ultimate source of system, subsystem, and part
requirements and specifications is stakeholder or customer needs. Therefore, low-level
requirements are ideally derived such that meeting these low-level requirements satisfies
stakeholder needs.
Systems engineering handbooks exemplifying best-practices prescribe that require-
ments must be feasible and verifiable, and should be codified into statements that abide by
the following structure: [(sub)system of interest] shall [design target or threshold] [15–18].
The following is an example of a well-written (performance) requirement statement as-
suming it is feasible and verifiable: the hydraulic pump shall be at least 95% power effi-
cient. Additionally, a requirement statement should only pertain to a single (sub)system
of interest and list only one design criterion. For example, a single requirement statement
should not address both a hydraulic pump’s efficiency and weight, but rather one require-
ment statement should address the pump’s efficiency while a separate statement addresses
the pump’s weight. Due to the prescriptive independence of requirement statements, engi-
neers are effectively given a set of constraints that define an orthogonal space from which
to find a design solution, see Fig. 1.2.
Given their binary nature, however, requirements themselves do not promote ex-
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Figure 1.1: Notional representation of using cascading QFDs to define subsystem require-
ment targets (adapted from Takai and Ishii [1]).
ceeding requirements and do not convey system-level trade-off preferences. For example,
a requirement that states the hydraulic pump shall be at least 95% power efficient assigns
the same value to a pump that is 99% efficient and one that is 95% efficient; an engineer
must draw upon outside factors to decide between the two. Adding another requirement
that states the hydraulic pump shall weigh at most 5 kg means a pump that is 99% efficient
and weighs 5 kg has the same value as a pump that is 95% efficient and weighs 3 kg; again,
an engineer must drawn upon outside factors to differentiate between the two alternatives.
In the case of balancing multiple requirements, an outside factor may be some notion of
importance assigned to individual requirements–cf. target importance in Fig. 1.1–which
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may help in a case where not all requirements can be met so focus is given to the most
important ones. There are many techniques for prioritizing requirements–see [19–23]–but
it is unclear if prioritization or setting importances encourage engineers to improve upon
a design that meets requirements.
Ball et al. performed a study on how electrical engineers solve an integrated-circuit
design problem and note the engineers in their study stop once they satisfy their design
requirements seemingly because the effort to improve upon a design that meets require-
ments goes uncompensated [24]. Ball et al. attribute this behavior to a satisficing approach
to searching for a design solution [25]. Satisficing behavior is where an individual finds
a solution that is "good enough" to their particular problem [26]. Requirements arguably
define what "good enough" means for the engineer, and prior research recognizes that sat-
isficing behavior impacts the quality of design solutions [24,25,27–31]. Ball et al. suggest
that the observed satisficing behavior is due to the engineers balancing what is expected,
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i.e. to meet requirements, with the effort cost of searching for a design solution [24].
Therefore, effort costs could be an outside factor that impacts how an engineer would
navigate a design space defined by requirements.
1.2.2 Delegation with Objective Functions
Participants from industry and academia of a series of NSF and NASA sponsored
workshops recognized the limitations of the current SE practice of requirements-driven
delegation and sought to establish the foundation for a theory of SE that is as rigorous and
tractable as control theory or thermodynamics [32–34]. These workshops identified Value-
Driven Design (VDD) as a viable alternative to current SE practice. The VDD paradigm
draws inspiration from optimization, decision theory, and economics to solve systems en-
gineering problems. In particular, decision theory and economics are used to formulate
a central, system value function, and optimization algorithms are viewed as analogies for
how we can find solutions to maximize system value [35]. Hazelrigg’s Decision-Based De-
sign (DBD) framework shown in Fig. 1.3 is synonymous with VDD in the case where an
engineering firm’s utility reflects maximizing profits [2]. In Fig. 1.3, we see the influence
of decision theory with a utility function U that represents risk attitudes toward uncertain-
ties, of economics in considering costs, revenue, and demand, and of optimization with
searching for system designs to maximize the expected utility. Since VDD hinges on a
central idea of value or utility, the majority of current VDD research is on formulating
central value models including techniques to formulate product demand models [36–39],
value modeling of commercial and government systems [40–44], and defining appropriate
figures of merit for large systems [3, 9, 45, 46].
The research in this dissertation goes beyond the majority of current VDD research
by examining delegation in the VDD paradigm, which will be referred to as Value-Driven
Delegated Design (VD3) herein. Owing to VDD’s analogies in optimization, proponents
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Figure 1.3: Hazelrigg’s Decision-Based Design framework [2].
of VDD hypothesize that flowing down design guidance in the form of objective functions
for subsystem designers to optimize better supports system value maximization over the
use of binary requirements [47]. Effectively using decentralized multidisciplinary design
optimization (MDO) as inspiration for such a hypothesis, flowing down objective functions
rather than requirements (1) actively promotes finding optimal design solutions as opposed
to solutions that merely satisfy a set of constraints and (2) explicitly conveys trade-off
preferences [48]. Returning to the example in the previous section, an engineer would
choose between a hydraulic pump with 99% efficiency and weighs 5 kg and a pump with
95% efficiency and weighs 3 kg by ranking them with an objective function that takes
efficiency and weight as inputs and choosing the highest ranked pump; see Fig. 1.4.
It is not clear how to formulate subsystem objectives to best support VDD. Col-
lopy is arguably the first to propose a method specifically for distributed objective-based
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Figure 1.4: Feasible space of pump designs intersecting with system value to yield an
optimal pump.
delegation in VDD, wherein objective functions are formulated using a first-order Taylor
series expansion of the central value function about an initial design point [49]. However,
he seemingly considers only a deterministic environment in judging its merits and does not
compare his approach to other methods, e.g. requirements. More on Collopy’s method is
discussed in Section 3.3.4. Taylor compares Collopy’s method against a distance-to-target
minimization approach, cf. Taguchi loss function, in a two-level vehicle design compu-
tational example with uncertainty [4]. He finds that a target-seeking approach produces a
higher mean system value than Collopy’s method but notes that generalization of this result
is dubious as he posits changing the characteristics of his example problem might change
the results as well. More on the target-seeking formulation is in Section 3.3.4. Benchmark-
ing and comparing distributed optimization problem formulations remain open issues in
the MDO community at large [47, 48, 50].
Complicating the issue of judging the effectiveness of objective-based delegation is
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the impact of the human engineer. Consider again the idea of satisficing discussed in the
previous section on delegation with requirements. In optimization practice, we often use
convergence criteria to determine when a solution is "good enough", arguably because an
incremental step beyond the convergence criteria does not compensate for the cost of the
step itself. When dealing with an objective, it is unclear how engineers would balance
what is expected, i.e. optimize their delegated objective, with their costs to do so.
Additionally, many MDO architectures require information sharing among the sub-
systems. For example, the Concurrent Subspace Optimization (CSSO) architecture re-
quires each subsystem problem to incorporate a constraint built using a surrogate model
of other subsystem analysis functions [50]. A basic formulation of a subsystem design
problem (subscript 1) that is coupled to another subsystem design problem (subscript 2) in
CSSO is the following:
maximize
x
f1(g1(x), y˜2)
subject to y˜2 = g˜2(x)
(1.1)
where f1(·) is subsystem 1’s objective function, g1(·) is subsystem 1’s analysis func-
tion, and g˜2(·) is a surrogate model of subsystem 2’s analysis function. In an empirical
study on collaboration between student design teams, Austin-Breneman et al. provide
student design teams with a tool to communicate gradient information so that effectively
y˜2 =
dg2
dx
|x∗(x− x∗), where x∗ is some current or fixed design. They note that even when
given tools to aid in collaboration, student subsystem designers working toward a satellite
design focused on designing their individual subsystems without much collaborative com-
munication with other subsystem teams [51]. Therefore, collaboration cannot be taken
for granted, which may impact the effectiveness of using MDO architectures that require
communicating model information–as with CSSO in Eq. 1.1–for coordinating engineers
in VD3.
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1.2.3 Summary of Open Issues in Design Delegation
Although explicitly considering system value and using processes that maximize it is
arguably a good way to conduct systems engineering, the VDD community recognizes that
it is unclear whether communicating design guidance with objective functions is superior
to using requirements [32]. Lack of clarity on this issue stems from the following:
• It is unclear how to formulate requirements and objectives so their merits can be
compared in the VDD framework.
• As the system design process is largely human-driven, it is unclear how the agency
of human engineers impacts the effectiveness of flow-down approaches.
Pertaining to the first issue, it is conceivable that an optimally formulated requirement
could support system value maximization better than a poorly formulated objective, and
vice versa. Therefore, formulation is imperative to comparison. Pertaining to the second
issue, agency refers to a human’s ability or capacity to make his own decisions [6]. From
the previous discussion, we see that an engineer’s capacity to satisfice or choose whether
to collaborate or not can impact final design solutions, and it is conceivable that different
delegation approaches interact with agency differently.
1.3 Research Objectives
As inferred from the previous section, the motivating research question for this re-
search is how should we conduct design delegation that is consistent with system value
maximization? This is question is sufficiently large and complex that this dissertation has
no hope of outright answering it. However, we identified two issues that by addressing,
we can take a step toward answering the motivating question. These issues are concerned
with (1) formulation and (2) comparative evaluation of delegation modes–i.e. requirement
delegation or objective function delegation. The primary objective of this dissertation is to
10
address these two issues using mathematical analyses as to set the foundation for Value-
Driven Delegated Design (VD3).
1.3.1 Research Context
In discussions on the open issues with design delegation, many researchers speak
in terms of incentives [32, 33, 52–57]. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, an
incentive is "something that encourages a person to do something" [58]. At the very least,
the use of "incentive" fulfills the need for a term that refers to design guidance elements
with the expectations or goals that accompany it. For example, a requirement statement is
accompanied with the expectation that an engineer will find a design that satisfies the re-
quirement statement; we can call this a requirement-based incentive to differentiate it from
an objective-based incentive–i.e. an objective function with the expectation of optimizing
it. Alternatively, the term incentive can refer to literal incentives that managers formulate
to motivate engineers to do something in the best interest of the manager. We know that
incentives can influence the system engineering process. The Columbia Accident Inves-
tigation Board reports that Space Shuttle program managers were heavily incentivized by
Congress to minimize schedule slippage, which led to an undue reduced concern on the
safety implications of debris impacts on heat shield tiles; the Space Shuttle Columbia dis-
integrated on reentry in 2003 due to damage to its wing’s heat shield [59]. This dissertation
will continue the use of the incentive terminology such that the objectives in this research
are concerned with incentive formulation and evaluation. This decision is made mostly to
keep consistent terminology with prior discussions on design delegation and to differen-
tiate the incentive element, which is controllable by a manager or system-level engineer,
from other elements, such as those pertaining to preference structures.
Bell et al. categorize decision-making research into three categories [60]:
• Normative Research: How rational decision makers should make decisions
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• Descriptive Research: How real decision makers actually make decisions
• Prescriptive Research: How real decision makers can make decisions more ratio-
nally
This dissertation lies more in the normative research category in that conclusions are made
from mathematical analyses based on rational decision making; the axioms of rational de-
cision making used in this dissertation are described in Chapter 2. However, this disserta-
tion incorporates descriptive research for building preference models of decision-making
agents, whom adhere to axioms of rationality, therefore leveraging both the mathematical
power of normative research and human representativeness power of descriptive research.
While the models in this dissertation derived from descriptive research may not be perfect
representations of human behavior, incorporating them brings us a step closer to under-
standing the merits of an incentive structure in the hands of a human engineer. Further-
more, the results of the normative analyses in this dissertation speak to prescriptions for
actual system design by identifying promising delegation structures, and the incentives
formulated in this dissertation can conceivably be deployed in systems design practice.
However, this dissertation is concerned with establishing foundational knowledge for del-
egation and less so on implementation, so operationalizing the incentive structures, for
example, is left for future work. Focusing on the foundations of effective delegation al-
lows us to identify promising ways to conduct design delegation, which can be further
scrutinized for implementation in future work.
1.3.2 Research Issue 1: Incentive Formulation
The first objective of this research is to formulate effective incentives such that max-
imizing an engineer’s incentive maximizes system value. To do so, four basic incentive
structure categories from the literature are investigated and related to prior requirement-
based or objective-based delegation approaches. These incentive structure categories are
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the following [61]:
• Flat Rate: the engineer gets a constant "reward" no matter what the final subsystem
performance is.
• Quota: the engineer gets a bonus "reward" if a certain performance threshold is met,
and is obviously related to using requirements.
• Variable Ratio: the engineer gets a bonus "reward" with some probability that is
based performance.
• Piece Rate: the engineer gets a marginal increase in "reward" with a marginal in-
crease in performance, and is obviously related to using objectives.
There are many possible formulations of the incentive structures listed above, e.g. two
incentive structures can be Piece Rate but use different performance metrics, so these
incentive structure types are used as the scaffolding for formulating incentives specifically
for VD3.
Our toolbox for resolving the first objective is the mathematical framework for ratio-
nal decision theory, which also forms the theoretical power for VDD. Prior approaches to
formulating these types of incentives, such as methods to elicit requirements and Collopy’s
method of constructing objective functions, are critiqued against normative decision the-
ory. By examining incentive formulation from a decision-theoretic perspective, we have
a single framework for formulating and comparing the merits of requirement-like and ob-
jective function-like incentives. Ultimately, two promising incentive formulations specific
to VD3 are proposed: a Variable Ratio structure formulation inspired by normative re-
quirement elicitation and a Piece Ratio structure formulation inspired by normative utility
maximization.
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1.3.3 Research Issue 2: Incentive Evaluation
The second objective of this research is to compare how each of the two promising
incentive structures contribute to overall system value when these incentives form just a
single element of a engineer’s decision model, other elements considered are risk attitude
and the personal action costs needed to maximize the incentive. By explicitly consider-
ing action costs, this work is differentiated from any prior notions that engineers can be
modeled as perfect computational agent that will solve any problem they are given in an
optimal manner according to some observer.
First, we consider the costs of searching for design solutions. Searching for a design
solution requires time and effort on the part of a subsystem designer (SUB), and a SUB
may determine a particular solution is "good enough" if searching for a better solution is
too costly for him. This idea of balancing reward with the cost of obtaining that reward
is an explanation for perceived satisficing behavior, wherein a decision maker seemingly
chooses an alternative that is satisfactory rather than optimal [26]. Prior empirical work
on solving design problems and modeling risk attitude inform a model for an engineer’s
effort provision. An abstract computational study using this model suggests conditions–
e.g. certain risk attitude or effort cost characteristics–where one incentive may induce
greater effort than the other, and another computational study representing an engineer
searching for a transmission design for a vehicle verifies results of the abstract study.
Next, we consider a subsystem engineer’s costs from collaborating with other sub-
system engineers to maximize system value. Intuitively, system value benefits from engi-
neers collaborating and sharing information with each other, and some MDO architectures
rely on sharing non-point-based information, e.g. analysis model approximations, among
the various subsystem design problems. However, creating communicable forms of this
information–e.g. in reports, models, or slide decks–is arguably costly for an engineer. The
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study by Austin-Breneman et al. shows there can be some aversion or preference toward
not collaborating with other teams [51]. A model of collaboration between two subsys-
tem designers is formulated, and the incentive structures are compared by how well they
induce a normative outcome–i.e. a Nash equilibrium–where both designers collaborate
for different levels of collaboration cost. The collaboration provision model is analyzed
computationally in two scenarios that have different characteristics, and this computa-
tional study suggests conditions–e.g. certain collaboration cost or problem formulation
characteristics–where one incentive normatively induces collaboration and the other does
not.
1.3.4 Summary of Research Objectives
First and foremost, this research aims to either support or counter the general VDD
hypothesis that communicating with objective function, or more broadly: models, is supe-
rior to communicating with requirements when considering system value maximization.
Additionally, the work in this dissertation aims to establish the foundations for a formal
Value-Driven Delegated Design framework. By doing so, the research in this dissertation
contributes to systems engineering research methodology by demonstrating the fusion of
normative and descriptive research approaches to yield promising prescriptions. The in-
centives formulated in this dissertation and the studies evaluating them are related to cur-
rent MDO architectures and their appropriateness for acting as blueprints for a formal VD3
framework. Ultimately, this dissertation generates new hypotheses related to VD3 to set
the path for future work.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
Beyond this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of five chapter. Chapter
2 lays out the mathematical theories that act as our tool box. To introduce these theories,
they are summarized in the context of their relevance to VDD, and therefore, Chapter 2
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acts as a theoretical journey to the formulation of the VDD philosophy for readers not fa-
miliar with VDD. Chapter 3 is all about formulating incentive structures by examining the
intersection of rational decision theory with commonly used incentive structures. Chapters
4 and 5 are all about evaluating the promising incentives formulated in Chapter 3 when
engineers have action costs. Chapter 4 investigates incentive effectiveness toward search-
ing for design solutions when an engineer values his effort toward searching for a design
solution. Chapter 5 investigates incentive effectiveness toward collaboration when col-
laboration among engineers is costly. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by revisiting
the three research questions listed above and discussing the status of their associated hy-
potheses given the analysis in this document. Additionally, Chapter 6 lists the contributes
of this dissertation and its implications toward a formalized framework for Value-Driven
Delegated Design (VD3).
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR VALUE-DRIVEN DESIGN
2.1 Introduction to the Chapter
This chapter introduces the normative theories used throughout this research and
how they apply to engineering design decision making. As we walk through the chapter,
results from the major normative theories are reviewed and will act as road signs for guid-
ing us to how we should think about decision making for designing complex engineered
systems. As Value-Driven Design (VDD) is formulated on the basis of mathematical theo-
ries pertaining to decision making, we must be cognizant of these theories as to not under-
mine the foundations of VDD in the analysis presented throughout this research. Section
2.2 reviews the theories for individual rational decision making. Next, Sec. 2.3 reviews
theories for cases where we have multiple, rational decision makers that make decisions
that can affect each other.
2.2 Rational Decision Making
2.2.1 Axiomatic Foundation
Decision making is often considered a fundamental activity in engineering design,
and thus engineering decision makers need a means to make effective decisions. Norma-
tive decision-making research investigates how decision makers should make consistent,
rational decisions. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) provide a set of axioms that
define necessary conditions for rational decision making [62]; these axioms are defined
below. The axioms are defined in terms of lotteries, which simply consist of a set of de-
cision outcomes z = {z1, . . . , zm} and their probability of occurrence φ = {φ1, . . . , φm}
such that lottery L = 〈φ1, z1, . . . , φm, zm〉. A lottery can be thought of as the result of
choosing a particular decision alternative.
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Axiom 1. (Completeness) For any two lotteries L1 and L2, either L1  L2, L1 ≺ L2, or
L1 ∼ L2.
Axiom 2. (Transitivity) If L1 - L2 and L2 - L3, then L1 - L3.
Axiom 3. (Continuity) If L1 - L2 - L3, then there exists a probability φ ∈ [0, 1] such
that φL1 + (1− φ)L3 ∼ L2
Axiom 4. (Independence) If L1 ≺ L2, then for any L3 and φ ∈ (0, 1], φL1 +(1−φ)L3 ≺
φL2 + (1− φ)L3
Completeness states that for any two lotteries, we either prefer one over the other or
we are indifferent between them. Transitivity precludes circular preference structures–e.g.
one cannot prefer a pizza to a taco, a taco to a hamburger, and a hamburger to a pizza all
at the same time. Continuity allows us to define a tipping point between our preferences
between uncertain outcomes and a certain outcome. Finally, independence precludes an
irrelevant outcome from influencing our preferences over L1 and L2–e.g. if one prefers a
taco to a pizza, one should not suddenly prefer a pizza to a taco if a hamburger becomes
available. These axioms will be used in the remainder of this chapter as we walk through
the theories useful for decision making in engineering design.
2.2.2 Expected Utility Theory
The four axioms form the basis for understanding how a rational decision maker
should make decisions. From these four axioms, von Neumann and Morgenstern arrive at
the following theorem [62]:
Theorem 1. (von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem) For any agent
satisfying Axioms 1-4, there exists a function U : Z → R that assigns a real number to
each decision outcome z ∈ Z in a lottery such that for any two lotteries, L1 ≺ L2 iff
E[U(L1)] < E[U(L2)].
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This theory states that we can mathematically describe a preference function U(·), and
since we can think of lotteries as associated with certain decision alternatives, the goal of
any rational decision maker is to choose an alternative that maximizes her expected utility
as in the following:
maximize
x∈X
E [U(L(x))] (2.1)
With a continuous outcome space the decision problem is as follows:
maximize
x∈X
∫ ∞
−∞
U(z)φ(z|x) dz (2.2)
where φ(z|x) is the probability density function of outcome z ∈ Z given alternative x.
Decision makers can elicit their utility function by answering a series of judgments
that involve finding certainty equivalents to lotteries with uncertain outcomes such that the
decision maker is indifferent between the certainty equivalent and the lottery [62–64]. For
example, the decision maker would determine some attribute value zce when presented
some lottery L = 〈0.5, zmin, 0.5, zmax〉 such that U(zce) = 0.5U(zmin) + 0.5U(zmax);
here zmin and zmax are some minimum and maximum attribute values under consideration,
respectively. Utility-based rank ordering is preserved upto a positive affine transformation,
thus we can arbitrarily define the utilities U(zmin) = 0 and U(zmax) = 1. Therefore,
U(zce) = 0.5 × 0 + 0.5 × 1 = 0.5. The process is repeated to determine other utility
relations, and a curve can be fitted to these points.
The shape of the utility function depends on how a decision maker tolerates uncer-
tainty; we call this tolerance risk attitude. Generally, we have three types of risk attitude:
(1) risk averse, (2) risk neutral, and (3) risk taking. To illustrate clearly risk attitude, con-
sider a lottery L = 〈φ1, z1, (1 − φ1), z2〉 that has two outcomes, and outcome z1 occurs
with probability φ1.
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Definition 1. (Risk Averse) A decision maker is risk averse if she prefers the expected
consequence E [L] of lottery L over lottery L itself such that
U(φ1z1 + (1− φ1)z2) > φ1U(z1) + (1− φ1)U(z2)
Definition 2. (Risk Taking) A decision maker is risk taking if she prefers the lottery L to
its expected consequence E [L] such that
U(φ1z1 + (1− φ1)z2) < φ1U(z1) + (1− φ1)U(z2)
Definition 3. (Risk Neutral) A decision maker is risk neutral if she is indifferent between
lottery L and its expected consequence E [L] such that
U(φ1z1 + (1− φ1)z2) = φ1U(z1) + (1− φ1)U(z2)
Through this example, we can see that risk attitude determines whether a utility
function is locally concave, convex, or linear; theoretically, a decision maker can have
different risk attitudes for different outcome regions. The coefficients of absolute and
relative risk aversion are metrics for local risk attitudes [65]. Assuming the utility function
is twice differentiable, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is
RA(z) = −U
′′(z)
U ′(z)
(2.3)
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Figure 2.1: Plots showing the differences between Absolute Risk Aversion and Relative
Risk Aversion coefficients for U(z) = z0.66.
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) refers to the specific case whereRA is constant.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is
RR(z) = zRA(z) = −zU
′′(z)
U ′(z)
(2.4)
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) refers to the specific case where RR is constant.
Outcome regions that produceRA > 0 andRR > 0 correspond to a region of risk aversion,
RA < 0 and RR < 0 correspond to a region of risk taking, and RA = 0 and RR =
0 correspond to a region of risk neutrality. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is
advantageous for describing risk attitude given certain utility forms. For example, consider
u(z) = z0.66; RA = 0.33z and RR = 0.33 which both indicate risk aversion for z > 0, but
RR is constant and gives us a more concise description of risk attitude in the outcome
domain. See Fig. 2.1.
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2.2.3 Multiattribute Decision Making
Up until now, we have considered the rational decision making framework as it ap-
plies to decisions with a single outcome dimension–e.g. we might choose a hydraulic
pump based on the available pumps’ volumetric displacement, which may be uncertain.
Often in the case of engineering design decision problems, we have several criteria to con-
sider when comparing alternatives–e.g. we might care about the volumetric displacement
and flow ripple amplitude of a hydraulic pump. Keeping within the rational framework,
many engineering design researchers adopted multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) as a
means to solve multiattribute decision problems, and more broadly multiobjective opti-
mization problems [66–69]. In MAUT, a decision maker formulates a utility function for
each dimension of the outcome space, and these utility functions are aggregated into a
final utility function. However, the ability to aggregate individual utility functions rests on
the principle of utility independence as defined below [70].
Definition 4. (Utility Independence) An attribute dimension Z1 is utility independent of
an attribute dimension Z2 iff for any lotteries 〈[Z1, zk]〉 and 〈[Z1, zk]〉 over Z1 × Z2 with
Z2 fixed to value zk, we have
〈[Z1, zk]〉 % 〈[Z1, zk]〉 ⇒ 〈[Z1, zj]〉 % 〈[Z1, zj]〉 ∀zj ∈ ζ2
Simply, an attribute is utility independent of another if the rank ordering over values in
only the original attribute is preserved even when changing the value in the other attribute
dimension. Two attributes are mutually utility independent if attribute Z1 is utility inde-
pendent of attribute dimension Z2 and Z2 is utility independent of Z1. With mutual utility
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independence, the aggregate utility function is
U(z) =
1
K
(
n∏
j=1
[KkjUj(zj) + 1]− 1
)
(2.5)
where Uj(·) is a utility function as in Theorem 1 over values in attribute Zi and K and
ki are coefficients defining trade-off relationships between attributes. Thurston provides a
means to elicit these coefficients that involves making a series of judgments similar to the
single attribute utility elicitation process [66].
Another approach for dealing with multiattribute decision problems is to express at-
tribute values in a common unit, which effectively reduces the decision problem to involve
only a single dimension such that we only need one utility function to express preferences.
The Value-Driven Design (VDD) and Decision-Based Design (DBD) frameworks use this
approach, wherein alternative attributes feed into a model of net-present value–or some
other metric–and the engineering design team’s objective is to maximize the expected util-
ity of net-present value [2, 35, 71]. Consider the DBD framework summarized in Fig. 2.2;
the inputs to utility is the revenue less costs. This approach is useful for avoiding the utility
independence condition in Def. 4 but relies on the ability to convert attribute values into
like units, e.g. through a model of net-present value. Building such models has been the
topic of recent research [2, 36, 37, 39, 46, 56]
2.3 Decision Making with Multiple People
2.3.1 Game Theory
Section 2.2 defines the foundations for rational decision making and introduces key
concepts that are useful for engineering design decision making. In the case of complex
engineered system design, however, design decisions are often made by several different
designers that could all be making their decisions based on the rational decision-making
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Figure 2.2: Hazelrigg’s Decision-Based Design framework [2].
framework discussed in Section 2.2, i.e. they can all have their own utility functions. Ad-
ditionally, often is the case that the decisions made by one designer affects the outcomes
of others. Game theory is an extension of decision theory that studies conflicts between
rational decision makers [72, 73]. The strategic interaction between decision makers is
termed a game and is the base unit of interest in game theory. Prior research on decen-
tralized design models the interactions between subsystem designers as a game [74–76].
Additionally, Marston’s Game-Based Design prescribes actively using game theory as a
tool to resolve conflicts between engineers’ design decisions [76].
The simplest game structure is a normal form game as defined below [73].
Definition 5. (Normal Form Game) Normal form game is a structure Γ = 〈I,X,U〉
where I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , N} is the set of players, X = {X1, . . . ,Xi, . . . ,XN} is an
N -tuple of strategy sets, and U = {U1, . . . , Ui, . . . , UN} is an N -tuple of vNM utility
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Table 2.1: The prisoner’s dilemma game in normal form.
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1
Cooperate
-1 0
-1 -3
Defect
-3 -2
0 -2
functions such that Ui :
∏
j∈N Xj → R.
A player’s strategy, xi ∈ Xi, is defined below:
Definition 6. (Strategy) a strategy is a contingency plan for determining which action a
player should take given the information he has.
For example, a player’s strategy might read as the following: I should do this if the other
player does that, but I should do this other thing if the other player does that other thing. In
a normal form game, players choose their strategy, xi ∈ Xi, simultaneously, so strategies
are largely synonymous with the actions available to the actions available to the player
[73]. Table 2.1 illustrates the prisoner’s dilemma game in normal form. Each player as
two strategies: Cooperate and Defect. Player 1’s utility is given in the lower left of each
game cell an Player 2’s utility is given in the upper right of each game cell. Each player’s
utility is dependent on both his own strategy and the strategy chosen by the other player.
Players might also randomize between their strategies, i.e. play a given strategy with
a certain probability. This type of strategy is defined below:
Definition 7. (Mixed Strategy) a mixed strategy is a probability distribution δ(Xi) ∈
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∆(Xi) over i’s strategy space Xi represents her probability of playing strategy xi ∀xi ∈
Xi.
In the context of the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 2.1, Player 1 randomly choos-
ing between Cooperate and Defect with equal–or unequal–probability would be a mixed
strategy. Choosing to Cooperate or Defect with certainty constitutes a special mixed strat-
egy where a player chooses Cooperate or Defect with a probability of one. When mixed
strategies are considered or permitted, we can recast a normal form game in Def. 5 in
terms of mixed strategies to yield a mixed extension of the normal form game. A game
〈I,∆(X),U〉 is a mixed extension of the game 〈I,X,U〉, where Ui :
∏
j∈N ∆(Xj)→ R.
The basic solution concept of a game between rational decision makers is a Nash
equilibrium, wherein no player can increase their utility by only changing their own strat-
egy. This is described mathematically in Def. 8 [72].
Definition 8. (Nash Equilibrium) Let 〈I,X,U〉 define a game with N player. Let xi ∈
Xi be the strategy profile for player i, x−i = {x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN} be the aggregate
of strategy profiles of players I \ {i}, and Ui(x) be the utility function for player i. A
strategy profile x∗ = {x∗1, ..., x∗i , ..., x∗N} is a Nash equilibrium if the following holds:
Ui(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(xi,x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ I
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of game 〈I,X,U〉 is simply the Nash equilibrium of
its mixed extension. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, both players choosing to Defect is
the Nash equilibrium since defecting dominates cooperating, i.e. each player will always
receive a higher utility from defecting despite what the other player chooses.
With the definition of a Nash equilibrium and its mixed counterpart established,
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consider the following theorem [77]:
Theorem 2. (Nash’s Existence Theorem) Every game with a finite number of players
N , each with a finite strategy space, Xi, has at least one Nash equilibrium, mixed or
otherwise.
This theorem essentially states that for any game where players have finite strategies, there
is a solution. In practical engineering design, we deal with discrete alternatives since we
truncate decimals. For example: if we can choose the pressure angle α of a gear set
such that 18◦ ≤ γ ≤ 24◦, we would practically only consider realizations of the pressure
angle to a certain decimal, say to the nearest one hundredth, so our set of alternatives–or
strategies–is really finite, γ ∈ {18.00, 18.01, 18.02, . . . , 24.00}. Therefore, we can say
a practical game played between engineers has at least one Nash equilibrium solution.
However, if we desire to maintain the notion of continuous alternative spaces consisting
of infinity alternatives, consider the following generalization to Theorem 2 [78]:
Theorem 3. (Glickberg’s Generalization) Every game with a finite number of playersN ,
each with a compact strategy space Xi and a continuous utility function ui, has at least
one Nash equilibrium, mixed or otherwise.
Given Theorems 2 and 3, we now know that a broad set of games between rational decision
makers has at least one Nash equilibrium outcome.
The Game-Based Design paradigm uses Theorems 2 and 3 to state that there exists
at least one rational design outcome between engineering decision makers making decen-
tralized decisions, and these decision makers should actively search for the designs that lie
at the Nash equilibria between their objectives [74–76, 79]. However, Theorems 2 and 3
do not say anything about the quality of the solution to a given game. Intuitively, the deci-
sion makers would desire an outcome that is Pareto efficient with respect to their utilities.
Consider the formal definition for Pareto dominance:
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Definition 9. (Pareto Dominance) A strategy profile x is Pareto dominated by a strategy
profile x′ if and only if Ui(x) ≤ Ui(x′)∀i ∈ I and Ui(x) < Ui(x′)∃i ∈ I.
Unfortunately, Nash equilibria solutions are not necessarily Pareto efficient. Consider
again the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 2.1. The Nash equilibrium of this game is for
both players to defect. However, we can see that if both players cooperate, the resulting
player utilities, U1 = U2 = −1, are greater than those given by both defecting, U1 = U2 =
−2. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of both players defecting is Pareto dominated by
both players cooperating.
2.3.2 Social Choice Theory
In Section 2.3.1, we see how rational decision makers making coupled decisions
can lead to an undesirable–i.e. Pareto dominated–outcome as perceived by an omniscient
observer. In this case, we could imagine decision makers wanting to aggregate their prefer-
ences to make a single decision that could be optimal for everyone, and indeed updates to
the Game-Based Design paradigm prescribe aggregating each designer’s utility function to
achieve Pareto optimality [74–76,80,81]. Social choice theory is the study of aggregating
individual preferences to make group decisions [82]. Preferences can be aggregated in two
ways: (1) preferences are aggregated into a social choice function to choose a particular
alternative from a set of alternatives or (2) preferences are aggregated into a social welfare
function to define group preferences over a set of alternatives. Intuitively, the former is
useful when we have a known set of alternatives and need to pick one, and the latter is
useful when we realize a new alternative and need a means to rank order it against other
alternatives. The following formally defines and exemplifies these functions:
Definition 10. (Social Choice Function) A social choice function is a function C :
R(X)N → X that aggregates the preferences profile (%1,%2, . . . ,%N) ∈ R(X)N of N
individual preferences over the alternative set X to choose some alternative x ∈ X.
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Example 1. Consider a group of ten engineers trying to decide which of the following
wire tying device concepts to develop further.
Eight engineers have the preference order C1  C2  C3, one has C2  C3  C1, and
the last has C2  C1  C3. A majority rules voting scheme chooses C1 as the group
choice and thus exemplifies a social choice function.
Definition 11. (Social Welfare Function) A social welfare function is a function W :
R(X)N → R(X) that aggregates the preferences profile (%1,%2, . . . ,%N) ∈ R(X)N of
N individual preferences over the alternative space X into a public or social preference%.
Example 2. Consider the same scenario in Ex. 1, but now the engineers want to rank order
the three alternative wire tying concepts. A Borda count scheme is used to rank order the
three concepts as in the following table:
Therefore, the group preference order isC1  C2  C3, and thus the Borda count scheme
exemplifies a social welfare function.
Any number of social choice and welfare functions can be constructed–such as the
majority rules and Borda count schemes–but ideally, these functions should be constructed
with some notion of fairness. Table 2.2 lists the joint fairness criteria for social choice
and welfare functions. Intuitively, the functions should choose/rank highest an alternative
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Rank
Concept 1st 2nd 3rd Score
C1 8 1 1 24
C2 2 8 0 22
C3 0 1 9 11
if the individuals unanimously rank the alternative highest–this relates to the notion of
Pareto dominance in Def. 9. Additionally, preventing one individual from completely
dictating the social choice or group preference ordering maintains fairness. Especially
with the social choice function, we do not want an individual to be able to manipulate
the social choice by reporting a false preference ordering–i.e. a preference ordering that
does not reflect his truthful ordering. Finally, since we may desire to rank order a new
alternative with a social welfare function, we do not want the new alternative to influence–
i.e. reverse–the rank ordering of our current alternatives when introduced, see Axiom 4.
The following theorems provide important results for constructing social choice and
welfare functions that attempt to meet the fairness criteria described in Table 2.2 [83–85]:
Theorem 4. (Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem) Suppose |X| ≥ 3 and
N ≥ 3. Every social choice function that is unanimous and dominant strategy incentive
compatible is dictatorial.
Theorem 5. (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem) Suppose |X| ≥ 3 and N ≥ 3. Every
social welfare function that is unanimous and independent of irrelevant alternatives is
dictatorial.
The basic implication of these two theorems is that in order to have effective social functions–
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Table 2.2: Fairness criteria for social choice and social welfare functions.
Criterion Definition
Unanimity If every decision maker prefers alternative x to x′,
then the SCF should choose x and the SWF should
rank x highest.
Nondictatorship Neither the SCF nor SWF should simply mimic the
preferences of a single individual.
Dominant Strategy Incentive
Compatibility
The SCF incentivizes an individual to reveal his true
preferences regardless of what the other individuals
report, i.e. the SCF is cheat-proof.
Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives
The SWF rank orders x and x′ based only on individu-
als’ preferences over x and x′ and not some irrelevant
alternative x′′.
either choice or welfare–for situations with at least three decision makers and at least three
alternatives, there must necessarily be a dictator. This is to say that a group cannot act as
a single rational decision maker without a single rational decision maker solely making
the group’s decisions. With a dictator, the social choice function becomes the dictator’s
decision problem, and the social welfare function preserves the preference ordering over
the set of alternatives determined by the dictator’s expected utility.
On the bases of Theorems 4 and 5 (Theorem 5 in particular), Hazelrigg argues that
for a design process to be rational, decision making authority should rest in a sole decision
maker, and thus only one utility function is used to rank order design alternatives as op-
posed to an aggregation of separate utility functions [86, 87]. This proclamation is at the
center of a debate on the implications of Arrow’s theorem in engineering design [88–93].
Frey et al. argue methods for decision making in groups such as Pugh Controlled Con-
vergence are valid for engineering design on the basis that qualitatively, these methods
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spur discussion and consensus [90]. While this might be true, Hazelrigg shows that the
mechanics of the Pugh matrix decision method violate the Independent of Irrelevant Alter-
natives criterion [94]. Scott and Antonsson argue that Theorem 5, and therefore Theorem
4, have no relevancy in engineering design claiming the engineering design decision prob-
lem is not a social choice problem [88]. Similarly, Keeney argues that the implications
of Theorem 5 is not as severe if we aggregate vNM utility functions as opposed to sim-
ple rank orderings and suggests that a group’s expected utility for a given alternative can
be computed from the weighted sum of each individual’s expected utility for that alterna-
tive [92]. An important detail missing, however, is how to select weights. Either we entrust
importance weighting to a single decision maker or we face the implicates of Theorems
4 and 5 in deriving fair and rational weights [89]. Therefore, this research will abide by
Hazelrigg’s interpretations of Theorems 4 and 5. Since VDD hinges on a central idea of
value or utility, the majority of current VDD research is on formulating central value mod-
els including techniques to formulate product demand models [36–39], value modeling of
commercial and government systems [40–44], and defining appropriate figures of merit
for large systems [3, 9, 45, 46].
2.3.3 Agency Theory
In Section 2.3.2, we see the theoretical basis behind the VDD and DBD argument of
having single utility function with which to rank order designs. Having a single decision
maker’s utility to rank order designs is not far fetched in engineering design as engineering
teams often have a team leader and engineering firms have CEOs so the dictator role
already exists. Since now we have a dictator making decisions, we have essentially come
full circle to the beginning of this chapter and the discussion of rational decision making.
The dilemma now is that the dictator most likely does not have the requisite knowledge
base to make effective decisions during the design of complex engineered systems [2,10].
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In this situation, firms delegate decision authority to those that have requisite knowledge
because (1) the communication of all of this knowledge is costly, and (2) the shear size of
the knowledge base is too large for one decision maker to process [95–98]. Agency theory
is an offshoot of game theory that studies agency relationships, i.e. relationships where
agents make decisions on behalf of a principal [99].
The basic assumptions behind agency theory are the following:
1. the interests or preferences of the principal and agent can conflict
2. the principal cannot perfectly monitor the actions of the agent or observe the agent’s
private information
The principal’s recourse is to devise a program to incentivize the agent to make decisions
in the best interest of the principal. The base unit of study in agency theory is the principal-
agent model. The generalized principal-agent model is summarized as the following [100].
Agent i has a type θi ∈ Θi that represents his private information, which is essentially
his information about his environment, skills, behavior, and preferences. The principal
makes some decision x0 ∈ X0, and agent i takes some action xi ∈ Xi. The principal
and agent each have a utility function such that U0 : X × Θ → R for the principal and
Ui : X×Θ→ R for each agent i, where X = X0×X1×. . .×XN and Θ = Θ1×. . .×ΘN .
All together, the basic principal-agent problem is formulated as the following:
maximize
x0
E[U0(x0, x
∗
1, ..., x
∗
N)]
subject to x∗i = arg max E[Ui(x0, x1, ..., xi, ..., xN |θi)] ∀i
(2.6)
The basic principal-agent problem formulation reflects that the principal desires to choose
an alternative x0 to maximize her expected utility but is constrained by the agents’ decision
problems.
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Principal-Agent Model
Adverse Selection Moral Hazard
Figure 2.3: Decomposition of agency theory model scenarios.
The interpretation of each element in the principal-agent model is context depen-
dent. However, there are two general scenarios where the principal-agent model is used,
see Fig. 2.3. Adverse selection refers to scenarios where the principal tries to elicit infor-
mation from the agents, but agents may have an incentive to lie [101]. Buyers try to elicit
information from sellers on product quality, sellers try to elicit potential buyers’ value
for a product, life insurers might try to elicit propensity for high-risk behavior from po-
tential policy holders, and systems engineers try to elicit resource needs from subsystem
engineers. In the case of resource allocation, subsystem engineers might ask for more re-
sources than they actually believe they need in order to mitigate the possibility that they
deplete their resources, among other reasons. In adverse selection models, type, θi, usually
represents hidden, truthful information and xi represents the information an agent actually
reports. The Vickrey auction is an incentive mechanism that induces bidders in a auction
to reveal their true value for a particular product [102]. Prior research on market-based
resource allocation in systems engineering bypasses the need for subsystem engineers to
truthfully report the amount of resources they need by creating a marketplace for subsys-
tem engineers to trade resources among each other [103–108]. This dissertation is not
particularly concerned with adverse selection cases since we are not solely focused on for-
mulating incentives to elicit information from subsystem engineers, but rather focused on
formulating incentives to influence the decisions subsystem engineers make.
Where adverse selection scenarios are concerned with knowledge hidden from the
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principal, moral hazard refers to scenarios where agents’ actions are hidden from the
principal [101]. A home insurer might not be able to observe if a home owner is taking
adequate actions to protect their home, a system stakeholder might not be able to know
if an engineer cut corners in the face of an approaching deadline, and a system engineer
might not be able to see if a subsystem engineer produced an optimal design. In these
scenarios, agents may not have an incentive to act in a way that benefits the principal. In
moral hazard models, xi represents the action taken by agent i; type is typically omitted.
Additionally, moral hazard models assume that an action xi accrues a cost for a agent such
that agent i chooses di that maximizes his utility for the difference between the reward he
is expected to receive and the associated costs with xi. Similarly, the principal chooses an
incentive scheme to balance the value generated by the agent choosing xi with incentive
payouts due to the agent. Many principal-agent researchers refer to action xi abstractly
as the effort an agent applies to complete his task when using moral hazard models in the
context of an employer-employee relationship; we also use this terminology in Chapter 4.
In the case where the principal can verify or observe what action the agent took,
the optimal incentive is to compensate the agent for the cost of taking that action but
punish the agent if he does any other action other than that specified by the principal [101].
This is called a first-best solution. In the case of punishments being not allowable, the
principal essentially must endow the agent with limited liability, e.g. an initial payout,
than can be taken if the agent does not act how the principal desires [101]. This is called a
second-best solution. Garber and Pate-Cornell examine the agency relationship when the
agent performs probability risk assessments for the principal [53,109]. In this context, the
principal’s decision, x0, is to choose an inspection policy to pop in on the agent, and the
agent’s decision, xi, chooses whether or not to take shortcuts while doing their assigned
probabilistic risk assessment. Garber and Pate-Cornell attempt to formulate an inspection
policy to discourage an agent from cutting corners such that the agent may be punished–cf.
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first-best solution–if observed shortcutting during an inspection.
Complicating matters is the case where the principal cannot verify or observe what
action the agent took. In this case, we might assume that there is one or more performance
figures of merit, z, that are verifiable or observable. Consider the following theorem for
optimal incentives for the case of unobservable actions [110]:
Theorem 6. (Holmström’s Sufficient Statistic Theorem) All available performance fig-
ures of merit, z, that inform on an agent’s action, xi, should be included in the incentive
structure.
AT&T used to pay their programmers based on the number of lines of code written, which
resulted in unnecessarily large and inefficient programs [111]. Rewarding based on just
lines of code opened a moral hazard for inefficient programs suggesting programmers
were not necessarily acting to produce optimal software. UPS monitors their delivery
drivers’ driving habits using sensors in addition to their delivery performance for driver
performance reviews [112]. Clearly, proper performance metrics for incentive formulation
are context dependent. Chapter 3 examines, in part, proper performance metrics for the
VD3 context.
The above discussion brings up the dichotomy of behavior based incentives and per-
formance based incentives. To clarify the difference in a design context, consider one
incentive that promotes an engineer to use a specific method to design a system and an-
other incentive that promotes an engineer to design the best system he can. The former
incentivizes a behavior, i.e. how a system is designed, and the latter incentivizes an out-
come, i.e. the design itself. Hupman et al. examine incentives for machinists based on
tool life and machine time–performance metrics–as opposed to incentives specifying tool-
ing parameters are rotation speed and cutting depth–"behaviors" [57]. Prior agency theory
results show that the effectivenesses of behavior- and performance-based incentives are
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largely inverse of each other with respect to certain variables, see Table 2.3 [6–8]. In Table
2.3, an increase in the variables listed either positively (+) or negatively (−) complement
the effectiveness of the two incentive types. Therefore, we see that a behavioral incentive
is not always better than a performance incentive, and vice versa. Which type of incentive
to use largely depends on context.
In the context of VDD, using behavior-based incentives presupposes that the behav-
ior promoted leads to maximizing value. Why would we presuppose a particular behavior
leads to maximizing value? One may say a certain behavior produces results more quickly
or cheaply than another. Alternatively, it is conceivable to formulate a performance-based
incentive that promotes results obtained in the quickest and cheapest way as opposed to
a behavior-based incentive that dictates specific behavior. The entire VDD paradigm is
centered around achieving a design outcome where value is maximized, and arguably, we
may not necessarily care about the methods used to achieve a system as long as the final
result is valuable. Therefore, this dissertation will consider performance-based incentive
formulations for motivating decision makers to make decisions according to the central
utility function.
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The scope of this dissertation is in building the mathematical foundations for dele-
gation in VDD, but here let us briefly discuss the embodiment of incentives in real world
cases. Arguably the most important consideration is defining the units of incentive struc-
tures. At first thought, many might assume incentives are financial. Incentives need not
necessarily be financial. In her 2016 dissertation, Bignon analyzes the impact of different
motivational factors on engineering professionals [113]. She examined four motivational
elements:
1. Salary
2. Independence–i.e. the ability to work without oversight
3. Challenge–i.e. the ability to work on challenging projects
4. Advancement–i.e. moving up in an organization’s hierarchy
While she found that salary is the more important element, she prescribed that incentives
should use all of four motivational elements. With a requirement-based incentive, for
example, an engineer could receive a small financial bonus in addition to greater inde-
pendence, etc. Bignon’s work supports prior engineering management prescriptions that
reward systems for engineers should include non-monetary rewards, while not replacing
monetary rewards [114–116]. For the mathematical modeling and analysis in this disser-
tation, incentive structures are collapsed to a single unit, and this unit can be thought of as
some abstract reward unit.
2.4 Chapter Summary
We now conclude our journey through the various theories that influence the basis
of Value-Driven Design. Looking back, we reviewed the normative backbone to Value-
Driven Design and discovered that we run into issues maintaining the principles of the
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normative backbone when we are in an environment with many people. Theoretical impli-
cations for a rational system design process support using a single utility or value function
with which to make decisions and judge system designs, and the concern then becomes
getting engineers to abide by this central function. The theoretical journey led us to the
principal-agent problem found in agency theory, and after a jaunt into the basics of in-
centives in the principal-agent problem, we stated we will focus on performance-based
incentives, which will be expanded upon in the next chapter. The largest take-away from
this chapter is the review of relevant mathematical theories as these theories provide the
basis of argument for chapter to come.
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3. FORMULATING RATIONAL INCENTIVES
3.1 Introduction to the Chapter
The previous chapter introduces the theoretical toolbox for analyzing decisions as
well as the principal-agent problem. This dissertation correlates the design delegation
problem with the principal-agent problem such that system-level managers formulate an
incentive program to motivate domain experts into making decisions in the managers’ best
interests. In this research, we assume that the central value function mandated by the VDD
paradigm represents the preferences of the principal/system-level manager, hereinafter re-
ferred to as SYS, in the principal-agent model. The focus of this chapter is on addressing
the first research issue by formulating incentives that could motivate domain experts, here-
inafter referred to as SUBs, to make decisions in the best interest of the central principle
of VDD: maximize system value. We call an incentive rational from the perspective of
SYS if it motivates a SUB to be consistent with SYS’s preferences.
We examine four basic incentive structure categories through the mathematics of
rational decision making in this chapter. These incentive structure categories are the fol-
lowing [61]:
• Flat Rate: the SUB gets a constant "reward" no matter what the final performance
is.
• Quota: the SUB gets a bonus "reward" if a certain performance figure of merit target
threshold is met, and is obviously related to using requirements.
• Variable Ratio: the SUB gets a bonus "reward" with some probability that is based
the performance figure of merit.
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• Piece Ratio: the SUB gets a marginal increase in "reward" with a marginal increase
in the performance figure of merit, and is obviously related to using objective.
There are many possible formulations of the incentive structures listed above–e.g. two
incentive structures can be Piece Rate but use different performance figures of merit–so
these incentive structure categories are used as the scaffolding for formulating incentives
specifically for VD3. Connecting back to Theorem 6, we determine proper figures of
merit, z, for the basic incentive structures listed above that support VD3.
Prior approaches from the literature for formulating requirements and objective func-
tions are cast in terms of the incentive structure categories listed above and critiqued using
the rational decision-making framework discussed in Chapter 2. Ultimately, two promis-
ing incentive formulations specific to VD3 are proposed: a Variable Ratio structure for-
mulation inspired by normative requirement elicitation and a Piece Ratio structure formu-
lation inspired by normative utility maximization. The analyses in this chapter are not
concerned with how much reward the SUB should get from the incentives but rather are
concerned with the metrics in the incentives, e.g. where the performance threshold for a
quota structure should be set. Additionally, the analyses in this chapter consider only a
single SUB and does not consider the costs associated with the SUB’s actions. Chapters 4
and 5 address the impact of search and collaboration action costs, respectively.
The next section of this chapter presents a reformulation of the principal-agent model
in Eq. 2.6 that will act as a notational reference for the analyses in this chapter. Section
3.3 is where each of the four incentive structures of interest are examined. In Sec. 3.4,
the proposed Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive formulations identified as promising
for VD3 are compared to determine whether or not a risk neutral SYS would prefer one
over the other in an ideal scenario. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the impli-
cations of the results in this chapter on Value-Driven Delegated Design (VD3) and design
42
delegation in systems engineers at large.
3.2 Reference Model and Notation
We first reformulate the principal-agent model in Eq. 2.6 into a more intuitive nota-
tion for VDD. The following model of SYS’s decision problem acts as a notational refer-
ence for the discussion presented in the remainder of the chapter:
maximize
vi(·)
E[U0(V (y(x
∗)))]
subject to x∗ = arg max E[Ui(vi(z(x)))]
(3.1)
where U0(·) is SYS’s utility characterizing her risk attitude over uncertain net system value
V (·), y is subsystem attribute(s), Ui(·) is SUB’s utility characterizing his risk attitude, and
vi(·) is the incentive structure dependent on figure of merit, z. The subsystem attributes
and figure of merit are dependent on the design variables, x, available to the SUB. We see
that SYS’s ability to maximize her value is constrained by the SUB’s decision problem.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the notational reference model.
A general assumption used in this chapter is that utility, whether it be SYS’s or
SUB’s, is strictly increasing with its domain. Therefore, U0 is strictly monotonic with net
system value, V , conveying that systems with greater value are more preferred. Similarly,
Ui is assumed to be strictly monotonic with the value imparted by the incentive, vi, con-
veying that greater incentive payout is more preferred than lower payout; this assumption
will be broken in Chapters 4 and 5. The notation vi signifies that the incentive structure
has some value to it, both to the SYS and to the SUB. We might think of net system value
as V = vs − vi, where vi is the value of the incentive and vs is system value generated
from all other sources, e.g. projected product revenue, etc.
To exemplify this model and clarify what each element represents, consider a case
where the SYS is producing a vehicle and wishes to have a vehicle design that maximizes
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Incentive, vi(z(·))
Design 
Characteristics, 
y(x*)
SYS
SUB i
max E[U0(V(y(x)))]
max E[Ui(vi(z(x)))]
Alternatives, x
Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the notational reference model in Eq. 3.1.
net present value, V (·). U0(·) characterizes SYS’s risk preferences for net present value.
Net present value of a vehicle design depends on fuel economy, y, as SYS will have larger
market share with higher fuel economy. The SYS delegates the design of an automatic
transmission controller to SUB with an incentive, vi(·), dependent on some figure of merit,
z, for the controller, e.g. z could be y itself or some distance y is away from some target,
etc. Ui(·) characterizes the SUB’s risk preferences for uncertainties in the final value of the
incentive. Fuel economy, y, is affected by the controller parameters, x. SUB has controller
design knowledge the SYS does not have, so SYS must rely on SUB to make controller
decisions and define an adequate incentive that characterizes the SYS’s risk attitude and
any trade-off preferences, e.g. preferences toward trading highway fuel economy with city
fuel economy.
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3.3 Incentive Structures
This section reviews incentive structure formulations of the four incentive structure
categories from which the SYS could select to solve the SYS’s problem in Eq. 3.1. We use
the same terminology for the designations of the incentive structures as does Bonner et al.
[61]. For each of the structure categories explored, we look at how SYS can formulate the
structure and examine such formulations through the rational decision-making framework
presented in the previous chapter. Again, focus in incentive formulation is not on how
much the incentives will reward the SUB, but rather on what performance figures of merit
or metrics, z, the incentive structures should use.
3.3.1 Flat Rate
Flat Rate structures offer a constant payout that is not linked to performance [61].
We might characterize this mathematically as
vFi (z) = K
F (3.2)
where KF is the constant payout offered to the agent. The notion of receiving a reward
despite the final outcome of a task is used in conjunction or built-in to other incentive
structures, as shown in the other incentive formulations discussed in the remainder of
this section. Giving a guaranteed minimum incentive payout satisfies the participation
constraint, which essentially ensures the agent will work for the principal as opposed to
seeking employment elsewhere [101]. Yearly salaries are an example of a minimum pay-
out: if a potential employer offers too little, a job seeker may pass on accepting a job offer.
However, salaries are accompanied by opportunities for bonuses, raises, and advancement,
so a fixed salary is not a the only factor in an incentive structure.
In the context of delivering design guidance, the Flat Rate model is similar to SYS
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instructing SUB to simply design a subsystem, with no information on how to make trade-
offs, etc. Obviously, this structure conveys no information about SYS’s preferences other
than the SYS values the "presence" of the SUB. Therefore, using this structure violates the
third of Grady’s posits discussed at the first chapter of this dissertation. Simply because
the Flat Rate structure does not include any performance criteria or metrics within it, we
will not consider it a viable incentive structure for VD3.
3.3.2 Quota
Quota structures offer a bonus payout if a certain target level of performance is
achieved or exceeded [61]. Mathematically, a quota incentive is the following:
vQi (z) =

KQ1 z ≥ t
KQ2 z < t
(3.3)
where t is some specified target threshold and KQ1 > K
Q
2 , assuming that producing per-
formance, z, at or above the target threshold, t, is desirable to the SYS. For cases where
performance is desired to be at or less than the target threshold, simply reverse the in-
equalities. The mathematical structure in 3.3 is also called a target-oriented value func-
tion [117–119]. It is important to note that a target in this context represents a threshold to
be above or below, depending on the situation, and not necessarily a value to be hit exactly.
We continue to use the target threshold terminology, however, to remain consistent with
prior literature on decision making with thresholds [117–119].
The Quota structure is analogous to an engineering performance requirement, where
SYS uses a performance requirement on a subsystem attribute, y, to convey to SUB what
is acceptable from what is not. Therefore, z = y in Eq. 3.3 when using the prescribed
requirements formulation approach discussed in the first chapter. The challenge with the
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Quota structure, as well as with requirements, is defining a target threshold, t. Using
a Quota structure presupposes that t is some optimal target threshold for the SYS such
that when the SUB meets that target, the SYS’s utility is maximized. The remainder
of this section on the Quota structure discusses normative decision making in relation
to targets and setting targets consistent with vNM decision theory, as discussed in the
previous chapter.
When we consider a subsystem attribute value, y, to be uncertain and conditioned
on the decision variable, x, the SUB’s expected utility with the Quota structure in Eq. 3.3
is the following:
E[Ui(v
Q
i (Y ))] = Pr(Y ≥ t|x)Ui(KQ1 ) + Pr(Y < t|x)Ui(KQ2 )
= Pr(Y ≥ t|x)Ui(KQ1 ) + (1− Pr(Y ≥ t|x))Ui(KQ2 )
=
[
Ui(K
Q
1 )− Ui(KQ2 )
]
Pr(Y ≥ t|x) + Ui(KQ2 )
(3.4)
Since KQ1 and K
Q
2 are constants, then Ui(K
Q
1 ) and Ui(K
Q
2 ) are constants as well. Ad-
ditionally, since KQ1 > K
Q
2 and Ui(·) is monotonically increasing, Ui(KQ1 ) > Ui(KQ2 ).
Therefore, E[Ui(v
Q
i (y(x)))] in Eq. 3.4 is a positive affine transformation of Pr(Y ≥ t|x),
and the SUB’s decision problem can be reformulated as the following:
maximize
x∈X
Pr(Y ≥ t|x) = 1− Φ(t|x) (3.5)
where Φ(t|x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of attribute performance, Y ,
given alternative, x. From Eq. 3.5, a rational, target-oriented decision maker wishes to
maximize the probability of meeting or exceeding her target threshold [117, 120].
Normative Targets
To derive normative target thresholds, it is useful to relate the SYS’s utility function,
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U0(·), to SUB’s objective of maximizing the probability of meeting the target as specified
in Eq. 3.5. Through integration by parts, Abbas and Matheson show the following to be
true when U0(·) is differentiable, see Appendix A for a proof [52]:
∫ ∞
−∞
U0(y)φ(y|x) dy = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(t|x)u0(t) dt (3.6)
where u0(·) is simply the derivative of the utility function, U0(·), and φ(·) is the probability
density function (PDF) correlating to the CDF, Φ(·). This relationship links the traditional
expected utility maximization problem in Eq. 2.2 with something at little similar to the
maximization problem in Eq. 3.5, with the difference now that we are integrating over the
CDF and "weighting" the CDF with u0(·).
Castagnoli and LiCalzi formally reinterpret the meaning of the conventional util-
ity function–as discussed in the previous chapter–as a cumulative probability distribu-
tion [121]. Consider the following theorem [121]:
Theorem 7. Expected utility is the probability of a random variable, Z, exceeding an un-
certain target, T , such that E[U(Z)] = Pr(Z ≥ T ) if the utility function is the following:
• Monotonic
• Differentiable
• Scaled between 0 and 1
See Appendix A for a proof. If x1 yields uncertain attribute performance Y1 and x2 yields
Y2, Y1  Y2 if Pr(Y1 ≥ T ) > Pr(Y2 ≥ T ) meaning Y1 is more preferred as the likeli-
hood of attribute performance drawn from Y1 being as good or better than some uncertain
attribute performance target, T , is higher than with Y2. Under this interpretation, an ob-
server cannot discern whether a rational decision maker is maximizing her expected utility
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or maximizing the probability of meeting an uncertain target [121, 122]. Therefore, this
discussion simply shows the tautology between maximizing utility and maximizing the
probability of meeting an uncertain target. With this established, we can now think about
formulating target, t, such that as an agent solves Eq. 3.5, she maximizes the principal’s
utility.
Equation 3.6 shows the duality between utility and probability and essentially allows
translation between the language of utility and the language of probability. Given this
duality, there exists an element in the probability language corresponding to the concept
of the certainty equivalent, yˆ, in the utility language called the aspiration equivalent, y˜,
such that
E[U0(y)] = U0(yˆ) = 1− Φ(y˜) (3.7)
Figure 3.2 graphically shows the relationships in Eq. 3.7. From Eq. 3.7, the distribution of
each alternative has its own aspiration equivalent since each has different expected utilities.
Abbas and Matheson suggest using aspiration equivalents as targets such that t = y˜ [52].
Therefore, each alternative has its own target associated with it. The goal is to choose the
alternative that maximizes the probability Pr(Y ≥ y˜|x). By doing so, SYS’s expected
utility is maximized due to Eq. 3.6. However, SYS must have monotonic preferences
toward y in order to compute y˜.
The same line of thought applies to decision making with multiple performance tar-
gets. Normatively, a target region is a region where everything inside the region is more
preferred to everything outside of the region [123, 124]. Given a multiattribute utility
function U0(y1(x), y2(x)), a rational target threshold is defined on an isopreference line
as in Fig. 3.3, and thus targets for each attribute should not be independent unless in-
dependence is reflected in the preference structure [117, 119, 123]. Abbas and Matheson
formulate a multiattribute extension for the aspiration equivalent when we can formulate a
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Figure 3.2: (TOP) Computing the certainty and aspiration equivalents yˆ and y˜, respec-
tively, when the outcome distribution Φ1(y) is normal with a mean 0.5 and standard dis-
tribution of 0.2. (BOTTOM) Computing the certainty and aspiration equivalents yˆ and y˜,
respectively, when the outcome distribution Φ2(y) is uniform between 0 and 1.
multiattribute utility function U0(y1(x), y2(x)) as single attribute utility over a value func-
tion as in U0(V (y1(x), y2(x))) [123]. Note that this is an inherent formulation in VDD, cf.
U0(V (·)) in Eq. 3.1. In this case, the aspiration value is computed similarly as in Eq. 3.7
such that
U0(Vˆ ) = 1− Φ(V˜ ) (3.8)
Therefore, the target region is defined by the set {y : V (y) ≥ V˜ }, and a decision maker
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Figure 3.3: (LEFT) Targets are chosen independently for each attribute y1 and y2 such that
the Target Region is rectangular. However, we can see that points in this Target Region can
be dominated by points outside of it. (RIGHT) Targets are not chosen independently, and
the Target Region is determined by an isopreference line such that no point in the Target
Region is dominated by a point outside of it.
should choose the alternative, x, with the highest probability of attribute performance, y,
lying in its associated target region.
Using Quota Incentives with Normative Targets
Abbas and Matheson show that when we feed attributes, y, through a value function
V (y), utility need not be monotonic with the attributes for Eq. 3.8 to hold as long as it is
monotonic with V (·), which we assume in VDD that it is [123]. If we assign subsystem
attributes as the performance figures of merit such that z = y, Eq. 3.3 is reformulated as
the following:
vQi (y) =

KQ1 y ∈ {y : V (y) ≥ V˜ }
KQ2 y 6∈ {y : V (y) ≥ V˜ }
(3.9)
Alternatively, we can reformulate Eq. 3.9 as the following to solidify the role of the central
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value function as the primary figure of merit, z = V (·):
vQi (V (y)) =

KQ1 V (y) ≥ V˜
KQ2 V (y) ≥ V˜
(3.10)
where V (·) is the value function in Eq. 3.1 and V˜ is an aspiration equivalent-based target
formulated from SYS’s utility U0(V (·)).
Recalling the discussion in the first chapter on prescriptively writing requirement
statements, a requirement statement should only pertain to a single (sub)system of interest
and list only one design criteria [15–18]. For example, a single requirement statement
should not address both a hydraulic pump’s efficiency and weight, but rather one require-
ment statement should address the pump’s efficiency while a separate statement addresses
the pump’s weight. As shown in Fig. 3.3, however, independent target thresholds create an
orthogonal space where a design outside of the target region could be just as preferable as
one inside the target region. There is seemingly a conflict between using normative targets
thresholds with the way requirements are currently used and conveyed. Placing a norma-
tive target threshold on system value, V , to mitigate the drawbacks of using independent
targets intuitively requires that a SUB receive (1) a model of the set {y : V (y) ≥ V˜ } or
(2) the value model, V (·), and aspiration value, V˜ . The first case might correspond to a
quote incentive structured as in Eq. 3.9 and the second case might correspond to a quota
incentive structured as in Eq. 3.10. Either way, we would not just be flowing down a
requirement statement giving a minimum acceptable threshold for value, but some model
would have to be delivered.
The dilemma with setting a normative target using Abbas’s and Matheson’s approach
described above is that the SYS needs distribution information for each alternative in order
to find each alternative’s aspiration equivalent with her utility function [125]. Consider
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again the situation in Fig. 3.2. Suppose Φ1 and Φ2 represent performance CDFs for
two technologies a SUB could choose for his subsystem. We see that, with regards to
SYS’s utility function, the technologies produce different expected utilities, and thus have
different certainty and aspiration equivalents. In order for the SYS to establish rational
targets based on her utility function for the SUB, she needs to know Φ1 and Φ2. However,
if she has this knowledge, she does not necessarily need the SUB to make the decision; she
can simply choose the technology that maximizes her expected utility. A basic assumption
in this dissertation is that the upflow of information like this is too costly (see Grady’s first
posit for system design listed in Chapter 1). Therefore, being able to set normative targets
contradicts the need for decision delegation.
There is an argument to be made that the SYS could use her subjective beliefs for
setting a target threshold from an aspiration equivalent. Consider a single attribute case
where SYS desired to minimize the attribute value, y, such that such that her utility over y
is the following:
U0(V (y)) = 1− y
5
(3.11)
Thus SYS is risk neutral; see Fig. 3.4. The SYS has a belief over the potential perfor-
mance such that Y ∼ lnN (0.4, 0.4); the CFD of this log-normal distribution is denoted
Φ0. Using SYS’s utility and beliefs, the aspiration equivalent y˜ = t = 1.7912; see Fig.
3.4. Therefore, SUB desires to maximize Pr(Y ≤ 1.7912) = Φ(1.7912). SUB has two
alternatives: Technology A with performance characterized by the CDF ΦA and Technol-
ogy B characterized by ΦB. Distribution information is listed in Table 3.1, and the CDFs
are shown in Fig. 3.4. From Table 3.1, SUB would clearly prefer Technology A. However,
SYS would prefer Technology B if she were making the decision between Technologies
A and B herself. Therefore, the SUB’s preferred alternative conflicts with SYS’s preferred
alternative had she made the decision herself with the technology distribution information.
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Figure 3.4: (TOP) SYS’s utility function and beliefs over attribute performance, y, with
associated certainty, yˆ, and aspiration, y˜, equivalents. (BOTTOM) CDFs for the two alter-
natives available to SUB.
This illustration exemplifies prior concerns with requirements usage [126].
In summary, the above discussion shows that traditional prescriptions for writing
requirements, i.e. performance requirements must be independent, can lead to a situation
where a design solution outside of the acceptable design space could be more preferable to
one inside the acceptable design region. Establishing a requirement on the basis of value,
V , resolves the issue of rank order inconsistency between solutions inside and outside
of the acceptable design region. However, this means that a SUB needs some model to
judge where the target region is, as discussion above. Needing to pass a model to resolve
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Table 3.1: Example technology distribution characteristics.
Technology A Technology B
Distribution of Y lnN (0.5, 0.1) lnN (0.4, 0.3)
Pr(Y ≤ y˜) 0.7964 0.7289
E[U0(Y )] 0.6686 0.6879
fundamental issues with requirements allocation supports the VDD hypothesis that model
communication supports value maximization better than strictly using requirements (tar-
get thresholds). Deriving target thresholds normatively can be cumbersome since Abbas
and Matheson state that each alternative should be judged against its own target threshold,
meaning SUB needs to have information and beliefs for all the alternatives available. Ad-
ditionally, we show how deriving a target threshold from subjective beliefs can lead to a
SUB choosing an alternative that is less preferred to the SYS.
3.3.3 Variable Ratio
Variable Ratio structures incorporate stochasticity into the payout schedule wherein
a bonus is offered with some probability [61]. This structure has the following mathemat-
ical form:
vV Ri (z) =

KV R1 with probability φ(z)
KV R2 with probability 1− φ(z)
(3.12)
where KV R1 > K
V R
2 are constants and φ(z) represents the probability of receiving the
higher payout, which is chosen by the incentive creator. A quintessential example of a
Variable Ratio structure is a slot machine: slot machines are programmed to give a payout
after a certain number of lever pulls, and the number of lever pulls changes after each
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payout. Playing a particular slot machine longer increases the probability of a payout.
Variable ratio structures have been used for exercise incentives [127], employee union in-
centive plans [128], and mountain beaver trappers incentives [129]. The probabilities in
these variable ratio structures, and variable ratio structures in general, tend to be formu-
lated around performance observations. For example, a teacher "observes" a student asking
a question and randomly rewards or reinforces that behavior once every x occurrences of
the student asking a question. Here, we will take a different approach and examine how
we should set φ(·) through the lens of normative decision theory.
With the Variable Ratio structure in Eq. 3.12, SUB’s expected utility is the follow-
ing:
E[Ui(v
V R
i (z))] = φ(z)Ui(K
V R
1 ) + (1− φ(z))Ui(KV R2 )
=
[
Ui(K
V R
1 )− Ui(KV R2 )
]
φ(z) + Ui(K
V R
2 )
(3.13)
Since KV R1 and K
V R
2 are constants, then Ui(K
V R
1 ) and Ui(K
V R
2 ) are constants as well.
Additionally, since KV R1 > K
V R
2 and Ui(·) is monotonically increasing, Ui(KV R1 ) >
Ui(K
V R
2 ). Therefore, E[Ui(v
V R
i (z))] in Eq. 3.4 is a positive affine transformation of φ(z).
Assuming the performance figure of merit, z, is conditioned to the design variables, x, the
SUB’s decision problem can be reformulated as the following:
maximize
x∈X
φ(z(x)) (3.14)
We could also assume the response variable is stochastic and φ(·) maps uncertain value, Z,
to a real number probability. Equation 3.14 is very similar to Eq. 3.5 in that the decision
maker wishes to maximize the probability of receiving the higher reward. However, the
probability element is controllable by SYS rather than inherited from the response variable
distribution. Much like the challenge with Quote structures is defining a deterministic
target threshold, the challenge with Variable Ratio is defining a probability, φ(·), for payout
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such that when the SUB maximizes his probability of getting the higher payout, the SYS’s
utility is maximized.
Consider again the reinterpretation of a vNM utility function as a CFD of its input,
z, meeting an uncertain target, T , such that U(z) = Pr(z ≥ T ). Similarly, if the input is
uncertain, E[U(Z)] = Pr(Z ≥ T ). If SYS structures φ(·) such that φ(z) = E[U0(V (y))],
we can reformulate Eq. 3.14 as the following:
maximize
x∈X
E[U0(V (y(x)))] (3.15)
SUB’s problem is now to maximize SYS’s expected utility in order to maximize the proba-
bility of receiving a higher reward, and SYS’s expected utility, E[U0(V (Y ))], becomes the
sole figure of merit for the quality of a particular design, x. The Variable Ratio structure
in Eq. 3.12 is reformulated as the following such that φ(z) = z = E[U0(V (·))]:
vV Ri (E[U0(V (·))]) =

KV R1 with probability E[U0(V (·))]
KV R2 with probability 1− E[U0(V (·))]
(3.16)
Since expected utility can be interpreted as the probability of meeting an uncertain
target threshold, SUB’s decision problem with the Variable Ratio formulation in Eq. 3.16
can be interpreted as trying to meet an uncertain target threshold. The concept of deal-
ing with uncertain requirements is not foreign in system design. Since requirements often
change over time, Pugliese et al. characterize upfront requirements as uncertain in a ro-
bust optimization routine but offer no insight into what these requirement distributions
might be [130]. Huynh et al. approximate target threshold distributions with linear and
triangular PDFs [131]. As outlined in the discussion on eliciting normative targets for a
Quota incentive, prior work notes that utility functions can have the same properties as a
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probability function and thus utility and probability are related [121]. With the Variable
Ratio incentive formulation in Eq. 3.16, we are effectively proposing using the utility-
as-a-distribution interpretation as a framework for modeling uncertain targets threshold-
s/requirements, which differs from Abbas’s and Matheson’s use of this interpretation for
deriving deterministic requirements [52]. In the previous section, we discussed the pit-
falls of using deterministic, normative target thresholds. Abbas and Matheson state that
each alternative should be judged against it’s own target threshold, i.e. aspiration value.
Additionally, we show in the discussion on using Quota incentives with normative target
thresholds that in a multiattribute case, a model needs to be flown down to SUB. Flowing
down U0(V (·)) effectively allows SUB to compute aspiration values himself to by pass
the need for SYS to elicit target threshold information for each alternative. Therefore, the
novel Variable Ratio incentive formulation in Eq. 3.16 is promising for VD3 and will be
analyzed further later in this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.3.4 Piece Rate
Piece Rate structures offer a marginal increase in payout with a marginal increase
in performance metric [61]. The simplest case of a Piece Rate structure is to offer a fixed
marginal increase in payout such that mathematically, this structure is the following:
vPRi (z) = K
PR
1 z +K
PR
2 (3.17)
whereKPR1 andK
PR
2 , and z is the performance figure of merit. IfK
PR
1 > 0, then Eq. 3.17
is simply a positive affine transformation of z, and thus maximizing vPRi (·) is equivalent
to maximizing z. If KPR1 < 0, maximizing v
PR
i (·) is equivalent to minimizing z. In
the context of delivering design guidance, the Piece Rate structure is analogous to SYS
instructing SUB to maximize or minimize some objective function. In the single attribute
case, the objective may just be to minimize or maximize some attribute value such that
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z = y, e.g. minimize cost or maximize efficiency. However, when the attribute value is
uncertain or there are multiple attributes, SUB intuitively needs guidance on how to deal
with uncertainty and trade offs or else SUB could use his own preferences to resolve gaps
in his design guidance.
Where effectiveness of the Quota structure depends on a deterministic target and
the effectiveness of the Variable Ratio depends on a stochastic target, the effectiveness of
the Piece Rate structure depends on the selection of z(·), i.e. the objective function. The
challenge is formulating an objective function, z(·), such that when a SUB maximizes Eq.
3.17, he maximizes the SYS’s utility. The remainder of this section structure discusses
two objective formulations from the literature through a rational perspective.
Target-Seeking Objective Function Formulation
The typical target-seeking objective formulation with uncertain attribute performance,
Y , is the following:
z = E[(Y − t)2] (3.18)
where t is some target. The square root of the argument in the expectation operator is the
Euclidean distance a attribute value, y, is from a target value, t. With the figure of merit
defined above and KPR1 > 0, SUB’s expected utility is the following:
E[Ui(v
PR
i (z))] = E[Ui(K
PR
1 (−E[(Y − t)2]) +KPR2 )]
= Ui(K
PR
1 (−E[(Y − t)2]) +KPR2 )
Since we assume in this chapter thatUi(·) is monotonically increasing with vi(·), as E[(Y −
t)2] decreases, SUB’s utility increases. Therefore, SUB’s design problem is to minimize
Eq. 3.18. The target-seeking formulation, or loss function, is a staple of Taguchi’s Robust
Design [132], Collaborative Optimization (CO) [133], and Analytical Target Cascading
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(ATC) [134]. The target-seeking formulation is much like the Quota structure in that its
use presupposes that SYS can formulate an optimal t. However, the target, t, is a value to
be produced exactly rather than a target threshold as with the Quota structure. Note that
the discussion on the target-seeking objective formulation also applies to the case where
we replace Y in Eq. 3.18 with V (Y ), in which case we effectively place a target on value
rather than on an attribute.
Baxter and Malak et al. examine the target-seeking problem formulation through the
lens of vNM expected utility theory [3, 9]. Let us define ζ = y − t. From the definition of
absolute risk aversion in Eq. 2.3, a target-seeking decision maker is universally risk averse
since RA(ζ) > 0 ∀ζ; see Fig. 3.5. Furthermore, Eq. 3.18 can be rewritten in terms of the
mean, µy, and variance, σy, of the distribution of Y such that [9]:
E[(Y − t)2] = (µy − t)2 + σ2y (3.19)
Therefore, the decision maker trades off between matching the target and distribution mean
and minimizing the distribution’s variance. At first glance, minimizing variance seems to
complement the risk averse nature of the target-seeking utility.
In the context of delegation, there is an obvious conflict when the SYS is risk taking
but incentivizes SUB with a target-seeking objective since the target-seeking objective
characterizes a risk averse attitude; see Fig. 3.5. However, it is not clear if the trade off
between target-mean matching and variance minimization adversely impacts delegation
when SYS is risk neutral. Let us consider the case of a risk neutral SYS such that
U0(V (y)) = 1− y
5
(3.20)
Thus, SYS’s expected utility is maximizes when the expected value of y is minimized. If
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Figure 3.5: The absolute risk aversion of a target-seeking utility [3].
the minimum possible value of y is 0, then t = 0 as matching this target maximizes SYS’s
expected utility. Therefore, SUB wishes to minimize µ2y + σ
2
y . SUB has two alternatives
in the technology he chooses for his subsystem, and the characteristics of the attribute
performance from these alternatives are given in Table. 3.2. Technology A has a higher
mean but smaller standard deviation, and Technology B has a smaller mean but larger
standard deviation. In this case, SUB would prefer Technology A but SYS would prefer
Technology B. Seemingly, the smaller variation in Y for Technology A overshadows the
fact that the mean of Y for Technology A is slightly larger than that of Technology B.
In the case of a risk averse SYS, the fact that a SUB with a target-seeking util-
ity (incentive) seems attractive as minimizing variance seemingly complements any risk
averse utility function. However, Malak et al. provide an example showing this is not
necessarily true [9]. Consider a case where SYS is risk averse with the utility function
U0 = 1 − exp(−y), and gives SUB the incentive in Eq. 3.18. SUB must choose between
two technologies for his subsystem that each produce performance distributions as listed
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Table 3.2: Example technology distribution characteristics.
Technology A Technology B
Distribution of Y lnN (0.5, 0.1) lnN (0.4, 0.4)
µy 1.6570 1.6161
σy 0.1661 0.6732
E[(Y − t)2] -2.7732 -3.0649
E[U0(V (Y ))] 0.6686 0.6768
in Table 3.3. We see from Table 3.3 that the SUB will choose Technology A since it has a
lower variance and the means are equal between the two technologies. However, SYS’s ex-
pected utility for Technology A is 0.84 and for Technology B is 1.63. Therefore, the SYS
would prefer Technology B but incentivized SUB to choose Technology A. This example
highlights that the target-seeking objective function–and variance minimization–does not
necessarily complement all risk averse preference structures.
A stochastic formulation of the ATC multilevel optimization architecture presup-
poses that the system-level objective function is target-seeking as in Eq. 3.19 [135]. This
represents a special case where SYS is absolute risk averse, and the target-seeking incen-
tive formulation promotes a similar risk attitude for the SUB. However, deviating from an
absolute risk averse, quadratic system-level objective function produces problems when
still using target-seeking incentives, as was just shown. The CO MDO architecture allows
for a more unrestricted system-level objective function, but uses target-seeking objective
functions for subsystem design problems. With out examples above, we show that a SUB
with a target-seeking Piece Rate incentive could choose counter to the preferences of the
SYS. This observation complements the computational criticism of CO of its ability to
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Table 3.3: Example technology distribution characteristics [9].
Technology A Technology B
Distribution of Y Triangular(0.1,0.5,0.8) Uniform(0.2,0.733)
µy 0.467 0.467
σy 0.0205 0.0237
E[U0] 0.84 1.63
converge to an optimal solution [50].
Taylor Series Objective Function Formulation
Collopy proposes formulating z from the first-order Taylor series expansion of the
SYS’s utility function with respect to the subsystem attribute, y [49]. Manipulation of this
expansion yields the following:
z = E
[
dU0
dy
∣∣∣
t
Y
]
=
dU0
dy
∣∣∣
t
E[Y ] =
dU0
dy
∣∣∣
t
µy (3.21)
where µy is the mean of Y and t is not a target here but rather some point about which the
Taylor series is taken. The t notation remains to highlight that this is a point SYS chooses,
similar to targets with the quota and target-seeking approaches. Since the derivative term is
constant, SUB desires to maximize µy if the derivative and KPR1 are positive but minimize
µy if the derivative or KPR1 is negative. Consider again the example scenario in Table 3.2.
With Eq. 3.21, we see that the SUB would choose Technology B, which is preferable to
SYS. In the case of the example in Table 3.3, however, SUB with performance figure of
merit in Eq. 3.21 would be indifferent between between Technologies A and B whereas
SYS prefers Technology B. Therefore, this objective formulation can cause problems when
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SYS is not risk neutral.
While we assume in Eq. 3.1 that SYS utility, U0, is monotonically increasing with
value, V , utility need not be monotonic with subsystem attribute performance, y [4]. Con-
sider the case of the top plot in Fig. 3.6. The SUB has an incentive to maximize y given the
linearization, which is counter to SYS’s preferences. Say SUB chooses an alternative such
that y = 1, if SYS relinearizes U0 with respect to t = 1 and communicates the new gra-
dient to SUB, it is clear to see that SUB is now incentivized to minimize y. The constant
iteration between maximization and minimization of y would not converge. Additionally,
Consider the bottom plot in Fig. 3.6. All outcomes are considered equal given the lin-
earization at the maximimum of U0. If y = 0 is not feasible, the SUB has no guidance for
a second-best solution.
The Bilevel Integrated System Synthesis (BLISS) MDO architecture relies on build-
ing subsystem-level design problems using gradient information from the system-level
design problem as in Eq. 3.21 [136]. Prior research notes that when system design prob-
lems are nonlinear, BLISS has convergence problems [50]. A computational remedy to
convergence issues is to restrict the bounds of y to enforce monotonicity. For example, a
constraint y < 0 would be added to the case in Fig. 3.6 to keep the SUB from going to
y = 1. However, restricting the domain does not mitigate the issue with uncertainty and a
non-risk neutral SYS, as discussed prior.
Taylor–not of Taylor series fame–proposes an alternate solution to the nonmonotonic
situation wherein nonmonotonicity is maintained for dimensions of y that SYS may not
have monotonic preferences [4]. Consider a case where y = [yM , yNM ] where SYS has
monotonic preferences on yM but not on yNM . Taylor’s approach would model z as the
following:
z =
dU0
dy
∣∣∣
t
E [yM ] + E [U0(V (tM , yNM))] (3.22)
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Figure 3.6: (TOP) A case where we linearize U0(V (y)) = 0.5 − y2 around t = −0.25.
(BOTTOM) A case were we linearize U0(V (y)) = 0.5 − y2 around t = 0 (adapted from
Taylor [4]).
where t = [tM , tNM ]. Intuitively, some of the trade-off preference information between
each attribute is lost since we are isolating them into additive terms, but if the domain is
restricted to be relatively small about t, perhaps the approximation is adequate.
An obvious remedy to restricting the domain solution and needing to choose an
adequate t is to set z = E[U0(V (·))]. The Piece Rate structure Eq. 3.17 reformulated with
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this intuitive formulation is
vPRi (E[U0(V (·))]) = KPR1 E[U0(V (·))] +KPR2 (3.23)
Therefore, SUB is directly incentivized to maximize SYS’s utility as opposed to some
highly abstracted approximation of SYS’s utility funciton. Collopy’s approach is to take
the first-order Taylor series approximate of SYS’s utility and the target-seeking is close–
but not exactly synonymous with–to the second-order Taylor series expansion. We see that
when we do approximates of SYS’s utility function, adverse effects can occur where the al-
ternative preferable to SUB is not that which is preferable to SYS. Therefore, we consider
the Piece Rate incentive in Eq. 3.23 as the ideal formulation for a Piece Rate incentive
structure. The Concurrent Subspace Optimization (CSSO) [137], Asymmetric Subspace
Optimization (ASO) [138], and Enhanced Collaborative Optimization (ECO) [139] MDO
architecture formulate subsystem problems directly with the system-level value function.
3.4 Benchmarking Incentive Performance
In the previous section, we examined several different incentive structures and how
appropriate they may be in the context of a VD3 paradigm. Through this journey, we iden-
tify two promising structures: the Variable Ratio structure as formulated in Eq. 3.16 and
the Piece Rate structure as formulated in Eq. 3.23. Both of these structures rely on the SYS
modeling her preferences in U0(·), which means SUB has guidance on how SYS would
deal with uncertainty as well as deal with trade-off between different dimensions in y, i.e.
trade-off between system attributes. This section compares the two promising incentive
structures with Eq. 3.1 to determine the conditions as to when the two incentive structures
are equivalent given a risk neutral SYS. This analysis is done with the assumption that
SUB’s utility function is monotonic with respect to vi(·) and will provide a benchmark
for the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 when we break the aforementioned assumption by
66
incorporating action costs into SUB’s utility function.
We focus on the case where SYS is risk neutral since firms that are well-diversified
or governments that can recoup losses through taxes should effectively be risk neutral
[140–142]. We can posit that the government or large systems engineering firms are well-
diversified such that they are effectively risk neutral; this is not necessarily always true but
offers adequate justification for looking at a risk neutral SYS for benchmarking purposes.
Additionally, we might posit that since the Variable Ratio structure deals in an uncertain
reward amount SYS will have to payout and the Piece Rate structure deals in a certain
reward amount SYS will have to payout, once seeing the resulting design, a risk averse
SYS would prefer the certainty of a Piece Rate structure and a risk taking SYS would
prefer the uncertainty of a Variable Ratio structure. However, there might be a condition
with at least a risk neutral SYS that the two structures are equivalent.
With a risk neutral attitude, SYS’s utility function is the following:
U0 = aV + b = a(vs − vi) + b (3.24)
where a > 0 and b are constants to be used to scale SYS’s utility. Additionally, recall
from Sec. 3.2 that V = vs − vi. The notation of model elements as being functions of
performance, y, is dropped for convenience. With Eq. 3.24 inserted into the Piece Rate
structure in Eq. 3.23, the Piece Rate structure is reformulated as the following:
vPRi =
KPR1
1 + aKPR1
E[UB] +
KPR2
1 + aKPR1
(3.25)
where UB = avs + b. A derivation of this new formulation is found in Appendix B.1.
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Combining Eqs. 3.24 and 3.25 yields SYS’s expected utility as
E[U0] =
(
1
1 + aKPR1
)
E[UB]− aK
PR
2
1 + aKPR1
(3.26)
We see here that SYS’s expected utility increases as E[UB] increases. Since vPRi is mono-
tonically increasing with E[UB] if KPR1 > 0 and we assume that SUB’s utility is monoton-
ically increasing with vPRi , SUB’s utility is maximized if he maximizes E[UB]. Therefore,
SUB desires to maximize E[UB] with the Piece Rate incentive in Eq. 3.23 and thus maxi-
mizes SYS’s expected utility.
Inserting Eq. 3.24 into the Variable Ratio structure in Eq. 3.16 produces the follow-
ing:
vV Ri =

KV R1
1+a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
with probability E[UB]
KV R2
1+a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
with probability 1− E[UB]
(3.27)
The expected value of the Variable Ratio structure yields a similar formulation as Eq. 3.25
as in the following:
E[vV Ri ] =
KV R1 −KV R2
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
E[UB] +
KV R2
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
(3.28)
A derivation of this new formulation is found in Appendix B.2. Combining Eq. 3.28 and
Eq. 3.24 yields SYS’s expected utility as the following:
E[U0] =
(
1
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
)
E[UB]− aK
V R
2
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
(3.29)
Like with the Piece Rate structure, SYS’s expected utility increases when E[UB] increases.
In Eq. 3.14, we establish the SUB wishes to maximize the probability of receiving the
higher reward when given a Variable Ratio structure. In Eq. 3.27, E[UB] is the probability
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of receiving the greater reward so SUB wishes to maximize E[UB].
By inspection, we can see that vPRi = E[v
V R
i ] when K
PR
1 = K
V R
1 − KV R2 and
KPR2 = K
V R
2 . Additionally, both incentive structures induce SUB to maximize E[UB].
Therefore, Eq. 3.26 is equivalent to Eq. 3.29. Let us codify this into the following theorem:
Theorem 8. When (1) SYS is risk neutral, (2) SUB’s utility function is monotonic with
respect to vi, and (3) KPR1 = K
V R
1 − KV R2 and KPR2 = KV R2 , then the Variable Ratio
incentive in Eq. 3.16 and the Piece Rate incentive in Eq. 3.23 produce equivalent expected
utilities for the SYS.
Theorem 8 essentially states sufficient conditions for equivalency between the two incen-
tive structures. This theorem acts as the benchmark for the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
Specifically, we break the assumption that SUB’s utility function is monotonic with vi by
introducing action costs, i.e. the costs or aversions associated with the actions SUB can
take to maximize his utility.
3.5 Discussion
Two promising incentive structures are formulated in this chapter: the Variable Ratio
structure in Eq. 3.16 and the Piece Rate structure in Eq. 3.23. The Variable Ratio structure
originates from a requirements mindset, and the Piece Rate structure originates from an
objective function mindset. Interestingly, both formulations are similar in that they use
SYS’s utility model has the performance figure of merit. We discuss that with both the
Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentives, SUB has an incentive to maximize the delegated
system utility model. Therefore, the primary difference in the two structures from SUB’s
perspective lies in the interpretation of what SYS’s expected utility function is. Once SUB
solves his design problem, there is uncertainty for the SYS is how much she pays out to
SUB with the Variable Ratio formulation but certainty for the payout with the Piece Rate
formulation. According to Theorem 8, there is a case where the two incentive structures
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are equivalent for the SYS.
Perhaps more importantly, the analysis in this chapter supports the wider VDD
hypothesis that model-based communication, i.e. communicating utility models to
guide design activities, supports value maximization better than communicating with
target thresholds or requirements. The prescriptions for writing requirements inherently
creates an orthogonal space from which to choose a design, but we discuss the negative
implications of such an orthogonal space, namely that a design outside of this space could
be more valuable than one inside the space. SUB needs a model of the target space or the
value function itself to ensure all design solutions in the target region are more preferred to
those outside it. In the cases where SYS would communicate a target or target threshold–
namely using requirements or target-seeking incentives, we provide examples where the
SUB would choose an alternative that conflicts with what the SYS would choose had she
made the decision directly. Additionally, the two promising incentive structures identified
in this chapter use a utility model as the performance figure of merit. Support for model-
based communication over point-based communication suggest MDO architectures may
be appropriate to serve as frameworks for structuring VD3.
Consider again Holmström’s Sufficient Statistic Theorem in Theorem 6. This the-
orem states that any performance metric that could be informative of an agent’s actions
should be incorporated in an incentive. In Sec. 3.3.4, we show that the target-seeking,
or squared distance to a target, metric may not be an appropriate metric since it could in-
centivize an agent to choose contrary to the SYS’s preferences. The same could be said
for a linearization of the central value function with respect to subsystem attributes as in
Collopy’s method. From our Variable Ratio and Piece Rate formulations, system value–or
utility–seems to be an appropriate metric for incentivizes. This choice of metric makes
sense as system value/utility is what the SYS uses to judge the quality of designs anyway.
This conclusion lends to a hypothesis that the SUBs’ objective functions should mirror
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the SYS’s objective function, and therefore, SUBs should be concerned with building the
best possible system and not necessarily the best possible subsystem. This hypothesis
complements the mirroring hypothesis, also known as Conway’s law, which hypothesizes
that an organization’s structure and the structure of an engineered system mirror each
other [143, 144].
Several MDO architectures use the system-level objective function for the objective
functions of subsystem-level problems, including the Concurrent Subspace Optimization
(CSSO) [137], Asymmetric Subspace Optimization (ASO) [138], and Enhanced Collabo-
rative Optimization (ECO) [139] architectures. Therefore, these architectures complement
the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive structures formulated in this chapter and may
be appropriate for forming the basis for a formal VD3 architecture. This is not to say
that other architectures, like ATC or BLISS, have no place in VD3. However, these may
constitute architectures to be used in special cases such as SYS’s utility is quadratic with
ATC or SYS’s utility is linear with BLISS.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter is all about formulation, and through our discussion on incentive struc-
tures, we formulate two promising incentive structures: the Variable Ratio structure in Eq.
3.16 and the Piece Rate structure in Eq. 3.23. Prior work notes that utility functions can
have the same properties as a probability function and thus utility and probability are re-
lated [121]. With the Variable Ratio incentive formulation in Eq. 3.16, we are effectively
proposing using the utility-as-a-distribution interpretation as a framework for modeling
uncertain targets thresholds/requirements. With the Piece Rate incentive formulation in
Eq. 3.23, we are effectively proposing a form of profit sharing, where if the system value
increases, SUB’s reward increases as well.
Even though the Variable Ratio structure originates from a requirements perspective
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and the Piece Rate Structure originates from an objective function perspective, the two
incentive structures converge to very similar formulations that use SYS’s utility model
directly. Therefore, this chapter addressed the first research issue by formulating com-
parable, promising incentive structures from the legacy approach–requirements–and the
proposed approach–objective function–for design delegation. Ideally, the two structures
produce the same design result since one structure is a tautology of the other. Theorem
8 states sufficient conditions for when the two promising incentive structures are equiva-
lent. The next two chapters test Theorem 8 by comparing the incentive structures when
SUB’s action costs are incorporated into his decision model, thus breaking the condition
in Theorem 8 that SUB’s utility is monotonic with incentive reward.
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4. INCENTIVE PERFORMANCE AND THE EFFORT PROVISION PROBLEM
4.1 Introduction to the Chapter
In the previous chapter, we identify two promising incentive structures that are built
around a utility model formulated from SYS’s preferences. These promising structures are
the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive structures formulated in Eqs. 3.16 and 3.23,
respectively. Since both of these structures are built around SYS’s preferences, the SUB is
motivated to make trade-offs between subsystem attributes and to deal with uncertainty in
a manner that is consistent with SYS’s preferences. What is unclear, however, is how these
incentive structures motivate SUB’s to search for optimal design solutions. Searching for
an optimal design solution requires effort on the part of the SUB, and the amount of effort
the SUB applies lends to the SUB’s idea of a design that is "good enough". In this chapter,
effort is not considered "free" so greater amounts of effort come with a greater effort cost
or disutility.
In this chapter, we evaluate and compare how our Variable Ratio and Piece Rate in-
centive structures motivate a SUB to apply effort toward searching for a design solution.
Therefore, this chapter addresses the second research issue of evaluating the incentives:
particularly when the cost of searching for design solutions is considered. Effort costs in
the context of this dissertation are not necessarily monetary but this terms refers to the
more general disutility or aversion to expending effort. Theorem 8 states that when not
considering these costs, the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive structures are equiva-
lent when SYS is risk neutral and the incentive parameters have a certain relationship. This
chapter tests Theorem 8 in the presence of effort costs. In the remainder of this chapter,
we formulate SUB’s effort provision problem and analyze it analytically and numerically
to determine cases where one incentive induces greater performance than the other. Re-
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sults from an abstract numerical experiment are verified against an engineering example
study that represents a SUB designing a vehicle’s multiratio transmission. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of results.
4.2 Model Formulation
The purpose of this section is to formulate the model that is analyzed in the remain-
der of this chapter. First, we present the basic effort provision problem and identify the
major elements in this model. We then discuss some of the major elements in the context of
engineering design and establish their properties assumed in this dissertation. Since SYS’s
utility is dependent on the performance of SUB’s design solution and we wish to compare
the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive formulations on how they impact SYS’s utility,
we reformulate the effort provision model using the properties of its elements to abstract
away the effort term itself so we have a model in terms of ex post performance. Ex post
performance refers to the performance resulting from a particular amount of effort. We
call this abstracted model the performance provision model, and this model is the basis for
the analyses conducted later in this chapter.
4.2.1 Effort Provision Model
The effort provision model modifies the SUB problem in Fig. 3.1 by using effort,
ai ≥ 0, as the decision variable and introducing effort cost, ca(ai|·), as in the following:
maximize
ai≥0
E [Ui (vi(z)− ca(ai|θi)|θi)] (4.1)
where Ui(·) is SUB i’s utility function characterizing his risk preferences, vi(·) is his al-
located incentive structure, z is the performance figure of merit, and θi is SUB i’s type.
SUB i’s type θi defines his (1) risk preferences, (2) design problem characteristics, and
(3) effort costs. The incentive structure vi(·) is defined by SYS and is thus not considered
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directly dependent on θi in this model.
We are explicitly concerned with the validity of Theorem 8 when effort cost is in-
cluded. Therefore, SYS is risk neutral, and we can consider specific the Variable Ratio
and Piece Rate incentive formulations in Eqs. 3.27 and 3.25, respectively, to define what z
is. For convenience, we will restate these formulations. The Variable Ratio structure given
a risk neutral SYS is the following:
vV Ri =

KˆV R1 with probability E[UB]
KˆV R2 with probability 1− E[UB]
(4.2)
The Piece Rate structure given a risk neutral SYS is the following:
vPRi = Kˆ
PR
1 E[UB] + Kˆ
PR
2 (4.3)
Recall E[UB] is a positive affine transformation of the system value, vs, that doesn’t ac-
count for incentive costs. Since E[UB] is the performance figure of merit for both of these
formulations, z = E[UB], but we will continue to use the notation z for conciseness. Be-
fore we can analyze the effort provision problem, we need to establish the relationship
between effort, ai, and the performance figure of merit, z. We call this relationship the
production technology. Additionally, we need to understand effort costs. The characteris-
tics of the production technology and effort cost are discussed below.
4.2.2 Production Technology
In economics, production technology–or the production function–relates the factors
of production to the quality or quantity of some output [145]. Factors of production typi-
cally include capital or labor. Therefore, a classical production technology function might,
for example, relate the number of widgets a factor produces to the amount of man-hours
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expended. For the purposes of this dissertation, we reinterpret production technology us-
ing the following definition:
Definition 12. (Production Technology) Production technology, f , is the type-dependent
mapping of effort space, Ai, to the performance figure of merit space, Z, such that f :
Ai ×Θi → Z. Specifically, production technology yields the ex post performance figure
of merit value, zˆ ∈ Z of applying effort ai ∈ Ai given type θi ∈ Θi such that zˆ = f(ai|θi).
Intuitively, for any change in z, SUB i must apply effort ai > 0. Our production technol-
ogy definition gives us a relationship between effort and the resulting performance of that
effort. If we consider the performance term, z, in the effort provision model in Eq. 4.1 to
be the result of a certain effort, ai, then we can substitute z with the ex post performance
value, zˆ = f(ai|θi), such that Eq. 4.1 becomes the following:
maximize
ai≥0
E [Ui (vi(f(ai|θi))− ca(ai|θi)|θi)] (4.4)
Prior research draws an analogy between the way designers solve design problems
and iterative optimization algorithms [31,146–150]. Effort is similar to the use of iterations
in an optimization algorithm; as more effort is applied to solving a design problem, the
quality of the solution against some figure of merit generally increases. Based off this
prior research, we can make assumptions on the properties of the production technology
by observing the relationship between the number of iterations used in an optimization
algorithm and the ex post objective function value; see Fig. 4.1. For this dissertation, we
make the following assumptions on the production technology:
Assumption 1. (Strictly Increasing) f is strictly increasing over Ai for all θi ∈ Θi.
Assumption 2. (Concave) f is concave over Ai for all θi ∈ Θi.
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Figure 4.1: Similarities and differences in iterative performance between the Method of
Steepest Ascent, the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method, and mean of
100 simulated annealing runs for maximizing the inverse of Rosenbrock’s banana function.
This shows how the ex post Rosenbrock function value, cf. zˆ, is dependent on the number
of iterations, cf. ai , used in a given optimization routine.
The first assumption may be strong since it is conceivable that an increase in effort does
not lead to an increase in ex post performance. For example, no matter how much effort is
applied, efficiency of any system can be greater than one. However, the strict monotonicity
assumption will give us some affordability in the analysis in this chapter. We can mitigate
the problem of physical impossibilities happening, e.g. efficiency greater than one, by
assuming the production technology has some asymptote, θmi .
The studies mentioned above note that engineers have heterogeneity in how they
convert resources (effort) into a design solution, which is analogous to differences in per-
formance between optimization routines; see Fig. 4.1. In Assumptions 1 and 2, we assume
strict monotonicity and concavity for all types. Therefore, SUB i’s type, θi, controls in part
the rate of increase of the ex post performance with an increase in effort and the concavity
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of the production technology. The shape of the production technology is arguably de-
pendent on (1) the physical constraints of the design problem–e.g. a hydraulic pump’s
efficiency will never be greater than 1 no matter how much effort is applied, (2) the de-
signer’s skill–e.g. an experienced pump designer is likely to design a highly efficient pump
with less effort than a novice designer, and (3) the design process used–e.g. a more auto-
mated process may reach a given design sooner than a less automated one. In summary,
the production technology considered in this research directly relates effort to ex post per-
formance, has the properties in Assumptions 1 and 2, and is type dependent as allowed by
Assumptions 1 and 2.
4.2.3 Effort Cost
A key assumption in Eq. 4.1 and agency theory models at large is that effort is costly;
more effort accrues more costs to the SUB [101]. Effort cost is not necessarily monetary.
Rather, the effort cost term represents the aversion to or disutility generated from applying
effort to a task. The simplest way of modeling effort cost is as a linear function as in the
following:
ca(ai|θi) = θciai (4.5)
where θci is the marginal increase in cost and is apart of type, θi. Continuing the optimiza-
tion analogy with effort provision, each iteration of an optimization run costs a certain
number of function evaluations or time, and the total cost of an optimization run is the
number of iterations (ai) times the cost of one iteration (θci ).
4.2.4 Performance Provision Model
In this section, we use Assumptions 1 and 2 to reformulate the effort provision model
in Eq. 4.1 in terms of ex post performance, zˆ. Consider the following lemmata:
Lemma 9. Let g : X→ Y be a strictly increasing function on its domain X. Then:
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• g has an inverse g−1
• g−1 is strictly increasing on Y.
Lemma 10. Let g : X → Y be a strictly increasing, concave function on its domain X.
Then its inverse g−1 is convex on Y.
The proofs of Lemmata 9 and 10 are in Binmore [151] §12. Since we established that the
production technology is considered strictly increasing, we can invert it due to Lemma 9
to derive an expression for ai in terms of zˆ:
ai = f
−1(zˆ|θi) (4.6)
Given Eq. 4.6, the cost associated with obtaining a certain ex post performance, zˆ, can be
derived such that
cz(zˆ|θi) = θcif−1(zˆ|θi) (4.7)
Lemma 10 states that f−1(·) is convex, so cz(zˆ|θi) is also convex–contrasting with the
linear ca(ai|θi). The convexity assumption of cz(zˆ|θi) is consistent principal-agent models
studied in the agency theory literature. In these very abstracted models, task outcome is
essentially the effort an agent chooses, and the cost of that effort is convex [101].
Since f(ai|θi) = zˆ and ca(ai|θi) = cz(zˆ|θi), we reformulate SUB’s utility as the
following:
Ui (vi(f(ai|θi))− cz(ai|θi)|θi) = Ui (vi(zˆ)− cz(zˆ|θi)|θi) (4.8)
Using this reformulation of SUB’s utility, we can formulate a new decision model for SUB
in terms of zˆ as in the following:
maximize
zˆ
E [Ui (vi(zˆ)− cz(zˆ|θi)|θi)] (4.9)
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We will refer to this decision model as the performance provision model to avoid confusion
with the effort provision model in Eq. 4.1.
The abstracted model in Eq. 4.9 is beneficial because we deal directly with zˆ. How-
ever, we must show that the performance provision model in Eq. 4.9 is equivalent to the
effort provision model in Eq. 4.1. Equivalency denotes a relationship between the optimal
effort, a∗i , found with Eq. 4.1 and the optimal performance, zˆ
∗, found with Eq. 4.9, such
that zˆ∗ = f(a∗i |θi)⇔ f−1(zˆ∗|θi) = a∗i . Given the relation in Eq. 4.8 and zˆ = f(ai|θi), the
optimality condition for maximizing SUB’s expected utility with respect to effort is the
following:
dE[Ui]
dzˆ
∣∣∣
zˆ=f(a∗i |θi)
× df
dai
∣∣∣
a∗i
= 0 (4.10)
The optimality condition for maximizing SUB’s utility with respect to zˆ is the following:
dE[Ui]
dzˆ
∣∣∣
zˆ∗
= 0 (4.11)
Clearly, Eq. 4.10 is satisfied wherever Eq. 4.11 is satisfied such that a∗i = f
−1(zˆ∗|θi).
We need to consider the case when only df
dai
∣∣∣
a∗i
= 0 in Eq. 4.10. This case implies
that there is a solution to the effort provision problem in Eq. 4.1 but there is no solution
to the performance provision problem in Eq. 4.9 since Eq. 4.11 would not be satisfied for
any zˆ. However, df
dai
∣∣∣
a∗i
= 0 is not possible given Assumptions 1 and 2 and given no upper
bound for effort, ai such that for any effort level, there is always an effort level greater than
that one. If there exists a stationary point, a∗i , such that
df
dai
∣∣∣
a∗i
= 0, then for all ai > a∗i ,
f(ai|θi) < f(a∗i |θi) if a∗i is a maximum or f(ai|θi) becomes convex if a∗i is an inflection
point. These two cases violate Assumptions 1 and 2. Therefore, there is no solution to the
effort provision problem if there is no solution to the performance provision problem.
Theorem 11. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the solution to the performance provision
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model is necessarily equivalent to the solution to the effort provision model such that
zˆ∗ = f(a∗i |θi)⇔ f−1(zˆ∗|θi) = a∗i .
The implication of Theorem 11 is that we can draw conclusions using the performance
provision model to are still valid for the effort provision model. Therefore, the analysis in
the rest of this chapter uses the performance provision model in Eq. 4.9.
4.3 Preliminary Analysis
With the basic performance provision model established in Eq. 4.9, we analyze
the optimality condition of the Piece Rate and Variable Ratio incentive formulations to
identify model elements that influence the optimal ex post performance value, zˆ∗.
4.3.1 Piece Rate Incentive Analysis
The performance provision model in Eq. 4.9 with the Piece Rate incentive in Eq.
3.23 is formulated below:
maximize
zˆPR
Ui
(
KˆPR1 zˆPR + Kˆ
PR
2 − cz(zˆPR|θi)|θi
)
(4.12)
Applying the optimality condition in Eq. 4.11 to Eq. 4.12 yields the following:
U ′i(Kˆ
PR
1 zˆ
∗
PR + Kˆ
PR
2 − cz(zˆ∗PR|θi))×
[
KˆPR1 − c′z(zˆ∗PR)
]
= 0 (4.13)
Note: θi is dropped from this notation for conciseness. It is clear to see the utility deriva-
tive term U ′i drops out, and the difference in the second term defines SUB i’s optimal ex
post performance. We already established that cz(·) is convex with respect to zˆPR. From
rearranging the remaining term, the optimal performance, zˆ∗PR, is the following:
zˆ∗PR = c
′ −1
z (Kˆ
PR
1 ) (4.14)
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Therefore, SUB i’s optimal performance increases as incentive parameter KˆPR1 increases
and is not dependent on SUB i’s risk attitude as characterized by Ui(·).
4.3.2 Variable Ratio Incentive Analysis
The performance provision model in Eq. 4.9 with the Variable Ratio incentive in Eq.
3.16 is formulated below:
maximize
zˆV R
zˆV RUi
(
KˆV R1 − cz(zˆV R|θi)|θi
)
+ (1− zˆV R)Ui
(
KˆV R2 − cz(zˆV R|θi)|θi
)
(4.15)
Applying the optimality condition in Eq. 4.11 to Eq. 4.15 yields the following:
Ui(Kˆ
V R
2 − cz(zˆ∗V R))− Ui(KˆV R1 − cz(zˆ∗V R)) + U ′i(KˆV R2 − cz(zˆ∗V R))× c′z(zˆ∗V R)
+
[
U ′i(Kˆ
V R
1 − cz(zˆ∗V R))− U ′i(KˆV R2 − cz(zˆ∗V R))
]
× zˆ∗V R × c′z(zˆ∗V R) = 0
(4.16)
By inspection, this condition is much more complex than what we derived for the Piece
Rate incentive in Eq. 4.13. This condition is nonlinear in zˆ∗V R, and thus we cannot derive
a simple expression for zˆ∗V R as we did for zˆ
∗
PR in Eq. 4.14 without functional forms for
utility, Ui(·), and performance cost, cz(·). That being said, the optimal performance, zˆ∗V R,
is dependent on risk attitude as characterized by Ui(·), which is intuitive as risk attitude
would determine how SUB trades effort for uncertainty in his reward. This contrasts with
the optimal outcome produced by the Piece Rate incentive, which is not dependent on
risk atttitude. Therefore, we cannot expect the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive
structures to produce the same outcome when effort aversion is present.
4.4 Comparative Analysis
In the previous chapter, we show that the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentives
are equivalent given the conditions in Theorem 8. With the previous section establishing
that the optimal performance from a Piece Rate incentive zˆ∗PR and the optimal perfor-
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mance from a Variable Ratio incentive zˆ∗V R are not necessarily the same when we consider
effort aversion, this section compares a risk neutral SYS’s preference for each incentive
structure when we incorporate effort aversion given the incentive parameter relationships
given above. Under these conditions, Variable Ratio produces a higher expected utility for
SYS if zˆ∗V R > zˆ
∗
PR. The general strategy for this analysis is to first assign parameterized
models to represent SUB i’s utility Ui(·) and performance cost cz(·), with type θi relating
to the specific parameter values used in these models. Then, the performance provision
models in Eqs. 4.12 and 4.15 are solved to obtain zˆ∗PR and zˆ
∗
V R, respectively, with varying
model parameter values. Appropriate utility, Ui(·), and performance cost, cz(·), models
are formulated in the following section.
4.4.1 Parametric Model Formulation
Risk Attitude
Empirical evidence from the behavioral economics and psychology literature sug-
gests that decision makers have different risk attitudes for outcomes they perceive as pos-
itive and for outcomes they perceive as negative [152–155]. We care about both positive
and negative outcomes since there may be cases where incentive payout is greater than as-
sociated costs yielding a positive effective payout as well as cases where incentive payout
is less than associated costs yielding negative effective payout. Tversky and Kahneman
provide a parameterized utility function to describe these risk preferences [153]:
Ui(pi) =

piα pi ≥ 0
−λ(−pi)β pi < 0
(4.17)
where α, β, and λ relate to relative risk aversion in the positive outcome region, relative
risk aversion in the negative outcome region, and the relative slope steepness between
the positive and negative utilities, respectively. Figure 4.2 shows the general shape of Eq.
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Figure 4.2: The shape of the utility function in Eq. 4.17 with α = 0.655, β = 0.678, and
λ = 2.16.
4.17. Other functional forms exist for characterizing general risk attitude trends (see [154])
but the form in Eq. 4.17 is attractive because it can represent risk neutral preferences by
setting α = 1 and β = 1.
As mentioned, the parameters α and β directly define the relative risk aversion in
the positive and negative outcome regions, respectively. Recall Eq. 2.4 where we define
relative risk aversion from the first and second derivatives of a utilty function. From Eqs.
4.17 and 2.4, the relative risk aversion for the positive outcome region is R+ and for the
negative outcome region is R− as defined in the following:
R+ = 1− α (4.18a)
R− = β − 1 (4.18b)
It is desirable to reformulate Eq. 4.17 in terms of relative risk aversion so we can easily
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identify values that given risk taking and risk averse preferences. Reformulating Eq. 4.17
in terms of relative risk aversion yields the following:
Ui(pi|θi) =

pi1−R
+
pi ≥ 0
−λ(−pi)R−−1 pi < 0
(4.19)
The parameters R+, R−, and λ are included in defining type, θi.
Abdellaoui et al. elicits these parameters from 48 economics students over monetary
outcomes using the certainty equivalent technique described in Sec. 2.2 [156]. Assuming
the provided parameters are not drastically different from parameters we would elicit from
engineers, we use Abdellaoui et al. ’s data to characterize the space for R+, R−, and λ
feasible values using a support vector domain description (SVDD). We do not characterize
the parameter space bounds with a hypercube so we do not sample and test points in the
parameter space that are not represented by the empirical data. SVDD takes an algorithmic
approach for predicting a data set’s boundary in Euclidean space [157, 158]. Using DD
Tools for MATLAB [159], an SVDD is wrapped around Abdellaoui et al. ’s data. A given
risk attitude parameter set x = [R+, R−, λ] is within the feasible space if W > r2(x)
where W is determined by the SVDD algorithm and
r2(x) = G(x, x)− 2
∑
i
γiG(x
SV
i , x)−
∑
i
∑
j
γiγjG(x
SV
i , x
SV
j ) (4.20)
where
G(xi, xj) = exp(−q‖xi − xj‖2) (4.21)
is a Gaussian kernel and γ, xSV , and q are determined by the SVDD algorithm. The
specific W , γ, xSV , and q values for the SVDD characterizing Abdellaoui et al. ’s data are
given in Table C.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.3: (LEFT) Abdellaoui et al. utility parameter data. (RIGHT) SVDD wrapped
around the parameter data set.
Performance Cost
Earlier in the chapter, we assumed properties for the production technology and
related these to performance cost, cz(·). Despite this, there is not an empirically generated
model of the production technology, f(·), or performance cost, both of which are related
through the set of properties we assigned. Laffont and Martimort suggest a cost function
that acts like a barrier function when the decision variable is bounded between 0 and 1 is
appropriate [101]. Performance cost as a logarithmic barrier function is given below:
cz(zˆ|θi) = −ρ ln(θmi − zˆ) = θci ×
(
− ρ
θci
ln(θmi − zˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f−1(zˆ|θi)
(4.22)
where ρ is the barrier function parameter and θmi represents the maximum possible value
of zˆ obtainable by SUB i. Compare Eq. 4.22 with Eq. 4.7. Figure 4.4 shows the shape
of Eq. 4.22. From the production technology discussion above, the parameter θmi depends
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Figure 4.4: The shape of the outcome cost function in Eq. 4.22 with ρ = 1 and θmi = 1.
on the physics or other constraints of the artifact being designed, e.g. mass cannot be zero
or negative, and the skill of the SUB, e.g. an unskilled SUB may not be able to decrease
mass below some threshold. In the previous chapter, we actively normalize zˆ = E[UB]
so that it can act as a probability distribution for the Variable Ratio incentive. Assuming
normalization is done in such an ideal way that obtaining an outcome zˆ = 1 is very difficult
or perhaps represents the physical limit of what is possible, θmi = 1, and we will only
consider this case when comparing the two incentive structures in the following analysis.
Using the barrier function in Eq. 4.22 seems appropriate and exhibits the monotonicity
and convexity properties we establish earlier. The barrier parameter, ρ, contributes to
defining the marginal rate of increase in cost and is included in defining type such that
θi = [R
+, R−, λ, ρ].
The range of barrier parameter values we would be interested in depends on the
incentive parameters KˆPR1 = (Kˆ
V R
1 − KˆV R2 ) and KˆPR2 = KˆV R2 . Consider the optimal
outcome from a Piece Rate incentive given in Eq. 4.14, and using the logarithmic barrier
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Figure 4.5: Sampling 936 risk attitude parameter points within the risk parameter SVDD.
representation of cz(·), the optimal outcome zˆ∗PR is the following:
zˆ∗PR = 1−
ρ
KˆPR1
= 1− ρˆ (4.23)
When the ratio ρˆ = ρ/KˆPR1 > 1, the optimal outcome zˆ∗PR < 0, which we can interpret
as the SUB would have no incentive to apply any effort in his design problem. Since this
case is uninteresting, we limit the range of the barrier parameter such that ρ = ρˆKˆPR1 =
ρˆ(KˆV R1 − KˆV R2 ) where 0 < ρˆ < 1.
4.4.2 Experiment Design
For the comparative analysis, the risk attitude parameter SVDD is densely and uni-
formly sampled to generate a cohort of 936 points of feasible risk parameters R+, R−,
and λ, see Fig. 4.5. For each of these risk parameter sets, zˆ∗PR and zˆ
∗
V R are solved from
Eqs. 4.12 and 4.15 for four values of Kˆ1 and four values of ρˆ, thus zˆ∗PR and zˆ
∗
V R are
determined for each point in the risk attitude parameter sample in 16 conditions. The
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Figure 4.6: Comparative study procedure summary.
conditions are defined by combinations of Kˆ1 = KˆPR1 = Kˆ
V R
1 = [1, 10, 100, 1000] and
ρˆ = [0.01, 0.25, 0.75, 0.99]; KˆPR2 = Kˆ
V R
2 = 0. For each combination of Kˆ1 and ρˆ, we
measure the incentive that produces the greater performance, zˆ∗, for each point in the co-
hort as well as the proportion of the cohort where the Variable Ratio incentive produces
the highest outcome. The procedure is summarized in Fig. 4.6.
4.4.3 Results
The results of the comparative study are summarized in Figs. 4.7 – 4.11. Figure
4.7 summarizes the more general results wherein we can see that at low Kˆ1 and ρˆ values,
the Variable Ratio incentive structures produces an as-good or better outcome in a larger
proportion of the cohort. For low values of Kˆ1 and high values of ρˆ, the Piece Rate
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Figure 4.7: Changes in the population proportion that the Variable Ratio produces an
outcome at least as good as the Piece Rate with changes in Kˆ1 and ρˆ; 95% confidence
intervals included.
incentive produces the more preferable outcome in slightly more than half of the cohort.
As Kˆ1 increases, the proportion of Variable Ratio winning approaches 0.5 for all values of
ρˆ.
Figures 4.8 – 4.11 give more context into the circumstances for when the Piece Rate
incentive is worse than the Variable Ratio incentive. These figures show strong dependence
between the type parameters and which incentive performs better. Despite the value of
Kˆ1, the Variable Ratio wins out fairly robustly for low values of ρˆ with risk aversion for
positive outcomes (R+ > 0) and risk taking for negative outcomes (R− < 0). This is
not necessarily the case for high values of ρˆ, but generally the Piece Rate wins with risk
aversion for both positive and negative outcomes (R+ > 0 andR− > 0). This trend breaks
down in the case where Kˆ1 = 1. There is no clear trend in incentive comparison and λ.
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Table 4.1: Utility parameter values for transmission design case study.
Utility Parameter Value
R+ 0.345
R− −0.322
λ 2.16
4.5 Verification Case Study: Vehicle Transmission Design
In this section, we seek to verify the results gathered in the previous section by
simulating a designer searching for optimal transmission ratios for a vehicle. Particularly,
we seek to verify that the effort level a SUB provides is incentive formulation dependent.
This case study differs from the previous numerical analysis in that here we are (1) adding
the physics of a vehicle driving the HWFET driving cycle and (2) not assigning parametric
forms for either the production technology or effort cost. We retain the parametric utility
model in Eq. 4.17, however, and set the utility type parameters to those in Table 4.1. These
values represent the average parameter values in Abdellaoui et al. ’s data and places the
designer in the region defined by risk aversion for positive payouts (R+ > 0) and risk
taking for negative payouts (R− < 0).
Prior work simulates the way human designers search for design solutions using
simulated annealing algorithms [31, 146–150]. Therefore, this study uses MATLAB’s
native simulated annealing optimization algorithm to simulate a SUB searching the design
space to be consistent with prior work and to test the mathematical results from earlier in
the chapter. The number of iterations used to solve the design problem is the analog to the
amount of effort provided, and the cumulative number of function evaluations is the analog
to effort cost. For each iteration, we calculate SUB’s utility given each type of incentive,
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Figure 4.12: Verification case study procedure summary.
then determine SUB’s optimal number of iterations (effort) for each incentive. With a high
enough incentive parameter Kˆ1, the marginal increase in cost relative to Kˆ1 is effectively
small, and we would expect the optimal number of iterations (effort) to be higher with the
Variable Ratio structure given the results we obtain in the previous section. Therefore,
we test the cases where Kˆ1 = 500 and Kˆ1 = 1000 for each incentive structure, and since
the simulated annealing algorithm is stochastic, we repeat each test case 200 times. The
procedure is summarized in Fig. 4.12.
Since we are computing the optimal number of iterations for both incentive struc-
tures in each simulated annealing run, the data collected for each test case of Kˆ1 is paired.
Therefore, we use the paired Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to test the following hypotheses
without assuming normal distributions for the computed optimal number of iterations:
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Null Hypothesis: The median difference between pairs of optimal number of iterations
given each incentive structure is zero.
Alternative Hypothesis: The median difference between pairs of optimal number of
iterations given each incentive structure is not zero.
We require 95% confidence to either reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.
4.5.1 Problem Description
The utility model a risk neutral SYS formulates for SUB’s incentive structure is
dependent on the fuel economy measured from the HWFET driving cycle and is as in the
following:
E[UB(vs(y))] =
1500y − 30000
75000− 30000 (4.24)
where y is fuel economy in miles per gallon. The HWFET driving cycle represents high-
way driving and is shown in Fig. 4.13. SUB’s task is to design a multi-ratio transmission
to maximize Eq. 4.24. For this case study, the multi-ratio transmission is fixed to have five
speeds such that the transmission schedule is the following:
Ξt(x˙) =

ξ1 0 < x˙ ≤ 4.47
ξ2 4.47 < x˙ ≤ 8.49
ξ3 8.49 < x˙ ≤ 12.5
ξ4 12.5 < x˙ ≤ 17.5
ξ5 17.5 < x˙
(4.25)
where x˙ is vehicle velocity in meters per second, and ξ{1,2,3,4,5} are gear ratios to be deter-
mined by SUB. Speed is given in meters-per-second.
Fuel economy is measured as the distance traveled in the HWFET driving cycle
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Figure 4.13: HWFET driving cycle [5].
divided by the total volume of fuel used. Distance and volume consumption are determined
by analysis models containing the dynamics of the vehicle as it drives the driving cycle.
The analysis model used to derive fuel economy is given below [160]:
x¨ =
ξdΞtTe
rm
− ρaCdAd
2m
x˙2 − Crg (Linear Dynamics)
m˙ = ωeTege (Mass Dynamics)
Q˙ =
m˙
ρf
(Fuel Volume Dynamics)
ωe =
ξdΞt
r
x˙ (Engine Speed)
Te = (vd − x˙)
(
Π
ωo
+
Π
ω2o
ωe − Π
ω3o
ω2e
)
(Engine Torque)
ge = H1 +H2ωe +H3Te +H4ω
2
e +H5ωeTe +H6T
2
e (Specific Fuel Consumption)
(4.26)
MATLAB code for this set of dynamic equations is given in Appendix C.2, and Table
4.2 describes the parameters of this model. Note that vd is the demanded velocity of the
HWFET driving cycle, and we see that the analysis model depends on the multi-ratio
transmission model in Eq. 4.25. Fuel economy, y, is computed from the final amount of
fuel volume used, Qf , during the driving cycle divided by the distance traveled, xf , such
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that y = h xf
Qf
, where h is a conversion constant to ensure units of miles per gallon.
Prior research uses simulated annealing to simulate designers searching for design
solutions [31, 146–150]. The generic simulated annealing algorithm pseudocode is given
below:
Algorithm 1: Simulated Annealing
input : Initial design solution Ξ0 and temperature T0
output: Optimized design solution Ξ∗
for q = 0 to qmax do
Temperature T = T0 − qqmax ;
Randomly generate new design solution, Ξnew;
if exp
(
−vS(Ξnew)−vS(Ξq)
T
)
≥ random(0,1) then
ξq+1 = ξnew ;
end
end
In this pseudocode, random(0, 1) represents a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Us-
ing the simulated annealing algorithm to solve the optimization problem
maximize
ξ1,2,3,4,5
UB(vS(y))
subject to y = Fdynamics(ξ1,2,3,4,5)
(4.27)
yields the behavior shown in Fig. 4.14. Note that there are no uncertain terms in the model
in Eq. 4.26 so the expectation in the objective function Eq. 4.24 is dropped. We see that
the average relationship between iteration and objective function output maintains the as-
sumptions we established earlier in the chapter: monotonically increasing with iteration
and concave. Additionally, we state that the number of function evaluations acts as our ef-
fort cost, and we see in Fig. 4.14 shows a linear relationship between iteration and number
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Table 4.2: Vehicle model parameters.
Symbol Description Value Units
ξd Differential Gear Ratio 3.55 N/A
r Tire Radius 0.305 [m]
Ad Frontal Vehicle Area 2 [m2]
Cd Drag Coefficient 0.4 N/A
Cr Rolling Resistance Coefficient 0.01 N/A
g Gravitational Acceleration 9.81
[
m
s2
]
ρa Air Density 1.2041
[ kg
m3
]
ρf Fuel Density 718.95
[ kg
m3
]
Π Maximum Engine Power 119.312 [kW]
ωo Engine Speed at Max Power 439.74
[
rad
s
]
H1
Brake Specific Fuel Consumption Map Parameters
1.8049e-7 N/A
H2 -3.8471e-11 N/A
H3 -4.7946e-10 N/A
H4 1.7641e-13 N/A
H5 -1.2664e-13 N/A
H6 8.9010e-13 N/A
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Figure 4.14: (TOP) Relationship between iteration and ex post objective function value zˆ
highlighting mean and standard deviation. (BOTTOM) Relationship between number of
function evaluations ca and iteration.
of function evaluations matching our baseline model in Eq. 4.5. With these observations,
we would expect to reject the null hypothesis for both Kˆ1 test cases given the results of
the simple comparative study in the previous section.
4.5.2 Results
The distributions of optimal number of iterations for each test case are given in Fig.
4.15. This figure also shows the distributions for the paired difference optimal number of
iterations for both Kˆ1 test bases. For our 200 samples in each test case, we see that the
mean optimal number of iterations is greater given the Variable Ratio incentive structure
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Table 4.3: Statistics from paired Wilcoxon signed rank test for each Kˆ1 test case.
Test Case Z Statistic p-value
Kˆ1 = 500 3.2712 0.0011
Kˆ1 = 1000 5.0896 < 0.0001
despite the value of Kˆ1. The paired Wilcoxon signed rank test indicates that median dif-
ference between pairs of optimal number of iterations given each incentive structure is not
zero for either the Kˆ1 = 500 nor Kˆ1 = 1000 test case. See Table 4.3 for test statistics.
Therefore, the null hypotheses for the two Kˆ1 test cases are rejected. Rejection of the
null hypotheses and the trends shown in Fig. 4.15 suggest the Variable Ratio incentive
promotes greater effort provision, and greater effort provision means a higher objective
function value due to Fig. 4.14.
4.6 Discussion
The analysis in this chapter shows that Theorem 8 fails when SUBs consider their
effort cost. This is to say that the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive formulations
do not necessarily motivate a SUB to provide the same amount of effort toward solving a
design problem. This result is important for future work on modeling engineering decision
makers. Particularly on the question of whether we need to model action cost or if we need
to model action cost in certain scenarios and not others. In a hypothetical human study,
the incentive formulations used to yield Theorem 8 can be used, and if the two incentive
formulations do not correlate with significantly different results then effort cost may not
be needed in a model of an engineer solving a problem. However, if the two incentive
formulations do correlate to significantly different results, support is given to the modeling
choice of incorporating actions cost, or action cost-like term, into a model of an engineer
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test case with sample means highlighted.
103
solving a problem.
The comparative analysis shows the Variable Ratio incentive structure produces a
higher ex post performance, zˆ, than the Piece Rate structure in the risk attitude parameter
region defined by risk aversion for positive payouts (R+ > 0) and risk taking for negative
payouts (R− < 0) when the marginal increase in costs is low. The numerical simulation
of a designer searching for a vehicle transmission design also suggests that the Variable
Ratio structure promotes greater effort provision and thus greater value to the SYS. This
result makes sense since risk attitude dictates how much someone is willing to pay to
reduce uncertainty. Expending more effort increases the probability of a positive reward.
Numerous experiments on decision making under uncertainty show that the general trend
is that decision makers are non-risk averse in the negative outcome region and risk averse
in the positive outcome region [152–155]. In fact, 77% of the risk attitude parameter value
sets and the mean parameter values shown in Fig. 4.17 elicited by Abdellaoui et al. lies
in this space [156]. If we assume these same trends characterize trends in engineers’ risk
attitudes, SYS should use the Variable Ratio incentive structure if she believes SUB has a
low marginal increase in cost.
SYS can arguably influence effort costs. In Sec. 4.2.2, we posit that the produc-
tion technology, and thus effort and performance costs, ca(·) and cz(·), is dependent in
part on SUB i’s skill and design process. Literature comparing expert and novice engi-
neers is consistent in the observation that experts are more effective in problem scoping
and formulation than novices [30, 161, 162]. Problem scoping and formulation are two
necessary, initial steps in the design process wherein the design search space is defined.
Improper problem scoping and formulation could cause setbacks and erode any progress
as new information is revealed or simply create a overly broad search area requiring ef-
fort to explore. Additionally, experts tend to use a breadth-first search method where
design alternatives are quickly evaluated and the search space thus contracts quickly, and
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novices use a depth-first search method where much effort is expended to evaluate a sin-
gle design [24, 163]. A study by Yu et al. shows that the breadth-first strategy generally
yields higher performance in terms of the number of iterations to solve the study design
problem [150]. Therefore, strategies that may contribute to reducing effort-related costs
include (1) educating and training engineers to build the necessary domain knowledge to
quickly evaluate alternatives and (2) deploy design support tools to promote a deliberate
and systematic design process. Using these strategies to effectively lower ρˆ and the gen-
eral trend of risk taking and risk aversion with negative and positive payouts, respectively,
we formulate the hypothesis based on theoretical analysis that the Variable Ratio incentive
will provide a better outcome to a risk neutral SYS.
4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter is all about building foundational knowledge on the performance of our
two incentive structures that we formulated in the previous chapter: the Variable Ratio and
Piece Rate structures. Theorem 8 gives sufficient conditions for when the Variable Ratio
and Piece Rate incentive formulations are equivalent. To test this theorem when we break
one of the sufficient conditions by considering effort costs, we formulated SUB’s perfor-
mance provision problem, and derived some basic assumptions on effort cost based on
prior empirical results on characterizing engineers searching for design solutions. Using
this model, analytical analysis suggests that the two incentive structures would produce
different performances, a departure from what we see in Theorem 8. Therefore, the incen-
tive formulation that yields a higher expected utility for SYS depends on the behavioral
characteristics of the SUB, e.g. risk attitude and effort cost evaluation.
The theoretical results in this chapter are not intended to state what will absolutely
happen in real engineering design situations with practicing engineers. However, the theo-
retical results lend to new hypotheses to be tested in future human studies. Computational
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analysis of SUB’s effort provision problem suggests the Variable Ratio structure is more
preferable for a risk neutral SYS when SUB is generally risk averse for positive payouts,
risk taking for negative payouts, and a low marginal increase in effort cost. We discussed
how empirical results on risk attitude show decision makers tend to line up with the risk
parameters where the Variable Ratio structure is the more preferable one. Additionally,
we discussed how SYS may influence and reduce the marginal increase of effort cost.
Therefore, a new hypothesis generated from this work is that engineers are more willing
to search longer for a "good enough" design solution than with a Piece Rate incentive.
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5. INCENTIVE PERFORMANCE AND THE COLLABORATION PROVISION
PROBLEM
5.1 Introduction to the Chapter
Analyses in the previous chapters are largely confined to a case where there is only
one SUB. In the design of large, complex systems, however, a SUB’s design decisions af-
fect those of other SUBs. For example, the guidance and navigation SUB for a spacecraft
may need information from the aerodynamics SUB when designing a controller. Intu-
itively, there must be come sort of information exchange between SUBs with coupled
design problems to maximize system value. What is unclear, however, is how the incen-
tives we formulate in Chapter 3 motivate multiple SUB’s to collaborate to find optimal
system designs. Just as with searching for optimal subsystem designs, collaborating to-
ward searching for optimal system designs comes at some personal costs to the SUBs, and
whether a SUB collaborates or not may be influenced by these costs.
In this chapter, we evaluate and compare how our Variable Ratio and Piece Rate
incentive structures motivate SUBs to collaborate toward finding an optimal system design
thereby addressing the second research issue of evaluating the incentives: particularly
when the cost of collaborating with other SUBs is considered. We see in the previous
chapter that Theorem 8 breaks down when effort cost is considered such that one incentive
formulation may motivate greater effort provision, and thus greater value to the SYS,
than the other. A similar result may arise when SUBs consider their collaboration costs.
Toward testing this suspicion, we first establish what we mean by collaboration and no
collaboration by comparing solution necessary conditions in the ideal system design case
and the case where we have delegation. Then we formulate the collaboration provision
model wherein the cost of collaboration is incorporated. This model is then analyzed
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numerically with different test cases to build knowledge on how the Variable Ratio and
Piece Rate incentives vary in motivating collaboration.
5.2 Collaboration in System Design
Since this chapter is about collaboration among multiple SUBs, we must first define
what we mean by collaboration and no collaboration. Intuitively, collaboration among
SUBs should produce a (near) optimal system design, so we examine the necessary opti-
mality condition for the system design problem as a whole and compare this condition to
the necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium, which we use to represent the solution in
the delegated case. Differences between the two conditions informs us what needs to be
shared to reach system optimality, and thus we define the act of sharing this information
as collaboration.
5.2.1 Monolithic System Design Problem
The monolithic system design problem is that which SYS would solve had she all
the necessary information herself. For simplicity, consider a system with two subsystems
such that the system value depends on the attributes of these subsystems. The monolithic
system design problem can be formulated as the following:
maximize
x
E[U0(V (y1(x), y2(x)))] (5.1)
where yi(·) is the analysis function for subsystem i and x is the design variable. We see
the difference between Eq. 5.1 and Eq. 3.1 in Chapter 3 in that SYS can choose a design
directly and is not constrained by a SUB’s design decision. The design solution x∗ that
solves the monolithic system design problem satisfies the following necessary optimality
condition:
E
[
dU0
dV
[
∂V
∂y1
dy1
dx
+
∂V
∂y2
dy2
dx
]]
= 0 (5.2)
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Let us now split the design variable into two constituent parts such that x = [x1, x2].
Reformulating the monolithic necessary optimality condition with this new notation gives
the following:
E
[
dU0
dV
[
∂V
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂V
∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
]]
= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (5.3)
where the subscript −i represents the element left from {1, 2} \ {i}. The optimal design
solution x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2] satisfies this set of equations. This set of optimality conditions will
act as a benchmark for generating an optimal system design in the delegated case.
5.2.2 Delegated System Design Problem
While formulating our two promising incentives in Chapter 4, we note that both
the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate structures to motivate the SUB to strictly maximize
z = E[U0(V (·))] when we do not consider effort costs. In the case where E[U0(V (·))]
is dependent on the attributes of multiple subsystems, SUB i’s design problem can be
modeled as the following:
maximize
xi
E[U0(V (yi(xi, x¯−i), y¯−i))] (5.4)
where xi is the design variable controllable by SUB i, x¯−i is a fixed instance of SUB i’s
design variable, and y¯−i is a fixed instance of SUB −i’s attribute values. With each SUB
solving his design problem in Eq. 5.4, the rational outcome of their interaction is a Nash
equilbrium design solution xNE as defined in Def. 8 [74–76]. The necessary conditions
for deriving xNE = [xNE1 , x
NE
2 ] is the following:
E
[
dU0
dV
∂V
∂yi
dyi
dxi
]
= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (5.5)
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At the Nash equilibrium, x¯−i = xNE−i and y¯−i = y−i(x
NE). We can see the obvious
difference between the monolithic optimality condition in Eq. 5.3 and the Nash condi-
tion in Eq. 5.5. Therefore, the solution to the monolithic design is not necessarily the
same as when we delegate the design among multiple SUBs that have the design problem
as formulated in Eq. 5.4. This observation reflects the point made in our discussion in
Chapter 2 showing that Nash equilibria do not necessarily lead to Pareto optimality. This
model reflects Marston’s Game-Based Design formulation [76] and Lewis’s and Mistree’s
noncooperative design model [74, 75], both produce xNE defined in Eq. 5.5.
Extensions to Game-Based Design, including the Ciucci-Honda-Yang (CHY) method
[81] and the Modified Approximation-Based Decentralized Design (MADD) framework
[80], as well as the Concurrent Subspace Optimization (CSSO) [137], Asymmetric Sub-
space Optimization (ASO) [138], and Enhanced Collaborative Optimization (ECO) [164,
165] multidisciplinary design optimization (MDO) architectures all rely on the SUBs shar-
ing their model information in one form or another to mitigate the disparity between the
Nash equilibrium solution and the true optimal solution. In the case of the Game-Based
Design extensions, model sharing is intended to achieve Pareto optimality with respect
to the SUBs’ individual objectives, and with the MDO architectures, model sharing is
intended to achieve optimality with respect to some central objective function.
Let us now reformulate SUB i’s design problem as the following:
maximize
xi
E[U0(V (yi(xi, x¯−i), y¯−i(xi)))] (5.6)
where y¯−i(·) is now some model SUB −i gives to SUB i that informs him how he affects
the attributes of subsystem −i with his design variable. The notation y¯−i(xi) reflects that
the shared model is necessarily dependent on xi but can be dependent on x¯−i. In practice,
y¯(·) is formulated in a number of ways. ECO relies on SUBs sharing linearizations of their
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analysis models, and MADD, CSSO, and ASO rely on surrogate models of other SUBs’
analysis functions. The CHY method has variants that rely on quadratic approximations,
linear approximations, and surrogate models. The necessary condition for the Nash equi-
librium given this kind of model information sharing, xNE−C = [xNE−C1 , x
NE−C
2 ], now is
the following:
E
[
dU0
dV
[
∂V
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂V
∂y¯−i
dy¯−i
dxi
]]
= 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (5.7)
We see obvious similarities between the Nash solution condition in Eq. 5.7 with the mono-
lithic optimality condition in Eq. 5.3, and when y¯−i(·) = y−i(·)⇒ x∗ = xNE−C .
In this dissertation, we will define collaboration among SUBs as the case where the
SUBs share their model information such that their design problems are formulated as in
Eq. 5.6; see Fig. 5.1. No collaboration in this dissertation is the case where the SUBs
share their attribute values such that a SUB’s design problem is formulated in Eq. 5.4.
Technically, SUBs are still collaborating in this case, just with less information, but we
use the term no collaboration to strongly contrast our use of the term collaboration. Com-
paring Eqs. 5.5 and 5.7 with Eq. 5.3, SUBs have an incentive to collaborate as long as
y¯i(·) ≈ yi(·) in an effort to maximize E[U0(V (·))] and thus maximize their incentive pay-
outs. Therefore, collaboration means greater expected utility for SYS. The collaboration
provision model formulated in the next section allows for cases where some SUBs may
choose to collaborate while others may choose not to.
The definitions of collaboration and no collaboration in this dissertation differ slightly
from uses in previous work. Takai builds a model of collaboration between SUBs where
collaboration corresponds to SUBs jointly working on a platform and no collaboration cor-
responds to SUBs working on their own module to put on the platform [166]. In Takai’s
model, if one SUB does not choose to collaborate, the other SUB(s) must choose whether
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Figure 5.1: Collaboration and no collaboration differs on how the SUBs communicate in
the context of this research.
or not to compensate and complete the platform design themselves. Arsenyan et al. model
collaboration between firms and define collaboration very abstractly as knowledge sharing
and trust between firms [167]. In their model, collaboration is a variable that represents
amount of knowledge sharing and trust between firms, but it is not immediately clear what
type of knowledge is being shared, whereas we explicitly define what is shared in our
context. In Lewis and Mistree’s model of collaboration, SUBs share their objective func-
tions so that SUBs can formulate new objective functions as a weighted sum of all of the
objective functions [74, 75].
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Table 5.1: Graphical normal form game of the collaboration provision model with two
players. SUB 1’s utility is in the lower left of each game cell, and SUB 2’s utility is in the
upper right of each game cell.
SUB 2
s2 = 1 s2 = 0
SUB 1
s1 = 1
U2(1, 1) U2(1, 0)
U1(1, 1) U1(1, 0)
s1 = 0
U2(0, 1) U2(0, 0)
U1(0, 1) U1(0, 0)
5.3 Collaboration Provision Model
While SUBs seemingly have an incentive to collaborate to find an optimal system
design, and therefore maximize their incentive, we now model the case where collabora-
tion is costly. First, we model the collaboration provision model at a high level as a normal
form game as in Def. 5 from Chapter 2 with N SUBs indexed in I = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each
SUB has the option to collaborate, si = 1, or not to collaborate, si = 0, such that SUB
i’s strategy space is Si = {1, 0} and S = {S1,S2, ...,SN} is an N -tuple of strategy sets.
Finally, as with any decision model, SUB i has a utility function Ui representing his prefer-
ences with U = {U1, U2, ..., UN} being the set of utility functions in the game. Therefore,
the collaboration game has the structure Γ = 〈I,S,U〉. A graphical example of this game
is shown in Table 5.1.
Modeling collaboration as costly reflects Boos’s argument that sharing knowledge
has benefits and costs [168]. Additionally, costly collaboration is a similar modeling
choice as in the collaboration models of Takai [166] and Arsenyan et al. [167]. In practical
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engineering, the cost of collaboration can be seen through SUB i creating a literal model
y¯i(·) of his knowledge and/or attending meetings to transfer this knowledge to other SUBs,
etc. More abstractly, incorporating a cost term allows representation of any aversions to-
ward collaboration. Consider again the study by Austin-Breneman discussed in Sec. 1.2.2
where student design team members did not share their subsystem model characteristics
even though they were provided tools to expedite knowledge communication [51]. While
we cannot state the precise reason why information was not universally shared in this
study, we might hypothesize that there was some aversion that penalizes collaboration.
The collaboration provision model for SUB i is the following:
maximize
xi,si
E [Ui (vi(yi(xi, x¯−i), g(s−i))− c(si))] (5.8)
where g(·) relates SUB −i’s decision to collaborate or not to what he shares and cc(·) is
the associated costs with collaborating and is not necessarily the same as the effort cost
term in the effort provision model Eq. 4.1 in Chapter 4. The function g(si) is below:
g(si) =

y¯i(x−i) if si = 1
y¯i if si = 0
(5.9)
The strategy si = 1 essentially denotes that y¯i is a function of x−i, and si = 0 denotes that
y˜i is simply a value SUB i communicates to SUB −i. The cost model is below:
cc(si) =

θci if si = 1
0 if si = 0
(5.10)
This model reflects that collaborating comes at a cost θci > 0. This model assumes that the
cost of collaboration is significantly larger than no collaboration. From Chapter 2, Theo-
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rem 2 guarantees us a normative solution to this game in the form of a Nash equilibrium
as in Def. 8. From the previous section, SYS would nominally prefer the outcome to
this game to be at the point where all SUBs collaborate such that sNE = {s1 = 1, s2 =
1, ..., sN = 1}. However, the rational outcome to the collaboration game depends on how
utility changes with s.
Let us now reformulate the collaboration provision model in Eq. 5.8 for each of
game cells in Table 5.1 in terms pertinent to the aims of the chapter. We are explicitly
concerned with the validity of Theorem 8 when collaboration cost is included, i.e. are our
two incentive structures equivalent in how they motivate, or fail to motivate, collaboration.
Therefore, SYS is risk neutral, and we can consider specific the Variable Ratio and Piece
Rate incentive formulations in Eqs. 3.27 and 3.25, respectively, to define what z is. For
convenience, we will restate these formulations. The Variable Ratio structure given a risk
neutral SYS is the following:
vV Ri =

KˆV R1 with probability E[UB]
KˆV R2 with probability 1− E[UB]
(5.11)
The Piece Rate structure given a risk neutral SYS is the following:
vPRi = Kˆ
PR
1 E[UB] + Kˆ
PR
2 (5.12)
Like in Theorem 8, we state Kˆ1 = KˆPR1 = Kˆ
V R
1 − KˆV R2 and Kˆ2 = KˆPR2 = KˆV R2 . Recall
E[UB] is a positive affine transformation of the system value, vs, that does not account for
incentive costs, such that E[UB] = aE[vs] + b. In the context of this chapter, we consider
the case where both incentive structures are dependent on E[UB(vs(yi(x), y−i(x)))], where
x = [xi, x−i].
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For the analysis in this chapter, we consider an idealized scenario for information
sharing. By considering a highly idealized collaboration scenario, we can identify if our
incentive structures motivate collaboration or not, and if not, it might be unlikely they
motivate collaboration in more realistic scenarios where such models have more error. In
the collaboration case, SUB i shares x¯i = xNE−Ci and his model information as y¯i(xi) =
yi(x−i, xNE−Ci ), cf. x
NE−C as the solution to the set of equations in Eq. 5.7. In the
no collaboration case, SUB i shares x¯i = xNEi and y¯i = yi(x
NE
i , x
NE
−i ), cf. x
NE as
the solution to the set of equations in Eq. 5.5. Therefore, we are comparing the Nash
equilibrium given no collaboration with the Nash equilibrium given collaboration and how
their resulting incentive payouts to a SUB interacts with the cost of collaborating, or no
cost of not collaborating.
5.3.1 Full Collaboration
Consider where there is full collaboration such that si = 1∀i, and thus SUB i re-
ceives models of how his decision variable influences other SUBs’ subsystem attributes
but accrues a cost for communicating a similar model. In this case, SUB i’s decision
problem is the following:
maximize
xi
E
[
Ui
(
vi(yi(xi, x
NE−C
−i ), y−i(xi, x
NE−C
−i ))− θci
)]
(5.13)
With the Piece Rate structure in Eq. 5.12, Eq. 5.13 becomes the following:
maximize
xi
Ui(Kˆ1 × E[UB(vs(yi(xi, xNE−C−i ), y−i(xi, xNE−C−i )))] + Kˆ2 − θci ) (5.14)
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Applying the necessary optimality condition to Eq. 5.14 using the derivative chain rule
yields the following:
dUi
dxi
=
dUi
d(vi − θci )︸ ︷︷ ︸
U ′i
×d(vi − θ
c
i )
dxi
= U ′i ×
d
dxi
(Kˆ1 × E[UB(vs)] + Kˆ2)
= U ′i × Kˆ1 ×
dE[UB(vs)]
dxi
= U ′i × Kˆ1 × a× E
[
∂vs
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂vs
∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
]
= E
[
∂vs
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂vs
∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
]
= 0
(5.15)
Therefore, Eq. 5.15 for each SUB creates a set of equations as in Eq. 5.7, and the solution
to this set of equations represents the design solution, xNE−C = [xNE−Ci , x
NE−C
−i ], due to
collaboration.
Similarly, SUB’s decision model in Eq. 5.8 is reformulated as the following when
given a Variable Ratio structure:
maximize
xi
[
Ui(Kˆ1 − θci )− Ui(Kˆ2 − θci )
]
× E[UB(vS(yi(xi, x−i), y˜−i(xi)))]
+ Ui(Kˆ2 − θci )
(5.16)
Since Kˆ1, Kˆ2, and θci are constants, the objective function of the optimization problem in
Eq. 5.16 is an affine transformation of E[UB(·)]. Therefore, the optimization problem in
Eq. 5.16 is equivalent to the following:
maximize
xi
E[UB(vs(yi(xi, x
NE−C
−i ), y−i(xi, x
NE−C
−i )))] (5.17)
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The optimality condition is the following:
dE[UB(vs)]
dxi
= E
[
∂vs
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂vs
∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
]
= 0 (5.18)
This optimality condition for each SUB creates a set of equations as in Eq. 5.7, and the so-
lution to this set of equations represents the design solution, xNE−C = [xNE−Ci , x
NE−C
−i ].
Obviously, this is equivalent to the optimality condition in Eq. 5.15 for the Piece Rate
formulation. Therefore, both incentive structures produce the same solution, xNE−C =
[xNE−Ci , x
NE−C
−i ], in this model. However, the expected utilities generated by each in-
centive structure given this solution are not necessarily the same, i.e. Ui(xNE−C |vPRi ) 6=
E[Ui(x
NE−C |vV Ri )], which is important when populating the collaboration game model in
Table 5.1 with utility values to determine the game solution.
5.3.2 Full No Collaboration
Now consider the case where no SUB provides a model of his knowledge but rather
conveys static information. SUB i’s decision problem in Eq. 5.8 is reformulated in this
case as the following:
maximize
xi,
E
[
Ui
(
vi(yi(xi, x
NE
−i ), y−i(x
NE
i , x
NE
−i ))
)]
(5.19)
The Piece Rate and Variable Ratio formulations of Eq. 5.19 are similar to those in Eqs.
5.14 and 5.16, respectively, but now θci = 0 and y−i is not dependent on xi. Since y−i is
not dependent on xi, ∂vs∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
= 0. Making this substitution into Eq. 5.15 and Eq. 5.18
yields the following set of optimalty conditions for both incentive formulations:
E
[
∂vS
∂yi
dyi
dxi
]
= 0 ∀i (5.20)
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Just as both incentive formulation yield the same optimality conditions when SUBs fully
collaboration, both incentive formulation yield the same optimality conditions when SUBs
do not collaborate. Therefore, both incentives produce the same design solution, xNE =
[xNEi , x
NE
−i ], due to equivalent optimality conditions, but this solution could yield differ-
ent expected utility values given each of the incentive structures, i.e. Ui(xNE|vPRi ) 6=
E[Ui(x
NE|vV Ri )].
5.3.3 Asymmetric Collaboration
When SUB i collaborates but others do not, SUB i’s decision problem is formulated
as the following:
maximize
xi
E
[
Ui
(
vi(yi(xi, x
NE−A
−i ), y−i(x
NE−A
i , x
NE−A
−i ))− θci
)]
(5.21)
Here, we see that SUB i accrues the collaboration cost for sharing his model knowledge
but does not receive others’ model knowledge. The basic difference between Eq. 5.21 and
Eq. 5.19 is that the cost term is present. Since y−i is not dependent on xi, ∂vs∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
= 0,
and making this substitution into the optimality conditions in Eqs. 5.15 and 5.18 yields
the optimality condition in Eq. 5.20. When SUB i does not collaborate but others do, his
decision problem is as the following:
maximize
xi
E
[
Ui
(
vi(yi(xi, x
NE−A
−i ), y−i(xi, x
NE−A
−i ))
)]
(5.22)
Here, we see that SUB i accrues no cost for collaborating but receives SUB −i’s model
information. The basic difference between Eqs. 5.22 and 5.13 is that the cost term is
absent. Therefore, the optimality condition for Eq. 5.22 is that in Eqs. 5.15 and 5.18.
To define the set of equations used to determine the design solution due to asymmet-
ric collaboration, let us define the set of collaborators that do not receive model information
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as ic = {i ∈ I : si = 1} and the set of noncollaborators that receive model information as
inc = I \ ic. The design solution is determined by solving the following set of optimality
conditions:
E
[
∂vS
∂yi
dyi
dxi
]
= 0 ∀i ∈ ic
E
[
∂vs
∂yi
dyi
dxi
+
∂vs
∂y−i
dy−i
dxi
]
= 0 ∀i ∈ inc
(5.23)
The design solution to this set of equations is xNE−A = [xNE−Ai , x
NE−A
−i ], and just like
with the full collaboration and full no collaboration cases, the solution here is not depen-
dent on the incentive structure.
5.3.4 Collaboration Game Summary
Table 5.2 updates the collaboration game model with the specific models for each
SUB in each game state. From the optimality conditions used to derive the design solution
to each game state, we see that for a specific game state, both incentive structures produce
the same design solution. Important to note is that even though both incentives produce
the same design solution for a given game state, i.e. they both ordinally rank the same
solution highest, the cardinal expected utility value produced by this design solution is not
necessarily the same across the inventive structures. This is because expected utility is
formulated differently for each structure. For example, consider the case where E[UB] =
0.75 is the ex post E[UB] value from both incentives. Using the utility model in Eq. 4.19
with risk parameters in Table 4.1 and Kˆ1 = 1 and Kˆ2 = 0, Ui(0.75) = 0.83 is the utility
garnered from the Piece Rate formulation and 0.75U(1) + (1 − 0.75)U(0) = 0.75 is the
expected utility garnered from the Variable Ratio formulation. Differences in the cardinal
expected utility means that the values used to compute the solution for the collaboration
game in Table 5.1 are dependent on the given incentive structure. Therefore, equilibra
behavior due to each incentive formulation may vary by varying collaboration cost values,
incentive parameters, or even how we scale the system utility model, UB. The next section
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investigates this behavior for each incentive structure.
Additionally, each cell of the collaboration game in Table 5.1 roughly corresponds to
one of three designer interaction models formulated by Lewis and Mistree [74,75]. Lewis
and Mistree formulate models where SUBs collaborate–corresponding to the cell 〈1, 1〉,
work in isolation–corresponding to the cell 〈0, 0〉, and where only one SUB has informa-
tion from the other–corresponding to the cells 〈0, 1〉 and 〈1, 0〉. The collaboration game
above unifies these models such that the SUBs decide which scenario in which they fall.
Note that in the models formulated by Lewis and Mistree, collaboration involves shar-
ing objective functions–to be weighted-summed to form new SUB objective functions–as
opposed to our terminology where collaboration is sharing attribute analysis model infor-
mation. In many of their examples, however, Lewis and Mistree equate objective functions
with minimizing or maximizing some subsystem attribute, e.g. minimize weight or maxi-
mize volume, so there is some commonality between their use of collaboration and ours,
but the models are "plugged" into our SUBs’ objective functions as opposed to weighted-
summed with our SUBs’ objective functions. We assume in this dissertation that SUB i
knows how to properly incorporate SUB −i’s model information into his design problem.
5.4 Comparative Analysis
5.4.1 Experimental Design
Since collaboration in this chapter depends on analysis model communication, our
comparative analysis between the Variable Ratio and the Piece Ratio incentives is con-
ducted on four example problems that differ in analysis function formulation and system
value function formulation. Similarly to the comparative analysis in Chapter 4, we vary
the incentive parameter such that Kˆ1 = KˆV R1 = Kˆ
PR
1 = [10, 100, 1000] and the relative
cost of collaboration ρˆ = θ
c
Kˆ1
= [0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075], thus forming 12 test cases for each
test problem. For each test problem in each test case, we populate the normal form collab-
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Table 5.2: Graphical normal form game of the collaboration provision model with two
players. SUB 1’s decision problem reference is in the lower left of each game cell, and
SUB 2’s decision problem reference is in the upper right of each game cell.
SUB 2
s2 = 1 s2 = 0
SUB 1
s1 = 1
Eq. 5.13 Eq. 5.22
Eq. 5.13 Eq. 5.21
s1 = 0
Eq. 5.21 Eq. 5.19
Eq. 5.22 Eq. 5.19
oration game shown in Table 5.1 with each SUB’s utility over their incentive payout due
to either the Variable Ratio or Piece Rate structure minus any collaboration cost. For this
analysis, both SUBs have same risk parameters listed in Table 4.1. The Nash equilibria of
the populated collaboration game model are calculated for each incentive structure using
the automated approach discussed later in this section.
As shown in Table 5.1, there are four possible states of the game and the design
solution for each states is found by solving the combinations of the collaboration problem
formulation in Eq. 5.6 and no collaboration problem formulation in Eq. 5.4. The necessary
condition for the solution where both SUBs collaborate 〈1, 1〉 is given in Eq. 5.7 and for
the solution where both SUBs do not collaborate 〈0, 0〉 is given in Eq. 5.5. The necessary
condition for the solution where only one SUB collaborates 〈1, 0〉 is found by using Eq. 5.7
for the SUB that collaborations and Eq. 5.5 for the SUB that does not. The comparative
study procedure is summarized in Fig. 5.2. The test problems and their properties are
discussed below.
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For 4       Values
Compute Payout w/ 
Variable Ratio
Compute Payout w/ 
Piece Rate
Next       Value
Next K1 Value
For 3 K1 Values
ˆ
Next Problem
For 4 Test Problems
Compute NE w/ 
Variable Ratio
Compute NE w/ 
Piece Rate
For 4 Game States
Compute Design 
Solution
Next Game State
ˆ
Figure 5.2: Comparative study procedure summary for testing the Variable Ratio and Piece
Rate structures in the collaboration game.
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5.4.2 Problem Descriptions
All four test problems are formulated on the Tragedy of the Commons situation.
The Tragedy of the Commons traditionally refers to a resource sharing and management
situation wherein if decision makers act independently, the outcome of their interaction is
suboptimal, i.e. non-Paretian. Therefore, we expect in a Tragedy of the Commons situa-
tion that collaborating SUBs will produce a different results than non collaborating SUBs.
Resource sharing and management is obviously applicable to systems engineering. How-
ever, the aim of this study is not to produce results on resource sharing and management
but rather to build insight into the sensitivities of each incentive’s impact on motivating
collaboration.
In all four test problems, the system value function vs(·) is simply the summation of
the output of each SUB’s analysis function yi(·) such that
vs(y1, y2) = y1 + y2 (5.24)
Additionally, we assume a risk neutral attitude for SYS such that SYS’s utility is formu-
lated as the following:
UB(vs(·)) = vs(·)− v
min
s
vmaxs − vmins
(5.25)
where vmins and v
max
s are constants used for scaling utility. The four test problems differ
on the form of yi(·) and the scaling constants used. Specifically, we use two forms of yi(·)
and two approaches for defining scaling constants, the combination of which yields our
four test problems.
The first formulation for yi(·) is the following:
yi(xi, x−i) = xi − x2i − xix−i (5.26)
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Table 5.3: Solutions to each game state given the analysis function in Eq. 5.26.
Game State x∗1 x
∗
2 UB, Scaling 1 UB, Scaling 2
〈1, 1〉 0.25 0.25 0.5 1
〈1, 0〉 0.5 0 0.5 1
〈0, 1〉 0 0.5 0.5 1
〈0, 0〉 0.3333 0.3333 0.4444 0.8889
where 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 is SUB i’s decision variable and x−i is the decision variable of the other
SUB; xi can be thought of as the percentage of resources SUB i claims. Table 5.3 gives the
solutions, x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2], for each game state. Figure 5.3 shows outcomes of collaboration
and noncollaboration. Clearly, not collaborating is the worst state in terms of system value.
For this formulation of yi, the first strategy for defining scaling constants vmins and v
max
s
is vmins = 0 and v
max
s = vs(y
max
1 , y
max
2 ) = 0.5, where y
max
i = 0.25 is the maximum
feasible value of yi. The second strategy is vmins = 0 and v
max
s = vs(y
∗
1, y
∗
2) = 0.25, where
y∗i = 0.125 is the optimal feasible value of yi.
In Fig. 5.3, we see that if just one SUB collaborates, UB is maximized given the
feasible outcome region. Therefore, there is an incentive to not collaborate, and thus ac-
crue costs, if the other SUB does collaborate. If SUB i believes SUB −i will provide his
model information, he can get the same reward payout without accruing the cost of col-
laboration by just sharing attribute value information, i.e. not collaborating. If both SUBs
believe the other will collaborate, their best response is to not collaborate. In this case,
however, system value suffers, as shown in Fig. 5.3, and the SUBs receive less reward.
If SUB i believes that SUB −i will not collaborate, he has an incentive to collaboration
with his model information as long as the increase in his reward is greater than the cost of
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Figure 5.3: A summary of problem characteristics with Eq. 5.26 and vmins = 0 and
vmaxs = vs(y
max
1 , y
max
2 ) = 0.5. The solution in attribute space are highlighted for each
game state.
collaborating. Thus, both SUBs collaborating in this test case is not completely ruled out.
The second formulation of yi(·) is devised by Pennock to model defense acquisition
where the capability growth of a defense system depends on the growth of individual tech-
nologies under the control of different SUBs [169]. The individual growth of technology
i is the following:
y(xi, x−i) = (1 + xi)
1
E[DM (xi,x−i)] − 1 (5.27)
where xi can be through of as the target level of improvement to technology i and E[DM(·)]
is the expected maximum duration to increase all technologies and is modeled as the fol-
lowing:
E[DM(xi, x−i)] =
E[Di(xi)]
2 + E[Di(xi)]E[D−i(x−i)] + E[D−i(x−i)]2
E[Di(xi)] + E[D−i(x−i)]
E[Di(xi)] = exp(2xi)− 1
(5.28)
126
Table 5.4: Solutions to each game state given the analysis function in Eq. 5.27.
Game State x∗1 x
∗
2 UB, Scaling 1 UB, Scaling 2
〈1, 1〉 0.5427 0.5427 0.8193 1
〈1, 0〉 0.8725 0.6665 0.7263 0.8865
〈0, 1〉 0.6665 0.8725 0.7263 0.8865
〈0, 0〉 0.8725 0.8725 0.6942 0.8474
Clearly, the expected maximum duration depends on the target level of improvement each
SUB chooses. Table 5.4 gives the solutions, x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2], for each game state. Figure 5.4
shows outcomes for collaboration and noncollaboration. Clearly, not collaborating is the
worst state with this problem formulation as well in terms of system value. The strategies
for setting the scaling constants in this scenario mimic those used for the other problem
formulation. Therefore, vmins = 0 for both scaling regimes and v
max
s = 0.1848 in one case
and vmaxs = 0.1514 in the other.
In Fig. 5.4, we see that if just one SUB collaborates, UB is greater given the feasible
outcome region than when neither collaborate. However, if SUB i believes that SUB −i
is going to collaborate, SUB i has an incentive to collaborate to yield a higher UB and
thus higher reward, as long as the cost of collaboration is smaller than the reward increase.
Clearly, both SUBs have an incentive to collaborate to yield the highest UB and reward
payout, but this incentive depends on the cost of collaboration.
5.4.3 Computing Nash Equilibria
To automate compute (mixed) Nash equilibria in the collaboration game, we take
a numerical approach that uses the quantal response equilibrium defintion. The quantal
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Figure 5.4: A summary of problem characteristics with Eq. 5.27 and vmins = 0 and
vmaxs = vs(y
max
1 , y
max
2 ) = 0.1848. The solution in attribute space are highlighted for
each game state.
response equilibrium (QRE) is an equilibrium concept in game theory used to describe
disparities between Nash equilibria and empirical results [170]. The QRE is a stationary
point in probability space. The probability of player i playing strategy j is the following:
φji =
exp(µEuji (φ−i))∑mi
k=1 exp(µEu
k
i (φ−i))
, (5.29)
where µ is a fitting parameter,Euji is player i’s expected utility for strategy j,mi is the total
number of strategies available to player i, and φ−i refers to the probability distributions
over other players’ strategies. Since expected utility is a function of φ−i, the QRE is the
solution to a system of equations. A properties of the QRE formulation in Eq. 5.29 is that
as µ→∞, the QRE approaches the Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, solving the
system of equations defined by Eq. 5.29 by incrementally increasing µ until convergence
of φji means we can approximate the Nash equilibrium.
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Table 5.5: Battle of the Sexes game in normal form.
Player 2
Football Opera
Player 1
Football
2 0
1 0
Opera
0 1
0 2
To demonstrate how the QRE can be used to numerically compute Nash equilib-
ria in a normal form game, consider a 2 × 2 Battle of the Sexes game as in Table 5.5.
Player 1 wants to go to the football game but Player 2 wants to go to the opera; if they
don’t coordinate, neither player is happy. This game has two pure and one mixed strategy
Nash equilibria. The pure equilibria lie at {Football, Football} and {Opera, Opera}; a
mixed Nash equilibrium lies at {2
3
Football, 1
3
Football}. The response correspondence in
Fig. 5.5 shows all three equilibria in probability space. Given the axes of the response
correspondence, {Football, Football} corresponds to the point at (1,1), {Opera, Opera}
corresponds to the point at (0,0), and {2
3
Football, 1
3
Football} corresponds to the point at
(2
3
,1
3
).
With the game in Table 5.5, player 1’s expected utilities for Football and Opera are
the following:
EuFootball1 = 2φ
Football
2 + 0(1− φFootball2 )
EuOpera1 = 0φ
Football
2 + 1(1− φFootball2 ).
(5.30)
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Figure 5.5: Response correspondence with all three Nash equilibria.
Likewise, player 2’s expected utilities are the following:
EuFootball2 = 1φ
Football
1 + 0(1− φFootball1 )
EuOpera2 = 0φ
Football
1 + 2(1− φFootball1 ).
(5.31)
The probabilities φFootball1 and φ
Football
2 are found using Eq. 5.29 such that
φFootball1 =
exp(µEuFootball1 )
exp(µEuFootball1 ) + exp(µEu
Opera
1 )
φFootball2 =
exp(µEuFootball2 )
exp(µEuFootball2 ) + exp(µEu
Opera
2 )
.
(5.32)
Inserting Eqs. 5.30 and 5.31 into Eq. 5.32 yields a system of equations with two unknowns
and two equations. Luckily, we have MATLAB to solve the system of equations for us!
To do this, we will construct two *.m files and rely on the fsolve() solver. The first *.m
file, called run.m, is used to set up the payoff matrices for both players and run fsolve();
run.m is shown in Appendix D.1. The second is called QRE.m and is used to set up the
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system of equations; QRE.m is shown in Appendix D.2.
For each Nash equilibrium, there is a corresponding QRE. To get the QRE associ-
ated with a certain Nash equilibrium, use the the Nash equilibrium as the initial point in
fsolve(). The following are inputs associated with the three Nash equilibria:
{Football, Football} → (1, 1)
{Opera,Opera} → (0, 0)
{2
3
Football,
1
3
Football} → (2
3
,
1
3
)
(5.33)
Figure 5.6 shows all three Nash equilibria and their corresponding quantal response equi-
libria. As µ→∞, the QRE approach their corresponding (mixed) Nash equilibria; µ = 0,
all QRE are (1
2
, 1
2
).
5.4.4 Results
The response correspondences indicating the Nash equilibria for the collaboration
game in Table. 5.1 are shown in Figs. 5.7–5.10. All of these figures show that there is
little to no variation in the Nash equilibrium ask Kˆ1 changes despite incentive structure and
problem formulation. Figures 5.7 and 5.7 reflect results with the yi(·) formulation in Eq.
5.26, and we see that as the collaboration cost parameter ρˆ increases, the Nash equilibrium
moves from both SUBs collaborating to both SUBs not collaboration for both incentive
structures. However, we see that the scaling regime we choose influences which incentive
structure produces a mixed Nash equilibrium closer to collaboration. With the first scaling
regime with Eq. 5.26 (vmins = 0 and v
max
s = 0.5), the Variable Ratio structure drops to
noncollaboration immediately when ρˆ > 0 but the Piece Rate gradually moves from full
collaboration to full noncollaboration as ρˆ increase. With the second Eq. 5.26 scaling
regime (vminS = 0 and v
max
S = 0.25), the Variable Ratio stays closer full collaboration as
collaboration cost increases, and both incentives gradually fall to noncollaboration.
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Figure 5.6: Response correspondence with all three Nash equilibria plus their associated
quantal response equilibria in red ×’s with µ = 2.1 (TOP) and µ = 7 (BOTTOM).
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 reflect results with the yi(·) formulation in Eq. 5.27. Despite
the scaling strategy used and the value of the collaboration cost parameter, the equilibrium
with the Piece Rate structure remains at full collaboration. For the Variable Ratio, there
is one instance where it does not induce an equilibrium at full collaboration: when col-
laboration cost is at its highest and the first scaling regime with Eq. 5.27 (vmins = 0 and
vmaxs = 0.1848) is used.
132
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
V
a
ri
a
b
le
R
a
ti
o
P
ie
ce
R
a
te
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
Fi
gu
re
5.
7:
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
N
as
h
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
an
al
ys
is
re
su
lts
w
ith
va
ry
in
g
Kˆ
1
an
d
ρˆ
gi
ve
n
y i
(·)
in
E
q.
5.
26
an
d
v
m
in
s
=
0
an
d
v
m
a
x
s
=
0.
5.
133
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
V
a
ri
a
b
le
R
a
ti
o
P
ie
ce
R
a
te
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
Fi
gu
re
5.
8:
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
N
as
h
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
an
al
ys
is
re
su
lts
w
ith
va
ry
in
g
Kˆ
1
an
d
ρˆ
gi
ve
n
y i
(·)
in
E
q.
5.
26
an
d
v
m
in
s
=
0
an
d
v
m
a
x
s
=
0.
25
.
134
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
V
a
ri
a
b
le
R
a
ti
o
P
ie
ce
R
a
te
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
Fi
gu
re
5.
9:
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
N
as
h
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
an
al
ys
is
re
su
lts
w
ith
va
ry
in
g
Kˆ
1
an
d
ρˆ
gi
ve
n
y i
(·)
in
E
q.
5.
27
an
d
v
m
in
s
=
0
an
d
v
m
a
x
s
=
0.
18
48
.
135
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
V
a
ri
a
b
le
R
a
ti
o
P
ie
ce
R
a
te
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
Pr(s
2
=1)
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
2
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
7
5
P
r(
s
1
=
1
)
0
0.
5
1
0
0.
51
Kˆ
1
=
1
0
0
0
ρˆ
=
0
.0
5
Fi
gu
re
5.
10
:
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
N
as
h
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
an
al
ys
is
re
su
lts
w
ith
va
ry
in
g
Kˆ
1
an
d
ρˆ
gi
ve
n
y i
(·)
in
E
q.
5.
27
an
d
v
m
in
s
=
0
an
d
v
m
a
x
s
=
0.
15
14
.
136
5.5 Verification Case Study: Pressure Vessel Design
In this section, we seek to verify the results gathered in the previous section by nu-
merically analyzing the collaboration game where the two SUBs are designing a pressure
vessel. Specifically, we seek to verify that mixed Nash equilibria to the collaboration game
is dependent on incentive formulation. This case study differs from the previous analysis
in that here we are (1) considering the case where SUBs share linear approximations of
their analysis function if they collaboration and (2) using the numerical characteristics of
solving the design problem to compute the cost of collaboration as opposed to simply
defining it.
In this case study, we handle collaboration similarly to how Enhanced Collaborative
Optimization (ECO) handles collaboration: SUBs share linearized approximations of their
analysis functions. Therefore, at a particular design iteration, q, the information SUB −i
gets is characterized by the following function:
g(si) =

yi(x
∗
q−1) +∇yi|x∗q−1(x− x∗q−1) if si = 1
yi(x
∗
q−1) if si = 0
(5.34)
where x∗q−1 is the vector of optimal xi and x−i of iteration q − 1. The difference in in-
formation is either SUB i shares a first-order Taylor expansion of his analysis function,
cf. collaborate, or a "zero-order Taylor expansion". In keeping with ECO-esque collabo-
ration, in the case where SUB −i collaborations, SUB i optimizes with respect to x¯−i in
addition to xi. However, x¯−i is considered a dummy variable, and its value is not used in
the ex post design solution since SUB i cannot control this variable.
Costs are computed using the number of iterations, q∗, for system value, vs, con-
vergence as well as the number of computations needed to generate the information being
shared. For example, if si = 0, SUB i is only computing yi(x∗q−1); however, if si = 1,
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Table 5.6: Pressure vessel fixed physical parameters.
Symbol Description Value Units
ρm Material Density 0.283 [lb in−3]
P Operating Pressure 3890 [psi]
St Strength 35× 103 [psi]
SUB i computes that value in addition to gradients. Therefore, cost is computed as the
following:
cc(si) = q
∗ +

q∗ × ng if si = 1
0 if si = 0
(5.35)
This cost formulation reflects SUB i must at least accrues a cost generating yi(x∗q−1) for
q∗ iterations. Additionally, if si = 1, then extra cost is accrued since SUB i generates ng
derivatives for the gradient for q∗ iterations.
For this case study, we define the incentive parameters as Kˆ1 = 1000 and Kˆ2 = 0.
We retain the homogeneous risk preference of the SUBs such that each of the two SUBs
have the utility model in Eq. 4.17 with the risk parameters in Table 4.1. The procedure
for this case study is summarized in Fig. 5.11, and the mixed Nash equilibria of the
collaboration game is computed similarly as in the previous section. The pressure vessel
problem description is given below along with the accompanying parameters used in Eqs.
5.34 and 5.35. MATLAB’s default fmincon() optimizer algorithm is used to solve each
SUB’s problem.
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SUB 1 Solves 
Problem
SUB 2 Solves 
Problem
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x1 x2
Compute SUB 1 
Costs using q and s1
Compute SUB 2 
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Compute NE w/ 
Piece Rate
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Figure 5.11: Verification case study procedure summary.
5.5.1 Problem Description
The pressure vessel problem, in one form or another, is a common example problem
for decentralized and distributed design research [74–76]. While this problem is simple
enough a single designer could complete, its formulation is intended to represent more
complex design problems. We modify it slightly by introducing a system-level utility
model that is dependent on the pressures attributes. Specifically, the utility model a risk
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neutral SYS formulates for the SUBs’ incentives is dependent on the volume, vol, and
weight, wgt, of the pressure vessel and is as in the following:
UB(vs(vol, wgt)) =
vs(vol, wgt) + 1
2
vs(vol, wgt) =
(
vol
5× 105
)2
−
(
wgt
4.5× 104
)3 (5.36)
This is a notional value function. The volume and weight of the pressure vessel are de-
pendent on its radius, r, wall thickness, t, and length, l. SUB 1 knows how these variables
influence volume such that
vol = y1(r, t, l) = pi ×
(
4
3
r3 + r2l
)
(5.37)
SUB 2 knows how these variables influence weight such that
wgt = y2(r, t, l) = pi × ρm
(
4
3
(r + t)3 + (r + t)2l − 4
3
r3 − r2l
)
(5.38)
where ρm is material density. Additionally, both SUBs know the following constraints on
the pressure vessel design:
Pr
t︸︷︷︸
σh
−St ≤ 0
−r + 5t ≤ 0
r + t− 40 ≤ 0
2r + l + 2t− 150 ≤ 0
(5.39)
The first constraint ensures hoop stress, σh, at pressure, P , does not exceed the strength of
the pressure vessel, St. The second constraint enforces the thin-walled assumption. The
final constraints limit the total width and length of the pressure vessel, respectively. We
140
consider material density, pressure, and strength fixed with values in Table 5.6.
In this case study, SUB 1 has final authority on the radius, r, and length, l, so
x1 = [r, l]. SUB 2 has final authority on the thickness, t, so x2 = t. Therefore, the pressure
vessel design after each iteration is x∗q = [x
∗
1(q), x
∗
2(q)]. Since the volume analysis func-
tion is only dependent on two variables, SUB 1 generates two derivatives to approximate
his analysis function for SUB 2 such that ng = 2 for SUB 1. Furthermore, the weight
analysis function is dependent on all three variables so SUB 2 generates three derivatives
to approximate his analysis function for SUB 1 such that ng = 3 for SUB 2. Derivatives
are computed numerically using the forward finite difference method with a step size of
0.00001 so that, for example, the volume gradient with respect to radius is the following:
∂y1
∂r
=
y1(r + 0.00001, t, l)− y1(r, t, l)
0.00001
(5.40)
Figure 5.12 shows the final attribute values for each game state and how system
value changes with design iteration, q. We see that if at least one SUB shares model
information, the result is close to the case where both SUBs share model information.
Table 5.7 confirms this. Therefore, there are similar incentives to free-ride and compensate
for a free-rider as with the first test problem in the previous section. Table 5.7 also lists the
number of design iterations for convergence, q∗, for computing cost in Eq. 5.35. These
values are cross-referenced with the bottom plot in Fig. 5.12. The values in Table 5.7
are used with Eqs. 5.11, 5.12, and 5.35 to compute each SUB’s expected utility given the
Variable Ratio formulation and Piece Rate formulation. The MATLAB code for this study
is given in Appendices D.3–D.5.
5.5.2 Results
The response correspondence for the collaboration game with the pressure vessel
example is given in Fig. 5.13. In Fig. 5.13, we see that the Variable Ratio and Piece
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Figure 5.12: (TOP) Location of final pressure vessel attribute values for each game state.
(BOTTOM) Ex post system value, vs, as it converges with design iteration in each game
state.
Rate incentive formulations yield different Nash equilibria. In the case of the Variable
Ratio, SUB 1 should not collaborate but SUB 2 should such that the Nash equilibrium
of the collaboration game is 〈0, 1〉. This result suggests that SUB 1 should essentially
free-ride, and SUB 2 should essentially compensate for SUB 1’s free-riding by providing
his approximated model information. In the case of the Piece Rate, the Nash equilibrium
is mixed such that each SUB collaborates with a probability of 0.92. Since the incentive
formulations yield different Nash equilibria, the results of the pressure vessel study support
142
Table 5.7: Iteration to convergence, q∗, and utility, UB, for each game state.
Game State q∗ UB
〈1, 1〉 5 0.6392
〈1, 0〉 15 0.6390
〈0, 1〉 9 0.6371
〈0, 0〉 1 0.4992
the comparative analysis made earlier in the chapter.
5.6 Discussion
The comparative analyses shows that the normative outcome in the form of a Nash
equilibrium of the collaboration game in Table 5.1 varies with the following:
• Incentive formulation
• Cost of collaboration
• System utility scaling scheme
• Analysis models involved
The fact that the normative outcome to the collaboration game differs with incentive for-
mulation support the results on effort provision that the incentive formulations should in-
duce different behavior. The influence of collaboration cost on the equilibrium is intuitive:
higher costs make collaboration more unattractive. Since collaboration in our context in-
volves sharing models, reducing the cost to create these models works towards reducing
collaboration cost. One approach is to generate an approximation of a model: ECO in-
volves sharing linear approximations, CSSO and ASO involve sharing surrogate models,
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Figure 5.13: Response correspondence with the Nash equilibria generated from the Vari-
able Ratio and Piece Rate incentive formulations.
the MADD method involves formulating a surrogate model from random sample points,
and the CHY method involves sharing quadratic approximations. The trade-off to this ap-
proach is that approximations can have a lot of error as we move away from the set of
points from which a model is generated and effort is needed to update the approximations
given new information, which effectively spreads collaboration costs across multiple it-
erations. It is not immediately clear how engineers would choose between accruing high
model generation costs upfront or accrue model updating costs over time; this is left for
future work.
What is perhaps less immediately intuitive is the role of utility scaling and the prop-
erties of the intrinsic characteristics of the problem. Consider the feasible Y1×Y2 spaces
for each formulation shown in Figs. 5.3 and 5.4. We see that with the scaling shown in
Fig. 5.3, the maximum system utility obtainable is UB = 0.5, which means the maximum
probability of getting K1 reward units with a Variable Ratio structure is 0.5. Therefore,
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equal "weighting" is placed on SUB i’s utility for the net reward Kˆ1 − θci = Kˆ1(1 − ρˆ)
as with SUB i’s utility of the cost −θci , but due to aversion towards costs–characterized by
λ > 1 in Eq. 4.17–even more "weighting" is placed on the utility of cost, which is negative
due to the utility model in Eq. 4.17. By using the second scaling regime, the maximum
feasible probability is 1, and thus greater "weighting" can be placed on the positive aspect
of collaboration of getting Kˆ1 reward units. The problem characteristics in Fig. 5.4 shows
that the problem formulation with Eq. 5.27 allows for a higher feasible system utility given
the first scaling regime, thus mitigating the problem with the formulation in Eq. 5.26 at
least to a certain relative collaboration cost.
The above observation suggests the need for intelligent scaling. Recall, we use scal-
ing on the system utility function so that it can act as a probability function for the Vari-
able Ratio structure. Intelligent scaling requires some knowledge of the feasible space,
which is defined by physics or other uncontrollable factors. Malak and Paredis provide a
support vector domain description approach for SUBs to abstract their feasible attribute
space, which may composed to generate an aggregate space such as those in Figs. 5.3 and
5.4 [158]. Galvan and Malak provide an efficient algorithm for generating sets from which
to generate support vector domain descriptions, thus moving toward minimizing a SUB’s
costs for creating this model [171]. With such abstractions, SYS’s information load is less
than communicating full subsystem analysis models up, and she is given some insight into
the system design problem characteristics to aid in intelligent scaling for effective incen-
tives. With the intelligent scaling schemes resulting in Figs. 5.8 and 5.10, the Variable
Ratio structure does just as well or surpasses the Piece Rate in motivating collaboration.
We discussed with the test problems that use the analysis function in Eq. 5.26 and
with the pressure vessel study that if a SUB believes the other SUB will collaborate, he
has an incentive to not collaborate. Conversely, if a SUB believes the other SUB will not
collaborate, he might have an incentive to collaborate if the cost of collaboration is smaller
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than the increase in reward from not collaborating. This type of behavior is similar to the
free rider problem, wherein a person benefits from something without paying for it [172].
In Fig. 5.3, one of the SUB’s can effectively let the other SUB "pay" to receive the highest
reward payout. Therefore, a SUB has an incentive to free ride, or to act in a way that
looks like free riding, in terms of information sharing or an incentive to compensate for
(perceived) free riding by the other SUB in that specific test case, but which depends on
his beliefs of what other SUBs will do. In terms of system value, one SUB "free riding"
has no effect on system value, so this type of free riding does not necessarily have a
negative effect on system value. However, both SUBs "free riding" negatively impacts
SYS’s utility, cf. Fig. 5.3. We see in Figs. 5.7 and 5.8 that the probability that the SUBs
will collaborate decreases as collaboration cost increases. With larger collaboration costs,
the increase in reward payout probably does not compensate for the cost of collaboration,
and thus SUBs have less of an incentive to compensate for free-riding. Choice of incentive
structure and utility scaling seem to mitigate the problem of all SUBs being more likely to
not collaborate.
The caveat to the results in this chapter is that the normative solution to the collabo-
ration game in the test examples is from the perspective of an omniscient observer that can
perfectly observe the outcome of each game state. Alternatively, this analysis reflects the
case where engineers know perfectly how collaborating or not affects their utility. Austin-
Breneman et al. observe in their study on student design teams that many of the design
teams did not communicate or discuss gradient information that could help each sub-team
work towards the overall team’s goals [51]. While Austin-Breneman et al. state the reason
for this is unknown, the models in this chapter produce similar behavior where our math-
ematical SUBs would more likely not share model information (such as gradients). This
behavior stems, in part, from the interaction of the benefits and costs associated with infor-
mation sharing. Therefore, engineers balancing the benefits with the costs of information
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sharing offers one interpretation for the results in Austin-Breneman’s et al. study.
5.7 Chapter Summary
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is all about building foundational knowledge
on the performance of our two incentive structures, but this time we look at their ability to
motivate collaboration. We define collaboration as model sharing between SUBs that have
coupled design problem. We do not take for granted that a given SUB is willing to share
model information because there can be costs or other aversions toward creating models
for other’s use.
Taking the hint from examining incentive performance in the effort provision prob-
lem, we hypothesize in the introduction section of this chapter that the two different incen-
tive structures would induces different collaboration decisions, and equivalency between
the two incentive structures breaks down and deviates from Theorem 8. From the compar-
ative study on what SUBs should do given each incentive structure in the face of collab-
oration costs, we see that there are cases where one incentive structure induces a higher
probability for full collaboration than the other at the same collaboration cost.
Which incentive structure induces a higher probability for full collaboration depends
on how SYS scales the central system value function through a positive affine transforma-
tion, as we discuss in the previous section. Therefore, a new hypothesis generated from
the theoretical work in this chapter is that system-level managers or stakeholders can in-
fluence collaborative behavior through scaling the central utility function, which is in turn
the base of each incentive structure.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Introduction to the Chapter
This chapter concludes the dissertation with a look back on the research and results
contained herein. The purpose of this dissertation is to lay the foundation for Value-Driven
Delegated Design (VD3), an extension to Value-Driven Design that sees design decision-
making authority in the hands of disparate domain experts. The common theme in this
dissertation is that the domain experts act in a way that is beneficial to them and that with
actions come costs. In laying this foundation, the specific objectives of this dissertation are
twofold: (1) formulate sound incentives and (2) evaluate these incentives when decisions
makers consider their personal costs. This dissertation addresses these research issues us-
ing mathematical frameworks for both analytical and numerical analyses. The next section
revisits the two research issues and the implications of the analyses. Following is a list of
the contributions generated from this dissertation, and finally a conceptual framework for
Value-Driven Delegated Design rooted in the results from this work that paints the path
for future research.
6.2 Revisiting the Research Issues
6.2.1 Research Issue 1: Incentive Formulation
The first objective of this research is to formulate effective incentives such that max-
imizing an engineer’s incentive maximizes system value. Four incentive structures are in-
vestigated in Chapter 3 through the lens the vNM decision theory summarized in Chapter
2. While we threw out the Flat Rate structure immediately, we draw parallels between the
Quota and the Variable Ratio structures with the use of targets or requirements and draw
a parallel between the Piece Rate structure with the use of objective functions. Where the
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Quota structure relies on a deterministic target, much like the current practice of require-
ment flow-down, the Variable Ratio structure relies on a stochastic target, the cumulative
distribution function of which can be synonymous with a utility function. The Piece Rate
structure, however, relies a performance function, i.e. objective function.
The investigation in Chapter 3 supports two promising incentive structures: (1) the
Variable Ratio structure that uses the system-level utility function as a CDF for an uncer-
tain target–see Eq. 3.16–and (2) the Piece Rate structure that uses the system-level utility
function as the objective function for the subsystem-level design problem–see Eq. 3.23.
As mentioned, the Variable Ratio structure originates from a requirements perspective, and
the Piece Rate structure originates from an objective function perspective. The expected
value of the Variable Ratio structure is mathematical equivalent to the Piece Rate struc-
ture, and thus the only difference between the two is the interpretation of the system utility
function, i.e. as a CDF for an uncertain target or as an objective function.
From the Variable Ratio incentive formulation using a utility function to define the
probability of meeting an uncertain target, we are effectively proposing using the utility
function elicitation framework for defining uncertain targets. Prior work on normative
decision theory draws parallels between a utility function and
The journey to the final formulations of the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentives
proposed in Chapter 3 yields some insight into the possible incompatibilities between
using requirements and maximizing system value. Current best practicing for writing re-
quirements prescribe that each requirement statement should be independent of the others.
However, Chapter 3 shows that an orthogonal target region created by independent require-
ments can violate the notion that all designs inside the target region are more preferable
than those outside of the target region. This observation in conjunction with the fact that
the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate formulations are based off of a utility model supports the
wider VDD hypothesis that using objective functions supports value maximization better
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than using requirements.
6.2.2 Research Issue 2: Incentive Evaluation
The second research objective is all about evaluating the Variable Ratio and Piece
Rate incentive structures when these incentives formulate only a single element of an en-
gineer’s decision model. Other elements considered are risk attitude and the engineer’s
personal action costs needed to maximize their incentive. In this dissertation, we con-
sider two types of "actions": (1) expending effort to search for a design solution and (2)
collaborating with other engineers by sharing model information.
In the benchmark case where an engineer does not consider his personal costs, both
incentive structures reduce to yield the same objective function for the engineer, and thus
would produce the same value. Theorem 8 states that the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate
incentive formulations are equivalent given some sufficient conditions. By evaluating the
incentive structures when costs are included, we are seeking if the two incentive structure
are still equivalent, and if not, which incentive formulation yields greater system utility
for the SYS. Specifically for effort provision, analysis determines under what risk and ef-
fort cost characteristics one incentive induces greater effort to search for a design solution.
Similarly for collaboration provision, analysis determines which incentive induces col-
laboration under different design problem characteristics, collaboration costs, and system
utility formulations.
Two models are formulated for effort provision evaluation and collaboration pro-
vision analysis respectively. These models are built upon prior results from the design
engineering literature, and used in numerical studies to compare the two incentive struc-
tures. In Chapter 4, we find the incentive structures do not induce the same effort provi-
sion. However, which incentive induces greater effort is predicted to be dependent on the
behavioral characteristics of the designer, including risk attitude, cost aversion, and effort
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evaluation. Analysis suggests that at low effort evaluation and if designers are risk taking
for costs and risk averse for rewards, the Variable Ratio structure induces greater effort.
As collaboration analysis in Chapter 5 shows, engineers have a clear incentive to
collaborate with both incentive structures if there is no cost to collaborate. As the cost to
collaborate increases, however, which incentive this is depends on the characteristics of
the system design problem. Analysis suggests that which incentives better motivates col-
laboration depends on how the system utility function is scaled. Since there are conditions
where one or both of the incentive formulation induce collaboration, MDO architectures
that rely on collaboration–i.e. model sharing–between subsystems are not ruled out as pos-
sible analogies for how to structure the system design process. This observation coupled
with the fact that both incentive structures are formulated using the system-level objec-
tive function, the Concurrent Subspace Optimization, Asymmetric Subspace Optimiza-
tion, and Enhanced Collaborative Optimization MDO architectures may be appropriate
architectures to coordinate distributed system design.
6.3 Contributions
The work in this dissertation is a conduit from existing results to their implications
toward systems engineering and Value-Driven Delegated Design, in particular. As a side
effect, this dissertation offers contributions in a number of areas relevant for systems en-
gineering and research. This contributions are listed below.
6.3.1 Support for Value-Driven Design
• In Chapter 3, we formulate two incentive structures that theoretically incentivize
subsystem engineers and domain experts to make design decisions in the best inter-
est of overall system utility. The Variable Ratio and Piece Rate incentive structures
are both built on the central, system utility function, and constitute profit sharing.
The treatment of a utility model as a probability distribution for reward payout con-
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stitutes a novel formulation of the general Variable Ratio incentive structure, and
we effectively propose using the utility function elicitation framework for modeling
uncertain targets.
• This dissertation offers support to the wider VDD hypothesis that model-based
communication, e.g. communicating utility models to guide design activities,
supports value maximization better than point-based communication, e.g. com-
municating with targets. Both of the incentive structure formulations proposed in
this dissertation rely on system-level managers or engineers making the system-level
utility model available to subsystem-level engineers.
• This dissertation also offers support to the wider VDD hypothesis that multidis-
ciplinary design optimization (MDO) architectures could serve as frameworks for
conducting system design. Both of the promising incentives formulated in this dis-
sertation complement the subsystem design problem formulations in the Concur-
rent Subspace Optimization and Asymmetric Subspace Optimization MDO archi-
tectures.
• By virtue of the observations made in Chapter 3, this dissertation offers a new hy-
pothesis for VDD and VD3 that the objective function for subsystem design prob-
lems should mirror that of the central system value function. Alternatively, the
general objective of subsystem engineers should be the same as the general objective
of the engineering firm.
• This dissertation offers a new perspective on the systems engineering design pro-
cess such that this process is itself an economy where goods and services are traded
and consumed by the agents in the systems engineering design process. However,
the work in this dissertation suggests that there is no one optimal way to control
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this economy. However, the optimal control mechanism is dependent on the interac-
tion of the heterogeneous agents within the economy and the characteristics of the
system design problem.
6.3.2 Hypotheses for Future Human Studies
• Firstly, analyses in this dissertation generate the hypothesis that if decisions makers
do not consider their action costs, the Variable Ratio and Piece Rate structures will
induce similar performance results. Testing this hypothesis will reveal if action costs
are necessary to be considered in models for engineering agents. If the Variable
Ratio and Piece Rate incentives produce significantly different results in a human
study, then support is given to modeling engineers’ personal costs to understand
how they take action.
• Results from analyses in Chapter 4 provide hypothetical correlations between behav-
ioral parameters and which of the incentive structures formulated in this dissertation
induced greater effort provision toward a design task. Validating these correlations
with human studies will provide a reference for engineering managers on which
incentive approach may be appropriate for their specific engineering design teams.
• Results from analyses in Chapter 5 provide hypothetical correlations between col-
laboration costs, utility formulation, and which of the incentive structures formu-
lated in this dissertation are more likely to induce collaboration–i.e. model sharing–
between two engineers. Validating these correlations with human studies will pro-
vide a reference for engineering managers on which incentive approach may be
appropriate to induce collaboration among their design teams given characteristics
of the system design problem.
153
6.3.3 Models for Systems Engineering Research
• Built upon empirical work from the engineering design literature, Chapter 4 con-
tributes a model for designer effort provision, both conceptual and parameterized,
and demonstrates its use in simulating a designer searching for a design solution, in
the form of a vehicle transmission design. This model, at the very least, contributes
a way of thinking about the relationship between a designer’s effort and how they
choose to apply that effort toward a design solution.
• The collaboration game formulated in Chapter 5 contributes a model that unites
the Collaborative, Sequential, and Isolated designer interaction models originally
formulated by Lewis and Mistree [74, 75] by allowing the designers in the game to
choose which scenario they would prefer. This framework is useful for future work
on evaluating incentive effectiveness under different modes of collaboration.
6.4 Limitations and Future Work
The work presented in this dissertation is focused on the mathematical foundations
for a VD3 framework, and therefore focus lies on the mathematical formulation for in-
centives rather than the practical deployment thereof. We discuss in Chapter 2 that in-
centive need not be financial, but it is unclear how we should balance possible financial
rewards with more qualitative rewards, such as greater recognition or responsibility, when
deploying the proposed incentives. Resolving the deployment and operationalization prob-
lem opens the path for collaborative research between engineering and social science re-
searchers.
Another interesting path for future collaborative research between engineering and
social science researchers is investigating if the differences in effort and collaboration pro-
vision predicted in this dissertation can be induced solely through framing. Both incentive
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structures use a utility function, but the interpretation of this utility function varies with
the incentive structure. It is unclear if just communicating a specific interpretation–e.g.
a CDF for an uncertain target or an objective function–will induce similar difference as
shown in this dissertation. If so, then the mathematical formulations of the Variable Ratio
and Piece Rate incentives prevalent in this research may not need to correspond to actual
incentives for engineers but rather different frames of a communicated utility model.
The major limitation of generalizing the results of the effort provision analysis is
the validity of the effort provision model. The mathematical analysis represents a nor-
mative perspective on effort provision, i.e. analyzing how much effort a SUB should
provide given an incentive structure and effort costs. Care is taken to build intuition into
model element properties from empirical studies in the engineering design literature so
the normative model includes behavioral characteristics, but these studies are not neces-
sarily designed to generate analytical models of human behavior. The only way to verify
or discredit the hypotheses generated from this normative perspective on effort provision
is through human studies, which provides ample activities for future research.
Similar to the effort provision study, analysis of the collaboration game is made from
a normative perspective, i.e. analyzing if each SUB should collaborate. This normative
analysis is made by homogenizing the behavioral elements of two SUBs, such as risk
attitude characteristics, and assuming that we know the effects of collaboration, i.e. we
know how much better off the SUBs will be if they collaborate. In actuality, SUBs can have
heterogeneous characteristics and have varying beliefs for how collaboration will impact
their utility. For tractability, this dissertation does not consider these variations to the
general collaboration game but recognizes they may be significant. However, expanding
analysis on the collaboration game including (1) more than two SUBs, (2) heterogeneous
SUB behavioral characteristics, and (3) various levels of model sharing provide a rich and
expansive area for future research.
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Figure 6.1: Delegation in systems engineering.
6.5 Towards a Framework for Value-Driven Delegated Design
To conclude this dissertation, we now discuss the implications of the foundational
research presented in this document on a framework for Value-Driven Delegated Design
(VD3), and thus provide a pathway for future research to explicitly formalize a VD3 frame-
work complete with the model-based tools and techniques to support delegated decision
making in large, complex system design with a Value-Driven bent. Figure 6.1 shows an
abstraction of the basic system design process and will act as a reference for relating the
results of this dissertation with a framework for VD3.
Step 1 shown in Fig. 6.1 is where system-level stakeholders formulate the central
system value/utility model to direct system design decisions. This model goes on to form
the basis of our two incentives formulated in this dissertation, which subsequently sub-
sumes Step 4 in Fig. 6.1. Future research is needed on techniques to communicate this
156
model. The central system value model may contain proprietary information that needs to
be abstracted away before communication. Various surrogate modeling techniques come
with different modeling errors, and it is unclear how these modeling errors would influ-
ence the behaviors of subsystem designers, if at all. Additionally, SysML is rising as a
formal language to communicate systems aspects and establish a single source of truth for
system design, but it is unclear how to model a value function in the SysML language as
SysML largely uses the terminology of requirements and constraints; perhaps requirement
diagrams can be co-opted for value modeling.
In Chapter 5, we show that how we scale the central system utility function for incen-
tive formulation normatively influences collaboration between subsystem designers, and
intuitively, having some information about the decision space aids in intelligently scaling
the system utility model. This information is a product of Step 2 in Fig. 6.1. Malak and
Paredis provide a support vector domain description approach for subsystem designers to
abstract their feasible attribute space, and Galvan and Malak provide an efficient algorithm
for generating sets from which to generate support vector domain descriptions [171]. How-
ever, we need an efficient program to aggregate the subsystem attribute spaces to generate
a complete view of the predicted feasible region for the system, thus giving insight into
the system design problem a stakeholder can use to intelligently formulate utility models
for incentive structures.
Both of our incentive structures are built directly from the system-level utility func-
tion such that as SUB maximizes his incentive payout, he simultaneously maximizes sys-
tem utility. This approach of effectively flowing down the central utility/value function is
similar to the the Concurrent Subspace Optimization, Asymmetric Subspace Optimization,
and Enhanced Collaborative Optimization MDO architectures. Given the similarities be-
tween our incentive formulations and the sub-discipline objective function in these archi-
tectures, they appear to be a promising architectures to coordinate the activities of subsys-
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tem designers as they solve their subsystem design problems in Step 5 of Fig. 6.1. Future
research should expand the work in this dissertation to specifically investigate these MDO
architectures as a human-driven, rather than purely computational, process to determine,
among other things, how the effectiveness of these architectures scales with increasing the
number of human decision makers.
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APPENDIX A
EXPECTED UTILITY AND PROBABILITY OF MEETING UNCERTAIN TARGET
EQUIVALENCY PROOF
Proof. Consider a utility function, U , that is monotonic with over its domain and scaled
between 0 and 1 through positive affine transformation. Additionally, u is the derivative of
U . Consider a decision outcome is random such that Z ∼ φ, and a target is random such
that T ∼ u(t). Z and T are independent.
Pr(Z ≥ T ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ z
−∞
u(t)φ(z) dt dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(z)
∫ z
−∞
u(t) dt dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
U(z)φ(z) dz = E[U(Z)]
Now consider the following:
Pr(Z ≥ T ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ z
−∞
u(t)φ(z) dt dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
t
u(t)φ(z) dz dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(t)
∫ ∞
t
φ(z) dz dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(t)(1− Φ(t)) dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u(t) dt−
∫ ∞
−∞
u(t)Φ(t)) dt
= 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
u(t)Φ(t) dt
Therefore, E[U(Z)] =
∫∞
−∞ U(z)φ(z) dz = 1−
∫∞
−∞Φ(t)u(t) dt = Pr(Z ≥ T ).
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APPENDIX B
BENCHMARKING PROOFS
B.1 Piece Rate Incentive Formulation with Risk Neutral SYS
Proof. Consider a risk neutral utility function, U(vs−vPRi ), such that U = a(vs−vPRi )+b
where a > 0 and b are constants. Consider a decision maker with the Piece Rate incentive
structure in Eq. 3.23.
vPRi = K
PR
1 E[U0(vs − vPRi )] +KPR2
= KPR1 (E[avs − avPRi + b]) +KPR2
= KPR1 (aE[vs]− avPRi + b) +KPR2
= aKPR1 E[vs]− aKPR1 E[vPRi ] + bKPR1 +KPR2
(1 + aKPR1 )E[v
PR
i ] = K
PR
1 (aE[vs] + b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[UB(vs)]
+KPR2
E[vPRi ] =
KPR1
1 + aKPR1
E[UB(vs)] +
KPR2
1 + aKPR1
B.2 Variable Ratio Incentive Formulation with Risk Neutral SYS
Proof. Consider a risk neutral utility function, U(vs−vV Ri ), such that U = a(vs−vV Ri )+b
where a > 0 and b are constants. Consider a decision maker with the Variable Ratio
179
incentive structure in Eq. 3.16.
E[vV Ri ] = E[U0(vs − vV Ri )]KV R1 + (1− E[U0(vs − vV Ri )])KPR2
= (KV R1 −KV R2 )E[U0(vs − vV Ri )] +KPR2
= (KV R1 −KV R2 )(E[avs − avPRi + b]) +KV R2
= (KV R1 −KV R2 )(aE[vs]− aE[vPRi ] + b) +KV R2
= (KV R1 −KV R2 )(aE[vs] + b)
− a(KV R1 −KV R2 )E[vV Ri ] +KV R2
(1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 ))E[vV Ri ] = (KV R1 −KV R2 )(aE[vs] + b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[UB(vs)]
+KV R2
E[vV Ri ] =
(KV R1 −KV R2 )
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
E[UB(vs)] +
KV R2
1 + a(KV R1 −KV R2 )
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APPENDIX C
EFFORT AVERSION SUPPLEMENTALS
C.1 SVDD: Risk Attitude Characterization
W q γ Support Vectors, xSV
0.8547 2
0.0782 0.5745 -0.116 0.3535
0.0904 -0.3723 -0.3923 0.8384
0.0781 0.5319 0.0608 -1.0000
0.0727 0.2128 -0.547 1.0000
0.0417 0.6064 -1 -0.1804
0.1216 -1 -0.0276 -0.0765
0.1038 1 -0.7017 -0.8384
0.8547 2
0.0693 -0.4362 -0.6022 -0.4228
0.0365 0.2766 0.0276 -0.4949
0.0483 0.5957 -0.8343 0.2641
0.0972 0.8617 0.9669 -0.9192
0.1064 0.8404 1 -0.1573
0.0030 0.4894 -0.547 -0.9365
0.0529 0.0106 -0.9227 -0.4228
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C.2 Vehicle Dynamics MATLAB Model
function dx = simulator2(t,y,z,H,M)
% dx = [dx dv dV]
% x = [ x v V];
% Simulate Vehicle
% Parse Inputs %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Dynamic Inputs
x = y(1); % [m] Distance
v = y(2); % [m/s] Velocity
m = y(3); % [kg] Mass
V = y(4); % [m^3] Fuel Consumption
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Constants %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Vehicle
R = 0.305; % [m] Tire Radius
%m = 1347.1; % [kg] Initial Vehicle Mass
Ad = 2; % [m^2] Frontal Area
Cd = 0.4; % Drag Coefficient
Cr = 0.01; % Rolling Resistance
% Fuel
rhof = 718.95; % [kg/m^3] Fuel Density
% Environment
g = 9.81; % [m/s^2] Gravitation Acceleration
rho = 1.2041; % [kg/m^3] Air Density
% Engine Performance
Pim = 160*745.7; % [N*m/s] Max Engine Power
wo = 4200*0.1047; % [rad/s] Speed at Max Engine Power
% Mechanical Transmission
if v <= 4.47
Xit = z(1);
elseif (v > 4.47) && (v <= 8.49)
Xit = z(2);
elseif (v > 8.49) && (v <= 12.5)
Xit = z(3);
elseif (v > 12.5) && (v <= 17.5)
Xit = z(4);
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else
Xit = z(5);
end
% Gear Ratios
xid = 3.55;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Throttle Controller %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Desired Speed [m/s]
vd = interp1(M(:,1),M(:,2),t);
% Controller
theta = (vd - v);
if theta > 1
theta = 1;
elseif theta < -1
theta = -1;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Fuel Consumption Dynamics %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Engine Speed and Torque
we = xid*Xit*v/R;
Te = theta*(Pim/wo + Pim/wo^2*we - Pim/wo^3*we^2);
% BSFC Map
n = (we - 50)/(2*pi); % Unit Correction and Scaling
Th = 6*Te - 1200; % Unit Correction and Scaling
ge = H(1) + H(2)*n + H(3)*Th + H(4)*n^2 + H(5)*n*Th...
+ H(6)*Th^2;
ge = (ge/6 + 350)/1000/1000/60/60; % Unit Correction
% Fuel Consuption
dm = Te*we*ge;
dV = dm/rhof;
if dV < 0
dV = 0;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Vehicle Dynamics %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
T = xid*Xit*Te;
dx = v;
dv = T/R/m - (rho*Cd*Ad/2/m)*v^2 - Cr*g;
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Output %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
dx = [dx dv dm dV]';
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
end
C.3 Vehicle System Utility MATLAB Model
function EU = designCar_Fast(z,H,HWY)
% Loop through Uncertainty %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Set Loop Variables
n = size(H,1);
u = zeros(n,1);
% Begin Loop
for i = 1:n
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Highway Fuel Economy %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[~,YOUTH] = ode23(@(t,y)simulator2(t,y,z,H(i,:),HWY),...
HWY(1:end,1),[0;0;1347.1;0]);
mpg(1) = fuelEcon(YOUTH(end,1),YOUTH(end,4));
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Compute Utility %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Value
u(i) = (1500*mpg - 1500*20)/(1500*50 - 1500*20);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% End Loop %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% End Loop
end
% Expectation
EU = mean(u);
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
end
function mpg = fuelEcon(x,V)
mpg = x*0.001/(V*1000)*2.35;
end
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APPENDIX D
COLLABORATION AVERSION SUPPLEMENTALS
D.1 Computing Nash Equilibria with the QRE Example Code: run.m
% Player 1's Payoff Matrix
p1 = [[ 2 0 ];
[ 0 1 ]];
% Player 2's Payoff Matrix
p2 = [[ 1 0 ];
[ 0 2 ]];
lam = 7; % Choose some lambda value
% Run Solver
for i = 1:length(lam)
[x,feval] = fsolve(@(x)QRE(x,lam(i),p1,p2),[0;0]);
psi(i) = x(1);
phi(i) = x(2);
end
D.2 Computing Nash Equilibria with the QRE Example Code: QRE.m
function F = QRE(x,lam,p1,p2)
psi = x(1); % Probability of P2 choosing 1
phi = x(2); % Probability of P1 choosing 1
% Expected Utility of Player 1 Choosing 1
Eu(1,1) = psi*p1(1,1) + (1 - psi)*p1(1,2);
% Expected Utility of Player 1 Choosing 2
Eu(1,2) = psi*p1(2,1) + (1 - psi)*p1(2,2);
% Expected Utility of Player 2 Choosing 1
Eu(2,1) = phi*p2(1,1) + (1 - phi)*p2(2,1);
% Expected Utility of Player 2 Choosing 2
Eu(2,2) = phi*p2(1,2) + (1 - phi)*p2(2,2);
% Probability of P1 Choosing 1
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P(1) = exp(lam*Eu(1,1))/(exp(lam*Eu(1,1)) + exp(lam*Eu(1,2)));
% Probability of P2 Choosing 1
P(2) = exp(lam*Eu(2,1))/(exp(lam*Eu(2,1)) + exp(lam*Eu(2,2)));
% Functions
F(1) = P(1) - phi;
F(2) = P(2) - psi;
end
D.3 Pressure Vessel Study Run Code
%% System Parameter Values
S_t = 35E3; % Maximum Tensile Stress [psi]
rho = 0.283; % Material Density [lb*in^-3]
P = 3890; % Pressure [psi]
%% Lower and Upper Design Variable Bounds and Constraints
% [ r t l]
LB = [0.1 0.5 0.1]';
UB = [36 6.0 140]';
A = [P -S_t 0;-1 5 0;1 1 0;2 2 1];
b = [0;0;40;150];
%% System Contour
% System Value
v = linspace(0,5e5);
w = linspace(0,4.5e4);
[V1,W2] = meshgrid(v,w);
vs = sysValue(V1,W2);
% Plot
figure(1)
contour(V1,W2,vs,'ShowText','on')
xlabel('$y_1$','Interpreter','latex')
ylabel('$y_2$','Interpreter','latex')
set(1,'units','inches','pos',[0 0 4 3])
set(findall(1,'-property','FontSize'),'FontSize',10)
%% Initialize Parameters
clear r; clear l; clear t; clear W; clear V;
x0(1,:) = [36 0.5 1];
% QRE Parameter
mu = 10;
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% Payoff Matrices
v1 = zeros(2,2,2);
v2 = v1;
% Define Utility Parameters
Rp = 0.345;
Rn = -0.322;
lam = 2.16;
% Define Incentive Parameter
K1 = 1000;
% Predefine Expected Utilities from each incentive
VR = @(v,c) v*valuePow(K1 - c,Rp,Rn,lam)...
+ (1 - v)*valuePow(-c,Rp,Rn,lam); % Variable Ratio
PR = @(v,c) valuePow(K1*v - c,Rp,Rn,lam); % Piece Rate
%% Monolithic
[xM,feval] = fmincon(@(x)-sysValue(vol(x(1),x(2),x(3)),...
wgt(x(1),x(2),x(3),rho)),x0(1,:),A,b,[],[],LB,UB);
vM = vol(xM(1),xM(2),xM(3));
wM = wgt(xM(1),xM(2),xM(3),rho);
VM = sysValue(vM,wM);
%% Collaborative
% Iterate SUB Interaction
for i = 1:5
x1 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB1(x,x0(i,:),1),x0(i,:),A,b,[],[],LB,UB);
x2 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB2(x,x0(i,:),1),x0(i,:),A,b,[],[],LB,UB);
x0(i+1,:) = [x1(1) x2(2) x1(3)];
vC = vol(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3));
wC = wgt(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3),rho);
VC(i) = sysValue(vC,wC);
end
q = 5;
% SUB 1 Expected Utilities
v1(1,1,1) = VR(VC(q),q*3);
v1(1,1,2) = PR(VC(q),q*3);
% SUB 2 Expected Utilities
v2(1,1,1) = VR(VC(q),q*4);
v2(1,1,2) = PR(VC(q),q*4);
%% Noncollaborative
% Iterate SUB Interaction
for i = 1:1
x1 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB1(x,x0(i,:),0),x0(i,:),...
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A,b,[0 1 0],[x0(i,2)],LB,UB);
x2 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB2(x,x0(i,:),0),x0(i,:),...
A,b,[1 0 0;0 0 1],[x0(i,1) x0(i,3)]',LB,UB);
x0(i+1,:) = [x1(1) x2(2) x1(3)];
vN = vol(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3));
wN = wgt(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3),rho);
VN(i) = sysValue(vN,wN);
end
q = 1;
% SUB 1 Expected Utilities
v1(2,2,1) = VR(VN(q),q);
v1(2,2,2) = PR(VN(q),q);
% SUB 2 Expected Utilities
v2(2,2,1) = VR(VN(q),q);
v2(2,2,2) = PR(VN(q),q);
%% Asymmetric Collaborative - SUB 1 Collaborates
% Iterate SUB Interaction
for i = 1:15
x1 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB1(x,x0(i,:),0),x0(i,:),...
A,b,[0 1 0],[x0(i,2)],LB,UB);
x2 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB2(x,x0(i,:),1),x0(i,:),A,b,[],[],LB,UB);
x0(i+1,:) = [x1(1) x2(2) x1(3)];
vCN = vol(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3));
wCN = wgt(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3),rho);
VCN(i) = sysValue(vCN,wCN);
end
q = 15;
% SUB 1 Expected Utilities
v1(1,2,1) = VR(VCN(q),q*3);
v1(1,2,2) = PR(VCN(q),q*3);
% SUB 2 Expected Utilities
v2(1,2,1) = VR(VCN(q),q);
v2(1,2,2) = PR(VCN(q),q);
%% Asymmetric Collaborative - SUB 2 Collaborates
% Iterate SUB Interaction
for i = 1:9
x1 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB1(x,x0(i,:),1),x0(i,:),A,b,[],[],LB,UB);
x2 = fmincon(@(x)-SUB2(x,x0(i,:),0),x0(i,:),...
A,b,[1 0 0;0 0 1],[x0(i,1) x0(i,3)]',LB,UB);
x0(i+1,:) = [x1(1) x2(2) x1(3)];
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vNC = vol(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3));
wNC = wgt(x0(i+1,1),x0(i+1,2),x0(i+1,3),rho);
VNC(i) = sysValue(vNC,wNC);
end
q = 9;
% SUB 1 Expected Utilities
v1(2,1,1) = VR(VNC(q),q);
v1(2,1,2) = PR(VNC(q),q);
% SUB 2 Expected Utilities
v2(2,1,1) = VR(VNC(q),q*4);
v2(2,1,2) = PR(VNC(q),q*4);
%% Find Mixed Nash Equilibrium for Collaboration Game
for i = 1:length(mu)
[xVR,fevalVR] =...
fsolve(@(x)QRE(x,mu(i),v1(:,:,1),v2(:,:,1)),[0.5 0.5]);
[xPR,fevalPR] =...
fsolve(@(x)QRE(x,mu(i),v1(:,:,2),v2(:,:,2)),[0.5 0.5]);
psiVR(i) = xVR(1);
phiVR(i) = xVR(2);
psiPR(i) = xPR(1);
phiPR(i) = xPR(2);
end
figure(3)
plot(1,1,'k.','MarkerSize',15)
hold on
plot(0,0,'k.','MarkerSize',15)
hold on
p1=plot(phiVR,psiVR,'x',phiPR,psiPR,'o',...
'LineWidth',2,'MarkerSize',10);
h = legend(p1,'Variable Ratio','Piece Rate',...
'Location','southeast');
set(h,'Interpreter','latex')
hold off
xlabel('$\Pr(s_1=1)$','Interpreter','latex')
ylabel('$\Pr(s_2=1)$','Interpreter','latex')
set(findall(3,'-property','FontSize'),'FontSize',10)
set(3,'units','inches','pos',[0 0 4 3])
axis([-0.1 1.1 -0.1 1.1])
D.4 Pressure Vessel Study SUB 1 Function
function vs = SUB1(x,x0,s)
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% Split Inputs
r = x(1);
t = x(2);
l = x(3);
rho = 0.283; % Material Density [lb*in^-3]
% Weight
w = wgt(x0(1),x0(2),x0(3),rho);
% Compute Weight Linear Approximation
if s
dwdr = (wgt(x0(1)+0.00001,x0(2),x0(3),rho) - w)/0.00001;
dwdt = (wgt(x0(1),x0(2)+0.00001,x0(3),rho) - w)/0.00001;
dwdl = (wgt(x0(1),x0(2),x0(3)+0.00001,rho) - w)/0.00001;
w = w+dwdr*(r - x0(1))+dwdt*(t - x0(2))+dwdl*(l - x0(3));
end
% Volume
v = vol(r,t,l);
% Value
vs = sysValue(v,w);
end
D.5 Pressure Vessel Study SUB 2 Function
function vs = SUB2(x,x0,s)
% Split Inputs
r = x(1);
t = x(2);
l = x(3);
rho = 0.283; % Material Density [lb*in^-3]
% Weight
w = wgt(r,t,l,rho);
% Volume
v = vol(x0(1),x0(2),x0(3));
% Compute Volume Linear Approximation
if s
dvdr = (vol(x0(1)+0.00001,x0(2),x0(3)) - v)/0.00001;
dvdt = (vol(x0(1),x0(2)+0.00001,x0(3)) - v)/0.00001;
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dvdl = (vol(x0(1),x0(2),x0(3)+0.00001) - v)/0.00001;
v = v+dvdr*(r - x0(1))+dvdt*(t - x0(2))+dvdl*(l - x0(3));
end
% Value
vs = sysValue(v,w);
end
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